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Meritocracy or Patronage?

Political Foundations of China's Economic Transition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2024

Fubing Su
Affiliation:
Vassar College
Ran Tao
Affiliation:
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Summary

This study interrogates the theoretical and empirical validities of two dominant theories about Chinese state in the post-Mao period. The authors argue that the meritocratic view has under-theorized the innate contradiction between officials' personal competence and political loyalty. In order to survive political struggles, political leaders need to rely on patronage networks to recruit followers and solidify trust, often at the expense of official competence. The popular view also misrepresents China's cadre assessment system in several important ways. The authors supplement this theoretical and anecdotal evidence with a systematic study of provincial level officials between 1978 and 2020. Contrary to the meritocratic view, leaders' economic performance does not increase their promotion chances. Work ties with central leaders, on the other hand, have provided provincial officials with advantage in promotion. This study contributes to general theories of autocratic state and inform the debate about autocratic growth in the political economy literature.
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Online ISBN: 9781009507967
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 05 December 2024

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Meritocracy or Patronage?
  • Fubing Su, Vassar College, Ran Tao, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
  • Online ISBN: 9781009507967
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Meritocracy or Patronage?
  • Fubing Su, Vassar College, Ran Tao, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
  • Online ISBN: 9781009507967
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Meritocracy or Patronage?
  • Fubing Su, Vassar College, Ran Tao, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
  • Online ISBN: 9781009507967
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