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The Dynamic of Corporate Self-Regulation: ISO 14001, Environmental Commitment, and Organizational Citizenship Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

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Abstract

This article examines the institutional impact of environmental management systems (EMSs), focusing on ISO 14001. It develops a pluralistic framework for thinking about the dynamic of corporate self-regulation that we term the polyphonic model. It argues that the adoption of ISO 14001 can move the firm into a new equilibrium trajectory, which enmeshes together environmental and economic goals and reflects greater sensitivity to ecological concerns. There is a positive reciprocal cycle between the pro-environmental structural changes induced by ISO 14001 and the employees' attitudes toward the firm and the environment. In order to examine ISO 14001 institutional impact, we conducted a series of interviews with managers and administered questionnaires to employees in 24 Israeli firms with and without certification. The findings indicate that the perceived environmental commitment of certified firms was higher than that of noncertified firms and was higher among employees that perceived the EMS as more highly integrated in the firm. Perceptions of the standard's integration were also found to be positively correlated with personal environmental commitment. The results also indicate that the increase in the firm's environmental commitment was positively associated with employees' organizational citizenship behavior within certified firms. Further indications of the pro-environmental dynamic induced by ISO 14001 were found in the in-depth interviews.

Type
Articles
Copyright
© 2009 Law and Society Association.

Over the last years, the environmental regulation system has undergone radical changes. Various private normative schemes play an increasingly important role in this new regulatory sphere. One of the main questions raised by this process is whether, and to what extent, private regulatory arrangements can replace public regulation. The question of the efficacy of private regulatory schemes reflects a broader dilemma concerning the circumstances under which firms will take environmental actions that go beyond what is prescribed by law. This article explores this question, focusing on the ISO 14001 environmental management system (EMS), which is the most common voluntary environmental standard in the world (ISO 2008:10), serving also as the EMS of the EU eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS).Footnote 1

In exploring the puzzle of the efficacy of EMSs, we draw on a new model of the firm that we term the polyphonic model. According to this model, which is inspired by the writings of Luhmann and Nelson, firms and other organizations are depicted as dynamic, self-organized decision-processing systems, which can accommodate multiple logics and cultural themes. We argue that this model provides a coherent framework for thinking about the way in which different logics intertwine in the context of the modern corporation.

Drawing on this theoretical construction, the article seeks to advance the empirical understanding of the dynamic of corporate self-regulation. Generally, we argue that the adoption of ISO 14001 can move the firm into a new equilibrium trajectory, which enmeshes together environmental and economic goals, reflecting greater ecological sensitivity. The certification process is likely to trigger a virtuous cycle between the firm's new structure and the employees' attitudes—toward the environment and the organization.

The article reports the result of our study of the impact of ISO 14001 on the internal dynamic and environmental commitment of Israeli firms. As part of our study we conducted a series of interviews with executives and administered questionnaires to employees in 24 Israeli firms with and without ISO 14001 certification. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative analysis, we examined to what extent the adoption of ISO 14001 has affected the attitudes and beliefs of the workers of certified firms by considering the standard's impact on their perceptions of the organization's environmental commitment, their personal environmental commitment, and their organizational citizenship behavior. The results of our study lend support to our thesis regarding the pro-environmental dynamic associated with the adoption of ISO 14001.

ISO 14001 was released in 1996, and a revised version was published in 2004.Footnote 2 The ISO 14001 EMS is based on the concept of continual improvement expressed in the “Plan-Do-Check-Act” methodology. According to this methodology, the organization should formulate an environmental policy with general environmental goals, design the mechanisms and procedures by which it will achieve these goals (including, for example, designation of responsibilities and training), use monitoring and documenting systems to assess performance against its designated goals, and take action to improve the environmental system's performance. The standard gives the organization the freedom to choose between self-certification and third-party certification and evaluation. External certification is provided by accredited EMS registration bodies (which also provide follow-up auditing services). In Israel, most certified organizations choose third-party certification and evaluation, commonly performed by the Standards Institution of Israel (SII).

Conceptualizing the Firm: The Polyphonic Organization

Examination of the environmental and organizational effect of EMSs such as ISO 14001 requires consideration of three key questions. First, what are the factors that cause firms to adopt an EMS? Second, how does the adoption of an EMS affect the internal structure and dynamic of certified organizations and the attitudes and beliefs of the individuals working in them? Finally, what effect do these systems have on the environmental performance of the organizations that adopt them, and what are the organizational mechanisms that generate these effects?

In addressing these questions we draw on an institutional conception of the firm that we term the polyphonic model.Footnote 3 The polyphonic model conceptualizes the firm as a complex social system that cannot be described by means of a single and temporally stable narrative (e.g., profit maximization).Footnote 4 According to the polyphonic model, firms and other organizations are depicted as dynamic, self-organized decision-processing systems, which can accommodate multiple logics. The calculative logic of profit maximization, while important, constitutes only one of these co-occurring logics. By postulating the firm as a pluralistic entity, the polyphonic model seeks to respond to the puzzle posed by March and Olsen regarding the way in which the logics of “consequences” and “appropriateness” interact in different institutional contexts (Reference GoldmannGoldmann 2005:43; Reference March and OlsenMarch & Olsen 2004:19).

The polyphonic model draws on two main theoretical pillars: Luhmann's communication-based theory of social systems (Reference LuhmannLuhmann 1995, Reference Luhmann2000) and Nelson's concept of “social technologies” (Reference Nelson and SampatNelson & Sampat 2001; Reference NelsonNelson 1991). In Luhmann's framework, organizations are conceptualized as self-organized systems of communicationsFootnote 5 of a special form: decisions; organizations are constituted by a recursive network of decisional communications (Reference Bakken, Hernes, Thorpe and HoltBakken & Hernes 2008).

The organization's structure consists of various decision premises or programs (Luhmann) or social technologies (Nelson), which constitute necessary preconditions for making a decision. Luhmann distinguishes between several types of programs (Reference MartensMartens 2006:89–94; Reference Seidl and BeckerSeidl & Becker 2006:24–9). First, there are decision programs, which in turn include goal-selection programs, execution/conditional programs (that determine what to do under varied conditions), and cognitive programs (which are responsible for the generation and ordering of information). Second, there are personnel programs, which determine how new employees are selected and assigned to different posts. Finally, there are structural programs that determine the organization's hierarchy and meta-structural programs that deal with the meta-questions of a possible redesign of any of the foregoing decision premises. These various programs may invoke diverse logics and criteria as antecedents for reaching a decision.

