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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant

Kant on Rational Sympathy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2024

Benjamin Vilhauer
Benjamin Vilhauer
Affiliation:
City University of New York, City College and Graduate Center

Summary

This Element explains Kant's distinction between rational sympathy and natural sympathy. Rational sympathy is regulated by practical reason and is necessary for adopting as our own those ends of others which are contingent from the perspective of practical rationality. Natural sympathy is passive and can prompt affect and dispose us to act wrongly. Sympathy is a function of a posteriori productive imagination. In rational sympathy, we freely use the imagination to step into others' first-person perspectives and associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to communicate their feelings. This prompts feelings in us that are like their feelings.
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Keywords

Kantsympathyempathyimaginationfirst-person perspectivecommunicationaesthetic ideasfriendshipsageimperfect duty
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
Online ISBN: 9781009371193
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 02 January 2025

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Kant on Rational Sympathy
  • Benjamin Vilhauer, City University of New York, City College and Graduate Center
  • Online ISBN: 9781009371193
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Kant on Rational Sympathy
  • Benjamin Vilhauer, City University of New York, City College and Graduate Center
  • Online ISBN: 9781009371193
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Kant on Rational Sympathy
  • Benjamin Vilhauer, City University of New York, City College and Graduate Center
  • Online ISBN: 9781009371193
Available formats
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