Book contents
- The Problem of Blame
- The Problem of Blame
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The Permissibility of Blame
- Chapter 1 The Problem of Blame
- Chapter 2 The Structure of Basic Desert
- Chapter 3 Blame and the Reactive Attitudes
- Chapter 4 Solving the Problem of Blame
- Part II Prescriptive Preservationism and Eliminativism
- References
- Index
Chapter 1 - The Problem of Blame
from Part I - The Permissibility of Blame
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 April 2022
- The Problem of Blame
- The Problem of Blame
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The Permissibility of Blame
- Chapter 1 The Problem of Blame
- Chapter 2 The Structure of Basic Desert
- Chapter 3 Blame and the Reactive Attitudes
- Chapter 4 Solving the Problem of Blame
- Part II Prescriptive Preservationism and Eliminativism
- References
- Index
Summary
In Chapter 1, I attempt to explicate the problem of blame by making use of an analogy with another more familiar problem relevant to permissibility and harm – the problem of punishment. I argue that this comparison serves to highlight two clear desiderata for a normatively adequate account of blame, one concerning the value of blame and another concerning desert. In this chapter, I also argue that the problem of blame concerns the reactive varieties of blame in particular, offer some principled strategies for distinguishing between reactive and nonreactive varieties of blame, and discuss the role that the negative reactive attitudes play in characterizing the former.
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- The Problem of BlameMaking Sense of Moral Anger, pp. 11 - 39Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022