Nelson adopts a similar conceptual vocabulary in his analysis of organizations, highlighting the role of routines in the firm's structure. Nelson characterizes firms in terms of a synthesis between strategy, structure, and core-capabilities. Strategy “connotes a set of broad commitments made by a firm that define and rationalize its objectives and how it intends to pursue them” (Reference NelsonNelson 1991:67). The structure and core-capabilities of a firm are defined in terms of organizational routines and decision procedures. Routines guide the behavior of the agents using them, forming what Nelson defines as “social technology” (Reference Nelson and SampatNelson & Sampat 2001:42–7).Footnote 6 The collection of decision premises or social technologies—both formal and informal—associated with a certain organization constitutes its unique structure or culture.

Like Luhmann, Nelson adopts a pluralistic vision of the firm, recognizing that the firm's goals and routines may be associated with a multiplicity of logics. Nelson argues in that spirit that the firm's strategy may be a product of faith and company tradition and not just calculation. Further, there is no reason to argue a priori that the firm's strategy will be in fact “optimal or even not self destructive” (Reference NelsonNelson 1991:67).Footnote 7

The concept of polyphonic organization also sheds light on the dynamic of organizational life and the causes of institutional innovation. The polyphonic model is based on the idea of a viable dynamic equilibrium. It is viable in the sense that while it is hypothesized that firms can host a variety of rationalities, only a limited combination of goals and routines offers a viable trajectory for the firm given the external constraints it is facing. Firms can be viable, however, without being economic optimizers. The notion of equilibrium reflects the claim that organizations have a more-or-less stable structure. Finally, the term dynamic reflects several features of the polyphonic organization; first, the idea that firms are network of decisions—they are not static solutions to discrete optimization dilemmas. Second, it emphasizes the idea that the firm's structure is potentially alterable and is subject to continuous internal contestation.

A further critical element of the dynamic of organizational life lies in the reciprocal interaction between the firm's structure and the attitudes and beliefs of the employees. This relationship can be mutually supportive but also destructive. Luhmann makes a clear distinction in this context between the organization and the human agents associated with it. The organization is depicted as an autonomous social entity that interacts with the employees' community in a reciprocal process of structural coupling. In analyzing this reciprocal process, the polyphonic model adopts a pluralistic conception of the self: Human beings are assumed to act on the basis of a wide range of motivations that cannot be explained in narrow materialistic terms or through the notion of self-interest (Reference Frey and StutzerFrey & Stutzer 2006; Reference Rocha and GhoshalRocha & Ghoshal 2006).

Institutional Change and Organizational Citizenship Behavior: ISO 14001 as a Transformative Agent and Equilibrium Anchor

The polyphonic model provides a complex framework for thinking about the causes for certification, the structural impact of ISO 14001, and ISO 14001 environmental efficacy. The polyphonic model argues that the organizational processes underlying these decisions are not governed by a single logic (economic, environmental, or other) but by a multiplicity of logics, whose exact constellation is context-dependent. Drawing on this general framework, we argue that the adoption of ISO 14001 can move the firm into a new equilibrium trajectory, which enmeshes together environmental and economic goals and reflects greater organizational sensitivity to ecological concerns.

Regarding the certification process, the polyphonic model maintains that this process can reflect a wide spectrum of motivations, both instrumental and ideological. Thus, while the polyphonic model recognizes that firms are likely to engage in some sort of cost-benefit calculus regarding the decision whether to implement ISO 14001, balancing, for example, the cost of certification against potential reputational gains, this economic calculus will not determine (necessarily) the firm's ultimate decision.Footnote 8 With respect to ISO 14001 institutional impact, we argue that ISO 14001 can trigger a change in the firm's internal dynamic through the various new routines it introduces. These routines ensure that environmental concerns will receive a stronger presence in the firm's decisionmaking process, allowing for the discursive expression of motivations and ideas that may have been suppressed under the previous regime. By creating new routines for selecting, ordering, and processing information, the system also extends the organization's cognitive horizon, enabling the generation of new environmentally related data that would not have been available to the organization beforehand.

By making environmental issues more salient and by imposing a process of continual improvement and reflection, the ISO 14001 system drives the organization to deal with competing (internal) economic and environmental demands and to develop new mechanisms for resolving potential tensions between them. This continuous internal contestation is an important source of technological and social innovation. While this internal tension may exist in uncertified firms, ISO 14001 bolsters this process by giving it permanent structural form. The adoption of ISO 14001 facilitates, then, a shift into a new dynamic equilibrium, in which environmental concerns are given more weight. The third-party certification and auditing system associated with ISO 14001 provides further support to the internalization of ISO 14001 structural requirements (Reference Potoski and PrakashPotoski & Prakash 2006:19; Reference AndrewsAndrews 2001:78–88). The new dynamic induced by ISO 14001 is not determined by the motivations that moved the organization to adopt the standard in the first place (and thus can take place in organizations that are not ideologically “green”).

The viability and resilience of this new equilibrium stems from several sociological and psychological processes, which cannot be understood by viewing the firm, and the interaction between the firm and its employees, solely through the lens of a calculative, economic logic. First, this new equilibrium draws on the reputational benefits of ISO 14001 (Reference Prakash and PotoskiPrakash & Potoski 2006; Reference ReinhardtReinhardt et al. 2008:225–8). Second, it reflects further benefits that are made possible by the new information generated by the system and the innovative drive it unleashes. A good example is efficiency gains generated by new technological or institutional techniques (e.g., new recycling techniques and enhanced energy efficiency). A third source of viability is the virtuous reciprocal interaction that the implementation of ISO 14001 generates between the firm's new structure and its workforce. Finally, the resilience of the new equilibrium reflects the fact that once the organization settles into this new equilibrium state, “going back” through, for example, abrupt decertification, may be costly. These costs reflect both the costs of dismantling the new routines—which become entrenched in the organization's structure—and the adverse effects of breaking the aforementioned virtuous cycle (e.g., damaging the employees' trust in the firm).

