Our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with ‘races’ and ‘final outcomes’ of conventional theoretical approaches and start modelling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations.

The theory of regulatory competition suggests a race to the bottom of environmental standards. This theory, however, has not found much empirical support. Several attempts to account for this theoretical failure have been made in the literature, which mainly refer to the underlying assumptions of the theory. In this article, we present an alternative explanation. We argue that in reality regulatory competition is overlapped by other mechanisms affecting the adjustment of national policies. Most important are the effects emerging from regulatory cooperation at the level of the European Union (EU). To arrive at more precise theoretical predictions, we therefore not only analyze the individual effects of competition and cooperation on national policies, but also the impact of their interaction.

The aim of this article is to examine the politics of competition policy in the United Kingdom by taking into account regulatory cooperation at the European Union level. Adopting a multiple streams approach, the article follows a bottom-up approach placing domestic politics at the heart of the puzzle. The analysis leads to four conclusions. First, pace-setters, such as the UK, may not be interested in playing one dimension of the regulatory competition game, that is, trying to influence the development of EU policy. Second, incongruence between domestic and EU regimes does not necessarily produce change at the domestic level. Convergence is not a top-down process. Third, the activating stimulus for change may be external (the EU), but the process is basially of domestic politics. Fourth, to the extent that the removal of political discretion characterizes a more transparent and strictly enforced regime, British competition policy provides empirical support for the hypothesis that the interaction of regulatory competition prior to regulatory cooperation leads to convergence to the top.

This article applies regulatory competition theory to an unexplored case of competition among legal norms: asylum. The asylum case study allows for a discussion of two main assumptions of regulatory competition theory: the spontaneous emergence of competition among rules and the mechanical response of regulators to market forces. The article explains to what extent the current legal framework impacts on the emergence and development of the competitive process. This framework determines the existence of a market of legal norms, it impacts on the arbiters' mobility and on States' decision to compete. The article then addresses the mechanical vision of competition. It shows that law frames the response given by regulators to market forces. It discusses the hypothesis that competing legal rules evolve in a linear way and converge. Finally, the asylum case shows the limits of competition theory's ability to explain the evolution of law.

One school of thought in the literature on regulatory competition in environmental and consumer policy argues that inter-jurisdictional competition promotes regulatory laxity. The other highlights rent-seeking as a major driving force, implying that regulatory laxity is rare because rent-seeking is omnipresent. We observe that in most areas of environmental and consumer policy in advanced industrialized countries regulation has become much stricter since the 1970s. What then has been driving environmental and consumer risk regulation up? A popular explanation holds that large green jurisdictions have been forcing their trading partners to trade or ratchet up their regulation. In addition, political economists have developed bottom up explanations focusing on interest group politics and corporate behaviour. This article adds to the latter line by endogenising public perceptions and by exploring the effects of corporate environmental performance strategies on environmental and consumer risk policy. The empirical relevance of propositions is illustrated with case studies on growth hormones, electronic waste, and food safety.

This article analyses the conditions under which a race to the top or California effect is likely to take place. To that end, it examines two cases in which the EU restricted or threatened to restrict imports from the United States and Canada because of differences in regulatory standards. In one case, the European data protection directive, a California effect occurred. In the other case, the EU ban on hormone-treated beef, no California effect occurred. An analysis of these two cases leads to two additions to existing explanations of the California effect. The analysis also has a number of implications for the debate on the race to the bottom thesis.

As an international and interdisciplinary publication, the Journal of Public Policy is particularly grateful for the time and thought devoted to reviewing articles by the following scholars in nine countries and twelve disciplines. Professor Richard Rose, Editor