The question of the control of corporations by the government is substantially the question of the control of business by the government, since the most important business is now carried on by corporate organizations. How far it is desirable that the state should control business is a question regarding which there is a countless variety of views. Nothing is more obvious, however, than the fact that there is a strong popular demand for extension of the control of business, especially of corporate business, by both state and national governments. The reason for this demand is apparent. It is a political axiom that the power of the sovereign must be greater than the power of any subject, otherwise the subject in his turn becomes the sovereign. It is apparent, however, from any historical observation that the nearer a subject approaches to the sovereign in power, the less stable becomes the political equilibrium.

My purpose in presenting this subject for your consideration is to indicate what, in my opinion, is the proper field for the development of administrative courts in the United States, and to that end I propose, first, to consider certain suggestions which have been made looking toward the introduction of administrative courts in this country, and then to outline briefly the need for such courts which actually exists and the functions which they should be expected to perform.

I trust that the result may be to assist in formulating a more precise definition of administrative courts and of their proper jurisdiction than has heretofore obtained and to remove some of the ambiguity which has attached to the previous presentations of the subject.

The general subject of this conference is ballot reform. A more accurate title would be Reform of the Methods of Popular Control of Government, and my topic becomes The Need of Simplification of the Method of Popular Control.

The theory of an election, I take it, is somewhat as follows: It is known that on a certain day the people are to select an officer to perform on their behalf certain duties and to hold certain powers. The office is made desirable by reason of the salary and honor and power attached to it. Various aspirants for the place come before the public by one method or another, make known their qualifications for the office, explain the policies which they desire to put into effect through the power attached to that office, and the voters go to the polls on election day and indicate on the ballot which of the aspirants they prefer.

You have been hearing about the need for a simplification of the ballot by a reduction in the number of elective offices, and the general argument for “the short ballot” is fresh in your minds. The part which has been assigned to me, as I take it, is to suggest an answer to the first question which the practical man invariably asks: “ How are you going to put this principle into operation? Just which offices will you take off the ballot and which will you leave on.”

Now I need hardly spend much time explaining that to attempt to answer this question satisfactorily I shall have to go rather far afield and discuss some things which at first sight have little to do with ballot reform. The actual shortening of the ballot in any state will require more or less extensive statutory and constitutional changes.

In seeking to discover whether we are going in the direction of the short ballot, I am not hunting for the “failures” of American democracy, but for those evidences which show that democracy is forging the instruments with which to achieve still greater things. I am attempting to find out whether we are still hopelessly involved in political tinkering and electoral futilities or are coming into a recognition of the really effective way of meeting the tremendous burden of administrative responsibilities which the epoch of social democracy has brought upon us. The age of laissez faire is dead; here and now, we are in the midst of a steady increase in governmental functions whether we like it or not. On every side, there is a pressure for a multiplication of public enterprizes, which cannot be stayed or turned aside by phrases or exclamations.

When I speak of Canadian nationalism, I mean that, for better or worse, we have on this continent, not one nation of British origin, but two nations, the one as completely resolved to go its own way as the other. Canada, like the United States, a great federation, has now nearly 8,000,000 people, about three times as many as had the United States when it became independent. Moving on its own lines, Canada is rapidly completing the apparatus of national life. It is taking steps to build a navy to be under its own control. It negotiates its own commercial treaties. Questions between Canada and other countries are settled now, not from London, but from Ottawa. The British ambassador to the United States, who is with us to-day, has a more difficult task, in some respects, than any other diplomat at Washington for he serves two nations, and not merely one.

In April, 1880, the conservative ministry which had held office for six years resigned. Of that ministry Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Beaconfield, had been the dominating spirit as well as the official head. But at the end Disraeli's government did not leave a clean slate. Indeed for the next thirty years successive British cabinets were compelled to deal with problems and policies unwillingly bequeathed to them by that ardent and imperious mind. What were then, in 1880, the major problems of foreign and colonial policy left unsolved? Secondly, have any of them been solved? And are there now new questions? So, may appear to us who sit and watch some characteristics or tendencies of recent British foreign policy.

Mr. Bryce in speaking of the constitutional changes that had occurred within the period of Mr. Gladstone's political career, said that it had been a time of wide and momentous change, both economic and political. Among the political changes the most remarkable was the democratization of the constitution by the acts of 1867 and 1885 which extended the parliamentary franchise. Of these the former, that of 1867 though not carried by Mr. Gladstone, but by the Tory ministry of 1867, was really due to the bill brought in by Mr. Gladstone in 1866 when Lord Russel was prime minister and lost in the house of commons. It went rather further than Mr. Gladstone himself had proposed. The latter measure was carried by Mr. Gladstone as prime minister in 1884-1885. Both franchise acts were accompanied by redistribution acts extinguishing small constituencies and rearranging seats according to population.

The real, purposeful preparation for a constitutional form of government in China, which forms the main theme of this paper, may be said to date only from 1908, but the need of a constitution had begun to be felt a few years before. Still older are those minor political reforms which were not at first consciously designed to pave the way for a constitutional régime, but which have had that practical effect to no small degree. A brief survey of the history of the gradual adoption of these reforms and of the rise of constitutional ideas in China may give one an insight into the character of her new régime and into some of the circumstances which must react upon its future.

To review the complete situation of a country in the space of a short article is well-nigh impossible; but the world-wide interest of the changes of China has resulted in the output of a voluminous literature, some of which well deserves attention. What follows is merely the presentation of a bird's-eye view of the Chinese government and people from a native standpoint.

The nationalism of China is characterized by a strong and influential public opinion. In order to understand the cause of this great national movement, we need a brief review of some of the chief factors which have evolved the people's feeling in recent years.

The government of Korea is in process of transition. Six years ago it was typically oriental; to-day it is essentially modern. It is Japan which has accomplished this transformation and which will doubtless in the near future perfect the governmental system which she has already outlined.

The old regime in Korea was patriarchal, modelled originally after that in China. The emperor, who was regarded almost as a sacred personality, was the sole source of all authority, executive, legislative and judicial. Under him, the highest official was the prime minister, who exercised general supervision over matters of state and court. There were, further, some half dozen heads of departments, who, together with a large number of other dignitaries, formed a deliberative council which passed upon nearly all questions of administration. In addition there were well-nigh numberless bureaus and offices.