One of the key features of the ISO 14001 system is the virtuous cycle it generates between the new organizational reality and the motivations and beliefs of the employees.Footnote 9 There is, in this context, an amplifying feedback between the organizational and individual levels. This reciprocal cycle is driven by four key processes.

First, the EMS creates a system of internal organizational norms that operate alongside the external system of statutory norms.

Second, the adoption of a comprehensive EMS can lead—through the emphasis it places on the environmental issue—to the internalization of environmental values in employees who did not previously have a clear position on this issue. It is also likely to strengthen pro-environmental attitudes in workers who are already committed to the environmental cause. We conceptualize the commitment to the environment as an internal, obligation-based, motivation (Reference Frey and JegenFrey & Jegen 1999:4; Reference OsterlohOsterloh et al. 2001:233). Intrinsic motivation should be distinguished from extrinsic motivation, which acts through external incentives (e.g., monetary) and is normally instrumental—that is, aimed toward achieving a specified objective (Reference Ryan and DeciRyan & Deci 2000:71).Footnote 10

The causal mechanism underlying the internalization process is complex. It reflects the symbolic (legitimizing) value of the organizational decision to adopt the standard (Reference Vigoda and GolembiewskiVigoda & Golembiewski 2001:545), the informative aspect of the certification process (e.g., providing information about the consequences of improper environmental behavior through training, monitoring, etc.), the creation of an explicit framework for placing responsibility for negative environmental behavior, and the creation of an organizational sphere conducive to public expression of the internal stance (Reference NyborgNyborg 1999:420). The structure of ISO 14001, which is based on continuous improvement and not on a rigid system of sanctions, and provides a framework for involving employees in the management of the environmental aspects of the organization's activities, can enhance employees' intrinsic motivation. This effect is facilitated by the EMS's positive influence on employees' perceived competence and on their experienced autonomy (Reference ThøgersenThøgersen 2003:201).

Third, strengthening the environmental commitment of the organization through ISO 14001 certification is also likely to increase the commitment of employees to the organization.Footnote 11 This hypothesis is based on the findings of several studies, which find a positive correlation between corporate citizenship and commitment to the organization (Reference Turban and GreeningTurban & Greening 1997:666; Reference MaignanMaignan et al. 1999:458, 464). Environmentally conscious firms are also likely to be associated with higher levels of organizational citizenship behavior, defined as “individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization” (Reference PodsakoffPodsakoff et al. 2000:513). Organizational citizenship behavior has been found to be positively correlated with job performance and organizational performance (Reference PodsakoffPodsakoff et al. 2000:537, 541, 543–8; Reference Podsakoff and MacKenziePodsakoff & MacKenzie 1997:142) and with employees' commitment (Reference MeyerMeyer et al. 2002:22, 39).

Fourth, the foregoing processes will support and further entrench the institutional changes instigated by the standard, by increasing the employees' willingness to invoke the new conceptual apparatus introduced by the EMS and to implement its routines.

Cumulatively, the institutional and personal processes described above should positively affect both the environmental and nonenvironmental output of employees in certified firms. The effect of the EMS on the employees' internal norms system and on their commitment to the organization therefore has important economic implications. It unleashes economic resources that were not available in the previous organizational setting. First, by affecting the internally driven (noninstrumental) willingness of employees to engage in pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., recycling, conservation of water and electricity, and greater attention to environmental risks such as leakage of hazardous materials), firms can improve their environmental performance without bearing the full cost of this improvement. Second, the increase in employees' commitment to the organization—reflected in increased levels of citizenship behavior—can contribute to the firm's financial performance. These two processes provide a further explanation for the ability of firms to bear the costs of certification, and achieve beyond compliance targets, without sacrificing profits.

The Polyphonic Model and Other Models of the Firm

How does the polyphonic model differ from the agency cost (or transaction cost) model and stakeholder theory? These rival theories dominate the contemporary corporate governance literature and as such deserve special consideration (Reference AgleAgle et al. 2008).

Consider, first, the models of agency cost or transaction cost. The first difference between these models and the polyphonic model lies in their concept of human agency. The agency and transaction cost models base their policy prescriptions on the idea that self-interested, material opportunism is a primary trait of human agency (Reference WilliamsonWilliamson 1998:31; Reference AllenAllen 1993:1401). This understanding of human motivation disregards the possibility—backed by numerous studies—that managers, employees, and shareholders may be driven by a complex set of motives, which may reflect other-regarding and duty-oriented concerns (e.g., environmental commitment) (Reference Perez and DillingPerez 2008:157–62; Reference RichardsonRichardson 2008:180–5). Adopting a more pluralistic concept of the self challenges the principal/agent problematic that drives these models. Further, this shallow understanding of the self makes the agency and transaction cost models inattentive to the limitations of monetary incentives and hierarchical control as modes of governance. There is ample evidence that hierarchical control and outcome-based incentives may have counterproductive results, such as increasing the distrust between managers and employees and decreasing people's intrinsic motivation (Reference GhoshalGhoshal 2005:85).

A second difference concerns the way in which the agency and transaction cost models conceptualize the firm as a social entity. Both models take a highly reductionist approach to this question, attributing everything that goes within the corporation to individual decisionmaking (Reference ReinhardtReinhardt et al. 2008:227) and disregarding the independent causal influence of the organization's structure. This approach is reflected in the claim that the firm's social structure can be gleaned by enumerating the formal contracts associated with it (Reference WilliamsonWilliamson 1998:35; Reference EisenbergEisenberg 1999). The polyphonic model rejects this reductionist claim, highlighting instead the intricate linkage between the organization's structure and individual action.

The polyphonic model is closer in its approach to stakeholder theory in that both models reject the attempt to ascribe a single goal to the corporation. Nonetheless there are deep differences between the two approaches. First, stakeholder theory is prominently normative. It seeks to provide normative guidance to the firm's managers, arguing that managers “ought to view the interests of stakeholders as having intrinsic worth and should pursue the interests of multiple stakeholders” (Reference DonaldsonDonaldson 1999:238). The stakeholder model thus prohibits the mobilization of the firm's resources to the benefit of any single constituency (such as shareholders) (Reference Donaldson and PrestonDonaldson & Preston 1995:87). The Clarkson Principles of stakeholder management provide a leading example of this facet of stakeholder theory.Footnote 12 The polyphonic model, by contrast, is not a normative theory. Rather, it takes interest in the way in which different normative orders—both external and internal—influence the firm's dynamic.

