This article touches on several themes grouped around the idea of pluralism. First, I give some examples of it and justify them. Second, I assert that it must have some limits, and third, I suggest criteria to determine these limits. Here I am somewhat tentative because I am opening up areas, a line of approach which is fresh, at least in part. For this reason it is wise not to be dogmatic. I hope others will ponder my ideas and where they stand examination classify, deepen and apply them. I believe my own and others' efforts in these directions will be worth while.

The nature of Christian upbringing today needs to be redefined. There can no longer be an easy identification of Christian development with general education. Religious education within the state school systems of modern, pluralist democracies cannot be regarded as intending to nurture Christian faith. But how can Christian nurture be distinguished from good education on the one hand and indoctrination on the other?

Does ἐγώ in Rom. 7:14–25 refer to the Christian? This question, pivotal for understanding Paul's view of both man and the nature of the Christian life, has been debated throughout the history of the Christian Church. The Greek fathers generally answered ‘no’. Augustine, in his struggle against Pelagius, however, answered ‘yes’. The mediaeval Church, Luther, Calvin, and Calvinistic theology agreed. A swing of the pendulum back to the ‘pre-Christian’ view began with Pietism, and, at least on the continent, was made virtually complete with the publication of Werner Georg Kümmel's Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus in 1929. Thus in 1964 the Dutch scholar W. K. Grossouw could say ‘ … among modern exegetes an occasional one still takes up an exceptional position and understands Rom. 7:(14)–25 of the Christian existence …’ A notable more recent continental exception, though, has been the Swedish scholar Anders Nygren. A considerable number of British scholars, too, hold to the ‘Christian’ position. Notable examples would include C. E. B. Cranfield, John Murray, F. F. Bruce, C. K. Barrett, J. I. Packer, and J. D. G. Dunn.

Since 1961 Hans Urs von Balthasar has been publishing a multi-volume study with the somewhat unusual title Herrlichkeit: Eine theologische Ästhetik. Although thus far only a brief section of volume one has been translated into English, a French translation has been appearing shortly after the publication of each German volume, titled La gloire el la croix: Les aspects esthétiques de la révélation. In the second volume of Herrlichkeit, which is devoted to the manner in which a theological esthetic has been achieved in the life and thought of certain distinctive Christians, Balthasar devotes a long chapter to St. Anselm. Although Balthasar has referred to Anselm often elsewhere in his many writings, this chapter contains his most sustained analysis of Anselm. It will lie at the center of my consideration of Anselm's doctrine of the atonement in the present paper. Where appropriate, I will also consider what Balthasar has said elsewhere about Anselm, particularly to show the influence of Anselm's theory on Balthasar's own thought. My goals are twofold, to summarise Balthasar's understanding of Anselm, and to show how Balthasar uses Anselm's thought in his own trinitarian speculation on the atonement.

My aim in this paper is to explore the question of David Hume's position on the theological problem of evil. I want to determine whether Hume was of the opinion that God and evil are logically incompatible. The argument will proceed by an examination of Parts x and xi of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and a discussion of two current views of Hume's view on this matter. These are the positions of William Capitan and Nelson Pike.