Southeast Asia's coinage during the first millenium AD is remarkably conservative and uniform. A single prototype, a silver conch and śrīvatsa coin, is the model for each mainland coinage issued over a period of more than five hundred years, from about AD 450 to 1000. (Plate 1, coin 1) Silver is by far the preferred metal for minting. Gold and copper are rarely used, and then only in late or debased issues. Most of the cointypes are limited in circulation to their place of issue, providing insight into the geographical extent of effective political control in the early states of Candra Arakan, Pyu Śrīkṣetra and Mon Dvāravatī. Weight standards are extremely variable indicating that each state had a localized currency and not one immediately acceptable on an international basis. The main exception is the Rising Sun/Śrīvatsa coinage found in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and southern Viet Nam. Unfortunately this Rising Sun coinage cannot be attributed to any mainland state with certainty.

As the title implies, this paper deals with two questions which I believe may be related to one another in significant ways. The first is the rise to power of Sūryavarman I (1002–49), to which the present study is principally devoted; and the second is the dynamics of state and political development in Angkorean Cambodia, which will be illuminated by the discussion of Sūryavarman.

One of the most frequently made remarks concerning British colonialism, both in print and in informal settings, has been the British role in bringing “law and order” to the colonies. Although serious scholarship has successfully questioned this assertion for some areas of the world, particularly India, for Burma, very little has been done. The reasons for proposing that Britain brought law, and especially order to Burma seem to stem from at least two factors. First, the study of Burmese law in the West is at best in its infancy, despite recent efforts by Burmese historians. Second, and more importantly, historians by and large have tended to ignore Burmese criteria for defining order, and have therefore misinterpreted as simple lawlessness what were on many important occasions traditional forms of expressing dissent and symptoms of social dysfunction, as well as cultural and psychological ambivalence of identity, especially amongst certain new classes created by colonialism itself. Thus what often appeared on the surface as order after so-called “pacification” and in general throughout the colonial period is an incomplete picture, for it was almost certainly as well, if not more so, the political, military, and psychological inability of the Burmese to present a united front against a technologically superior power. But because the entire colonial period cannot be dealt with here—although I suspect it would only further support the major thesis of this essay—and because the British concept of “pacification” (and as a result the literature on the subject) had established the intellectual framework and parameters for evaluating the subsequent colonial and post-independence periods, I feel it is adequate to have centered my arguments around the so-called period of “pacification” only. I intend to approach this topic by first describing briefly what we might call indigenous methods of pacification, contrast it to the general pacification policies and methods pursued by the British, observe the significance of the differences, and then conclude by showing how the coup of 1962 could be interpreted more as a resurrection than a true revolution.

For many years now, the Malaysian government's population policy has included both a growth component and a distribution component. The growth component, adopted in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971–75) and still in force, was the goal of reducing the rate of population growth from 3 per cent to 2 per cent by 1985. The distribution component, first enunciated in a coherent way in the Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, is a strategy for regional development with direct population redistribution consequences. The Third Malaysia Plan (1976–80) elaborated the population situation and goals in greater detail but their broad thrust remained essentially unchanged. The Fourth Plan (1981–85), while maintaining the target of lowered growth rates, emphasized the quality of human resources and was sanguine about the prospects for economic development far outstripping the rate of population growth. Indeed, earlier concern with unemployment had been replaced by worries about the emergence of labour shortages.

Until 1900 Dutch rule in eastern Kalimantan was little more than nominal. In January of that year, as if to indicate the rapid changes which the new century would bring to this as to other areas of the Outer Islands till then ignored, the Dutch Cabinet gave approval for the Netherlands East Indies government to intervene decisively in the affairs of the states constituting the region. During the year new contracts were signed with the rulers of these states which transferred to Dutch control the external trade upon which the states depended for much of their income. Henceforth Dutch officials would supervise the harbours and levy customs and excise; control of the salt and opium monopolies also passed to the Dutch, and, in some cases, of pawnbroking and gambling. Annual pensions were arranged for the former holders of these rights.

It is a biological fact that the health of mother and child are interdependent. The care, attention and affection given by the mother to her young offspring are of major significance in the psychobiological development of the infant and indeed, in subsequent personality development. Suggestions have been made that special attention to a pregnant woman brings double health benefits: to her as an adult member of society, and to the outcome of her pregnancy. Although childbearing is a natural process, women all over the world do not possess full faith in the ability and self-sufficiency of the human body to deliver safely a healthy baby. Pregnancy has been described as a unique and ambiguous state for women: it is not a usual condition nor a medically pathological state, so it is especially problematic. Several influences are known to affect women's pregnancy outcome. Factors relating to the mother—such as age, parity (or the number of births she has had), her age at marriage, socio-economic status such as education, occupation and income, and past obstetric history, are likely to be interdependent in their influence on pregnancy outcome. However, complications of pregnancy and delivery brought about by the interdependence of these factors can be prevented by careful antenatal care. Presumably, this type of care is closely related with modern medical science, thus only available in clinics. Consequently, the prevention of the many complications of pregnancy rests more with seeking careful antenatal care from the clinic than with any other factors.