But the stakeholder model also makes certain empirical claims about the structure of firms. Thus, for example, Donaldson and Preston describe the corporation as a “constellation of cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value” (1995:66). And in describing the way in which firms respond to these multiple claims, Reference FreemanFreeman and colleagues argue that firms may develop diverse normative cores (2004:368). The strong pluralistic spirit underlying these claims marks an important common ground between the polyphonic model and stakeholder theory.

However, stakeholder theory does not provide a coherent sociological account of the way in which these competitive interests are manifested in the firm's structure. Stakeholder theorists tend to focus on the way in which stakeholder claims influence managerial decisionmaking (Reference GunninghamGunningham et al. 2004:326–8; Reference Donaldson and PrestonDonaldson & Preston 1995:75). This approach seems lacking in that it fails to give proper weight to the autonomous impact of the firm's institutional structure. The polyphonic model seeks to unfold the way in which corporations—as self-referential communicative systems—reconstruct the claims of different stakeholders (e.g., nature, employees)—according to their self-created programs and routines. It also seeks to shed light on the intricate relationship between the corporate culture and its employees and managers, highlighting the independent causal role of each.

The Empirical Study

The empirical part of the study focuses on one key element of our theoretical framework: the claim that ISO 14001 may transform the firm's internal dynamic in a pro-environmental fashion, generating a virtuous cycle between the firm's new environmentally sensitive structure and the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of the employees—toward the environment and the organization. In this context we focused on two key questions: the impact of ISO 14001 on the firm's internal structure and on its ecological commitment and the impact of ISO 14001 on the employees' attitudes toward the organization and the environment. In studying these questions we employed a multimethod research design, using in-depth interviews with executives in combination with structured questionnaires that were administered to employees in certified and noncertified firms.

In analyzing the structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews we have drawn on the following set of hypotheses.

  1. 1. The environmental commitment of certified firms, as perceived by their managers, will be higher than that of noncertified firms.

  2. 2. The environmental commitment of certified firms, as perceived by their employees, will be higher than that of noncertified firms.

  3. 3. Among certified firms, the environmental commitment of the firm, as perceived by the firm's employees, will be higher among employees with a high integration score than among employees with a low integration score.

  4. 4. The adoption and implementation of the ISO 14001 EMS is likely to enhance the environmental commitment of employees.

  5. 5. An increase in the firm's environmental commitment score, as it is perceived by the firm's employees, will be positively associated with all three organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) indexes. This association will be stronger within ISO 14001 firms than within noncertified firms.

Data and Methods

Participants

The Firms' Sample. Twenty-four firms of varied sizes (medium and large) participated in the study, half with ISO 14001 certification (henceforth, “certified firms”), and half without. The firms are located in different geographic areas and belong to various economic sectors. Eight of the organizations (33.3%) belong to the chemical sector and the rest to the following sectors: electrical and electronics (N=5, 20.8%), food (N=3, 12.5%), metal (N=3, 12.5%), paper and byproducts (N=2, 8.3%), trade and services (N=2, 8.3%), and construction (N=1, 4.2%).

The Executives' Sample. Of the 47 participating executives, 36 (76.6%) were employed by 19 firms where employees were also sampled and 11 (23.4%) were employed by five other firms. Twenty-four executives (51.1%) were employed by 12 certified organizations and 23 (48.9%) were employed by 12 noncertified organizations. Forty-two executives were men (89.4%) and 5 were women (10.6%).

The Employees' Sample. Of the 576 participating employees, 400 (69.4%) were employed by 10 certified firms and 176 (30.6%) by 9 noncertified firms. Employees included manufacturing workers (46.1%), middle- to low-level managers (22.7%), service providers from administration and marketing (15.8%), and expert employees (e.g., chemists, engineers; 15.4%). Eighty-four percent of the employees were male and 16% were female. Finally, 41.9% of the participants had an academic education, 52.8% a high-school education, and 5.3% an elementary education.

Tools

All questionnaires (apart from the OCB) were designed especially for this study.

Questionnaires for Senior Managers in Certified and Noncertified Firms. The interviews of senior managers were based on the following questionnaires:

Demographic Data and Firm's Profile. This questionnaire included 11 questions dealing with the personal and professional background of the manager, such as academic degree, gender, position in the organization, and length of employment. It also included questions about the firm's main area of activity, number of employees, competing firms, export rates (of the total output), and whether the firm was part of a conglomerate.

Environmental Commitment. This questionnaire examined the environmental commitment of the firm according to the managers' perception, irrespective of the question of ISO 14001 certification. The questionnaire included 15 questions (mostly formulated as open-ended ones) dealing with the firm's approach to environmental matters. It referred, for example, to the existence of a unit in the firm responsible for environmental issues, to the existence of formal policy on environmental matters, to the actions taken by the firm to comply with regulatory requirements or go beyond them, to the existence of an internal (emissions) monitoring system, to the involvement of senior management in environmental issues, and to the level of training on environmental issues. In noncertified firms an additional question was included related to the existence of an alternative (non-ISO) EMS.

ISO 14001. This questionnaire, which was administered only among managers of certified firms, examined the implementation and integration of the standard. The questionnaire included 32 questions mostly formulated as open-ended ones. It included, for example, questions concerning technological and organizational changes in the firm following certification, changes in the firm's culture and objectives, the environmental impact of the EMS, possible consequences of violating the ISO 14001 guidelines, and several questions concerning the EMS as a possible substitute for public regulation. In addition, managers responded to a section about the central motivation for certification and the degree of environmental improvement following certification. This section included verbal descriptions, such as “How is the improvement in environmental behavior expressed?” It also included a ranking of the motivational factors for certification on a 5-point scale, ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very significantly” (5).

Motivations and Environmental Behavior. This questionnaire, which was administered only among managers of noncertified firms, examined various aspects of the firm's attitude toward environmental issues. The questionnaire included eight questions, the majority of them formulated as open-ended questions, concerning for example, preventive actions taken by the firm, the motivations for the firm's decisions regarding environmental issues, the reasons for not adopting the ISO 14001 EMS, and factors affecting the firm's environmental behavior.

Questionnaires for Employees in Certified and Noncertified Firms. The interviews of employees were based on the following questionnaires:

Demographic Data. This questionnaire included six questions, mostly open-ended, dealing with education level, gender, position in the organization, length of employment, and whether the employee had an environmental responsibility.

Environmental Commitment. This questionnaire was similar to the managers' questionnaire but included only 10 questions, which were formulated as closed questions. In noncertified firms, an additional question was included about the existence of an alternative (non-ISO) EMS.

OCB Questionnaire. The OCB questionnaire included 27 statements that referred to the level of involvement and commitment of the employees to their role, the organization, and their colleagues and superiors.Footnote 13 The questionnaire was divided into three domains:

  1. 1. OCB–job performance: referred to commitment to the role and compliance with internal guidelines and norms. It distinguished between a worker's behavior according to the organization's internal rules (as represented by this domain) and forms of behavior that went beyond formal expectations (as represented by the other two domains). Sample statement: “I am committed to the guidelines and norms that protect the organization.”

  2. 2. OCB–interpersonal behavior: referred to helping behavior toward coworkers in a task or problem relevant to the organization. Sample statement: “I assist my colleagues after they return to work following a long period of absence.”

  3. 3. OCB–civic virtue: included the involvement of the worker in decisionmaking processes in the organization. Sample statement: “I participate in decisions related to the creation of internal guidelines and norms within the organization.”

ISO 14001. This questionnaire, which was administered only among employees of ISO 14001 firms, examined the implementation and integration of the standard. The questionnaire included 14 questions formulated generally as closed questions. They covered issues such as the organization's environmental behavior prior to certification, internal and external inspections with respect to the implementation of ISO 14001, technological and organizational changes following certification, and the impact of the standard on the employee, the employee's role, and the environment. Except for several questions with a choice of two answers (yes/no), the employee was asked to choose from five options on a scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very much” (5).

Index Design and Score Computation

In order to analyze the interviews and questionnaires we developed several indexes, which are described below.

Environmental Commitment Index. The Environmental commitment index examined how the employees and managers of all participating firms (with and without certification) perceived the firm's commitment to the environment, as reflected in the firm's structure. The score given to each interviewee was computed by summing up the interviewee's answers to questions dealing with the organization's approach to environmental matters, and by converting the resulting score to percentages. The index comprised eight questions taken from the environmental commitment questionnaire. There were slight differences between the indexes of managers and employees. The higher the score on this index, the greater the environmental commitment of the organization as perceived by the interviewee. The internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach's α) for these questions was α=0.79 among managers and α=0.80 among employees.

ISO 14001 Integration Index. The ISO 14001 integration index reflected the degree to which the firm had implemented and assimilated the different elements of the EMS into its internal structure as perceived by the employees. The index examined how the firm supervised the application of the EMS rules, the impact of the EMS on the organization (from a technological and organizational perspective), and the changes the system instigated at the employee level (in the employee's job description and in the employee's environmental worldview). The index's score was calculated only among employees of certified firms by summing up the participants' responses to questions dealing with the implementation and impact of the ISO 14001 EMS and by converting the resulting score to percentages. The index comprised seven questions taken from the ISO 14001 questionnaire. The internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach's α) for these questions was α=0.70.

Organizational Environmental Motivation Indexes. The environmental motivation indexes reflected the various motivations that led firms to certify for ISO 14001, or to adopt a pro-environment policy (in the case of noncertified firms), as these motivations were perceived by managers in both firm types. We computed four motivational scores covering four different areas: (1) public regulation and enforcement; (2) economic considerations (Israeli clients and suppliers; foreign clients and suppliers; stockholders; competitors; business relations; operational considerations, α=0.75); (3) environmental considerations (environmental organizations; a sense of commitment to the environment, r=0.52, p<0.001); and (4) responsibility for the community (employees; neighbors/neighboring community, r=0.25, p<0.5). The scores were computed by averaging the answers to the constituent motivation factors. Scores ranged from 1 to 5; the higher the score, the higher the level of motivation in the relevant area.

OCB Indexes. The OCB indexes examined the level of OCB within participating employees of both firms' categories, focusing on three dimensions: organizational compliance (OCB–job-performance), helping behavior or interpersonal relationships (OCB–interpersonal behavior), and civic virtue (OCB–civic virtue). OCB–job performance refers to forms of behavior directed at the organization, demonstrating compliance with formal or informal organizational rules and procedures (such as high standards for attendance, punctuality, conservation of the organization's resources, and use of time while at work) (Reference PodsakoffPodsakoff et al. 2000:520; Reference OrganOrgan 1997:94–5). OCB–interpersonal behavior captures activities such as assisting or emphatically interacting with specific individuals (coworkers, associates, clients, superiors) (Reference PodsakoffPodsakoff et al. 2000:518–9; Reference OrganOrgan 1997:94). OCB–civic virtue refers to constructive involvement in the decisionmaking processes within the organization (Reference PodsakoffPodsakoff et al. 2000:522).

In order to design the OCB indexes, we performed a factor analysis with Varimax rotation to the 27 questions of the OCB questionnaire. The factors analysis fully validated the distinction between the three behavioral domains. The three factors together explained 39.58 percent of the total variance. The factor “commitment in the interpersonal domain” (OCB–interpersonal behavior) explained 14.81 percent of the variance (α=0.79); the factor “commitment to the job and obedience to rules and norms” (OCB–job performance) explained 13.13 percent of the variance (α=0.75); and the factor “participation in the process of organizational decisionmaking” (OCB–civic virtue) explained 11.63 percent of the variance (α=0.82). The internal consistency of all questionnaire items was found to be high (α=0.75). Drawing on the findings of the factors analysis and the examination of the internal consistency, we computed a score for each employee in each of three factors. We did so by averaging the score in each of the questions respectively for each index. The score ranged between 1 and 5 such that a higher mark indicated a higher citizenship behavior in the dimension measured by that index.

Procedure

Method of Sampling ISO 14001 Organizations and Organizations Without ISO 14001 EMS Certification. A list of 138 ISO 14001 organizations provided to us by the Standards Institution of Israel (current as of January 2004) served as the basis for the phone solicitation of ISO 14001 firms. The various factories were classified according to district, sector, and size using the database of Dun & Bradstreet Israel. Selection was based on these three criteria. Factories of medium size and larger were preferred, with an attempt to represent every sector and district. The list of certified firms was matched with a list of noncertified firms; for each ISO 14001 firm we attempted to choose a similar firm based on the criteria mentioned above. Of 66 organizations solicited by phone to participate in the research (32 ISO 14001 firms and 34 noncertified firms), 24 firms agreed to participate in the final sample, half of them with ISO 14001 certification.

Interviews With Senior Managers. The managers who took part in the study were either members of the firm's top management (for example, the vice president of human resources or the chief operations officer) or executives involved in the management of the firm's environmental matters (for example, the head of the environment and safety department or the head of quality assurance). The managers were interviewed at their firms in a structured (oral) interview based on the corresponding questionnaires.

Distribution of Questionnaires to Employees. Employees of both ISO 14001 and noncertified firms were selected for the questionnaires based on several criteria. The initial preference was for production workers, but various lower-level position holders also participated in the research. The questionnaires were distributed over a period of 15 months. In ISO 14001 organizations the rate of response was 41.3%; in noncertified firms the rate of response was 33%.

Findings: Quantitative Analysis

To examine our hypotheses about the differences between the conception of the organization's environmental commitment among managers and employees of ISO 14001 and noncertified firms, we calculated a series of multiple linear regression equations, separately for managers (Table 1) and employees (Table 3). We calculated a separate equation for employees of ISO 14001 firms (Table 4). We also conducted a t-test to examine the differences in the indexes of organizational environmental motivation between certified and noncertified firms, as perceived by the managers (Table 2).

Table 1. Linear Regression Estimates Predicting Organizational Commitment to the Environment as Perceived by Managers, Using the ISO 14001 Certification Variable (N=47)

Note: Coefficients are standardized (β). Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.05;

** p<0.01

Table 2. Differences in the Indexes of Organizational Environmental Motivation Between Executives of Certified and Noncertified Firms (N=47)

** p<0.01

Table 3. Estimates of the Linear Regression for Predicting the Organizational Environmental Commitment According to the Employees' Perception, Using the ISO 14001 Certification Variable and Environmental Commitment According to the Executives' Perception

Note: Coefficients are standardized (β). Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.05;

** p<0.01;

*** p<0.001

Table 4. Estimates for Predicting Organizational Environmental Commitment According to Employees' Perception in ISO 14001 Firms, Using the ISO 14001 Integration Variable and the Environmental Commitment According to the Executives' Perception (N=400)

Note: Coefficients are standardized (β). Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.05;

** p<0.01;

*** p<0.001

In the regression equations used for managers, the dependent variable was defined as the firm's environmental commitment as reflected in the environmental commitment index; the independent variable was defined as ISO 14001 certification.Footnote 14 The specification of the regression model was:

Environmentalcommitment(managers)=β'x+δISO14001certification+ɛ

where the x vector included the additional attributes of the firm, the firm's environmental motivation indexes, and a constant (intercept).

We also conducted a t-test for independent samples to compare the managers of the two firms' categories with respect to the environmental motivation indexes (Table 2).

The structure of the variables in the regression equations calculated for the employees was similar to that used for managers: the dependent variable was defined as the firm's environmental commitment as reflected in the environmental commitment index, and the independent variable was defined as ISO 14001 certification (Table 3).Footnote 15 The specification of the regression model was:

Environmentalcommitment(employees)=β'x+δISO14001certification+ɛ

where the x vector included the additional attributes of the firm, the attributes of the employees, the organization's environmental commitment as perceived by the managers, and a constant (intercept).

To examine our third hypothesis, the employees of ISO 14001 firms were divided into two groups according to their integration score. The first group included participants whose integration score was lower than or equal to the median of the entire group (med.=58.04). The average integration score in this group was 41.25 and the standard deviation was 17.67 (N=215, 53.8%). The second group included participants whose implementation score was higher than the median of the whole group. The average integration score in this group was 77.56 and the standard deviation was 11.76 (N=185, 46.3%).Footnote 16 Next, a multiple linear regression equation was performed. The dependent variable was defined as the organizational commitment to the environment among employees, and the independent variable was defined as the integration of ISO 14001 (as reflected in the integration index).Footnote 17 The specification of the regression model was:

Environmentalcommitment(employees)=β'x+δimplementationofISO14001EMS+ɛ

where the x vector included the additional organizational attributes, employee attributes, executive perception, and a constant (intercept).

To examine our fifth hypothesis regarding the OCB indexes, a series of multiple linear regression equations was calculated. The equations were calculated separately for employees of ISO 14001 firms and those of noncertified firms (Table 5). In the regression equations the dependent variable was defined as the OCB measured by the three indexes: OCB–interpersonal behavior, OCB–job performance, and OCB–civic virtue. The independent variable was defined as the firm's environmental commitment as perceived by employees and executives (measured in their respective environmental commitment indexes).Footnote 18 The specification of the regression model was:

OrganizationalCitizenshipBehavior=β'x+δenvironmentalcommitment+ɛ

where the x vector included the additional organizational attributes, employee attributes, executive perception, and a constant (intercept).

Table 5. Estimates of the Linear Regression for Predicting OCB Using the Organizational Environmental Commitment According to Employees' and Executives' Perception (N=576)

Note: Coefficients are standardized (β). Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.05;

** p<0.01;

*** p<0.001

Table 1 shows estimates of the linear regression predicting organizational commitment to the environment as perceived by managers, using the ISO 14001 certification variable. Table 1 shows that the equation for predicting organizational commitment to the environment is significant, the explained variance is 49 percent, and among the predicting variables, the ISO 14001 certification variable alone had a significant positive unique contribution to the explanation (β=0.54). Based upon the beta coefficient and consistent with our first hypothesis, the perception of the firm's environmental commitment among managers of ISO 14001 firms was higher than among managers of noncertified firms.

Table 2 shows averages, standard deviations, and values of t-tests for independent samples of organizational environmental motivation. The analysis was conducted at the executive level (N=47). Table 2 shows that the strength of considerations having to do with public regulation and enforcement involved in certification (or in the adoption of environmental policy in noncertified firms) was lower among managers of certified firms (M=2.29, SD=1.46) than among managers of noncertified firms (M=3.43, SD=0.94). No significant differences were found among the other motivation indexes (p>0.05). The findings also indicate that for both groups public regulation and enforcement and environmental considerations were higher motivations than economic considerations.

Table 3 shows estimates of the linear regression for predicting the organizational environmental commitment according to the employees' perception, using the ISO 14001 certification variable and environmental commitment according to the executives' perception. Table 3 shows that the equation for predicting organizational environmental commitment according to the employees' perception was significant, and the explained variance was 42 percent. Among the predicting variables, the ISO 14001 certification variable was the one with the highest significant unique contribution to the explained variance (β=0.72). Based upon the beta coefficient and consistent with the second hypothesis, employees of ISO 14001 certified firms were found to have a higher perception of organizational environmental commitment than those of noncertified firms. The index of organizational environmental commitment based on the managers' perception contributed significantly and positively to the explained variance. The higher the organizational environmental commitment was according to the executives' perception, the higher the organizational environmental commitment was according to the employees' perception. This pattern was not found to be significant among employees of ISO 14001 firms.Footnote 19

Table 4 shows the linear regression estimates for predicting organizational environmental commitment according to employees' perception in ISO 14001 firms, using the ISO 14001 integration variable and the environmental commitment according to the executives' perception. Table 4 shows that the equation for predicting organizational environmental commitment based on the perception of all employees of ISO 14001 firms was found to be significant, and the explained variance was 32 percent. The ISO 14001 integration variable contributed uniquely to the explained variance (β=0.27). Based upon the beta coefficient and consistent with the direction suggested by the third hypothesis, we found that among employees with a high integration score the level of organizational environmental commitment according to the employees' perception was higher than that of employees with a lower integration score.Footnote 20

We also examined the influence of the degree of ISO 14001 integration on workers' environmental commitment.Footnote 21 We found that employees with a high integration score had a significantly higher level of increase in their environmental commitment following certification (N=183, M=3.29, SD=0.76) than employees with a low integration score (N=152, M=2.08, SD=1.13).Footnote 22 This finding was consistent with Hypothesis 4.

Table 5 shows estimates of the linear regression for predicting OCB as measured by the OCB indexes, using the organizational environmental commitment according to employees' and executives' perceptions. Table 5 shows that in ISO 14001 firms the equation for predicting OCB based on the organizational environmental commitment was found to be significant in all three measures of OCB, and the range of explained variance was 7–9%. The organizational environmental commitment according to the employees' perception contributed uniquely and significantly to the explained variance (β's range: 0.13–0.20). Based upon the beta coefficients and consistent with the direction suggested by the fifth hypothesis, we found that as the perception of the firm's environmental commitment increased among its employees, so did the employees' OCB score in the three indexes (OCB–interpersonal behavior, OCB–job performance, OCB–civic virtue). The connection between these measures was significant only among employees of certified firms.Footnote 23

Findings: Qualitative Analysis of Interviews

Interviews With Senior Executives in ISO 14001 Firms

In general, the analysis of the interviews supports the findings of the quantitative analysis; however, it also gives a clearer expression of the limits of ISO 14001. In response to the question of the reasons motivating the organization to adopt the standard, the managers emphasized instrumental considerations, such as pressure by clients (particularly large and overseas clients), regulatory bodies, and insurance companies. The managers also emphasized the value of certification as a vehicle for improving the firm's reputation through the creation of a green image. A significant number of executives noted, though, that a central consideration for certification was ideological—a sense of commitment toward the environment and the neighboring community.

Most managers expressed the view that the system had a significant structural impact, giving the environmental issue a more significant presence in the organizational sphere. It appears that the EMS had a significant effect on organizational routines, information management, and decisionmaking processes. One manager noted that the “ISO focused the problems.” Another manager remarked that that since certification “there are regular meetings, formal and systematic managerial influence, monitoring, and clear plans.” Other executives noted that that environmental and safety officers were appointed and that improvement and environmental quality teams were established. Another manager mentioned that “everything is much more precise and measurable. Every action is preceded by contemplation. There is a decisive attitude to improve and act on behalf of the environment.” He added that as a result of implementing the standard, “environmental protection and safety are taken into consideration as part of the daily routine.” Another manager from the electronics sector noted that “the objective has changed, from complying with legal requirements to beyond compliance.” Several managers noted that the standard served as a catalyst for installation and procurement of new technologies and for reforming the firms' production and operation methods.

The managers also noted that the standard increased the awareness and commitment of the employees to environmental issues and extended their involvement in the management of the firm's environmental impact. One manager remarked that “employees are involved by sharing responsibility; they go through every stage of the process and maintain discussions.” Another interviewee stated that the standard created team spirit and that the issue became part of the factory's culture. Another manager emphasized that the ISO 14001 EMS was “the only way to transmit the message on to the worker in the field.” Many executives noted that integrating the system increased the employees' environmental commitment, enhancing their willingness to contribute to the firm's environmental performance (e.g., through greater investment in recycling, conserving environmental inputs such as water, and paying greater attention to environmental risks such as leakage of hazardous substances). Nevertheless, it appears that the system was applied in hierarchical rather than cooperative fashion across the board.

Nonetheless, in response to the question of whether ISO 14001 can be a substitute for public regulation, a large number of managers noted that a voluntary EMS cannot replace legislation. First, some of the managers criticized the wide discretion the standard grants organizations in designing their environmental policy. The fact that ISO 14001 is a process-based standard was also highlighted in this context: “The standard cannot replace public regulation because it requires, in essence, processes and not results. Therefore, a positive process with negative results is possible.” Second, some managers criticized the voluntary nature of the standard. A third strand of criticism dealt with the quality and integrity of the external audit.

The analysis of the interviews supports our initial hypothesis concerning the ability of the ISO 14001 EMS to induce significant and changes in the internal dynamic of certified firms. The key elements of the ISO 14001 EMS were those that created new routines: instructions dealing with top-management responsibility, documentation, monitoring, training, regular inspections, and review. Managerial attitudes concerning the impact of certification on the organizational culture and the employees' state of mind also supported the hypothesis that ISO 14001 can bolster a process of internalization of pro-environmental norms among the firm's employees. Nevertheless, most managers noted that the ISO 14001 system cannot replace public regulation, and some expressed doubts about its effectiveness.

Interviews With Senior Executives of Noncertified Firms

A key issue that was raised in the interviews had to do with the reasons underlying the firms' decision not to adopt the ISO 14001 standard. There were significant differences among the firms in this respect. Some managers noted that the firm had a different agenda and opted to focus on standards such as ISO 9000 and the HACCP food safety standard. Other managers mentioned the cost of certification as a central barrier, and others mentioned lack of awareness. Some indicated that they were in the process of adopting the standard. Several executives strongly criticized the standard. Thus, for example, one manager noted that “in general, there is a sense that those implementing the standard are either giant organizations that implement it throughout the organization, or problematic organizations that do it to gain acceptance and for the sake of the certificate.” Another manager remarked that “in principle, standards are a purely bureaucratic issue. You can sell garbage with a standard, because you set the standard.” Another executive indicated that the firm did not identify any special incentive on the part of the government for implementing the standard (any form of immunity or bureaucratic incentives), and no commercial potential. Yet another executive said that the firm was reluctant to implement the standard because of “the excess bureaucracy and regulation” associated with ISO 14001.

But this was not the position of all the managers. Some noted that their firm was about to begin the ISO 14001 certification process, and that they had not done so to date because they were not “prepared for the examination.” Others mentioned the fact that ISO 14001 is more stringent as a consideration for not adopting it.

Another interesting issue concerned the firms' commitment to the value of environmental protection. Sixteen out of 23 managers stated that the firm they worked for was very committed to the environment (10 out of 12 firms surveyed). The managers emphasized several factors that motivated their companies to take environmental action. Most prominent among them were legal requirements and governmental supervision (17 out of 23 mentioned this issue as a main consideration). A variety of additional, less dominant motivations was also mentioned, including environmental ideology, considerations of the organization's image and reputation, and economic considerations such as pressure by clients and operational considerations, employee safety, and pressure by the neighboring community.

Discussion

Our empirical findings lend support to the thesis that ISO 14001 can induce pro-environmental dynamic within certified firms. First, we found (consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2) that the perception of the firm's environmental commitment among managers and employees of ISO 14001 firms was higher than the perception among their peers in noncertified firms. We also found (consistent with Hypothesis 3) that among employees of ISO 14001 firms, those with a higher integration score had a higher perception of organizational environmental commitment.Footnote 24

Second, our results also indicate that the certification process may influence the attitudes of employees toward the environment and the firm. We found, first, that employees with a high integration score had a significantly higher level of increase in their environmental commitment following certification than employees with a low integration score. This finding lends support to the fourth hypothesis, which claims that the implementation of ISO 14001 is likely to enhance the employees' (internal) environmental commitment. By focusing only on the ISO 14001 group, this analysis has allowed us, in effect, to control for the impact of any pre-existing green ideology common to this group.

Further, we found a positive linkage—only among certified firms—between the perception of organizational environmental commitment among employees and their OCB (consistent with Hypothesis 5). This finding suggests that there was indeed something institutionally unique in certified firms. A possible explanation for this result is that certification makes the environmental issue more salient within ISO 14001 firms. Certification has a kind of internal reputation effect, which mirrors the external effect emphasized by Potoski and Prakash.

The analysis of the in-depth interviews with the firms' managers sheds further light on the structural impact of certification, demonstrating how the standard has increased the firms' sensitivity to environmental issues. The discursive analysis of the interviews demonstrates not only the breadth of the pro-environmental changes induced by the standard, but also the standard's innovative force as a catalyst for the installation of new technologies, and for the introduction of new production and operation techniques. The managers we interviewed also made consistent remarks about the positive influence of the system on the employees' environmental commitment. The analysis of the interviews with the managers also demonstrated that the organizational motivation for adopting pro-environmental policies was in part ideological and not merely economic.Footnote 25

The empirical results support our thesis that the adoption of ISO 14001 can move the firm into a new equilibrium trajectory, which enmeshes together environmental and economic goals and reflects greater ecological sensitivity. ISO 14001 operates in this context as a social technology, which mediates between the environmental and economic dimensions. However, ISO 14001 does not offer a complete algorithm for resolving possible tensions between these competing dimensions. This issue was reflected in the interviews we conducted with the executives. Rather, ISO 14001 drives the organization to develop, through a process of continuous learning, ecologically “sensitive” mechanisms that could deal with such tensions. ISO 14001 can be viewed in that sense as inspiring a shift from myopic thinking—focusing on short-term profit maximization—into long-run thinking (Reference JensenJensen 2002:245).

The foregoing argument raises the question of the viability of the new (environmentally sensitive) organizational equilibrium (Reference ReinhardtReinhardt et al. 2008:219; Reference Lyon and MaxwellLyon & Maxwell 2008:241). The polyphonic model suggests that the stability of this new equilibrium stems from the capacity of ISO 14001 to unleash hidden social and economic resources. In particular, our findings highlight the capacity of certification to generate a self-supporting cycle between the firm's new environmentally sensitive structure and the employees' environmental and organizational attitudes. The contribution of ISO 14001 to the corporation's survival is not limited therefore to the standard's positive reputational effect (as emphasized by Potoski and Prakash).

More generally, our findings challenge some of the presuppositions that characterize the agency and transaction cost models and stakeholder theory. First, our findings challenge the idea that the internal dynamic of firms is determined entirely by the idiosyncratic logic of profit maximization. Our findings lend support to the idea that firms are polyphonic creatures, which may be driven by a plurality of logics and discursive streams. In contrast to the stakeholder model, which considers stakeholder claims as “external inputs” to internal managerial decisions (Reference GunninghamGunningham et al. 2004:326–8; Reference Donaldson and PrestonDonaldson & Preston 1995:75), the polyphonic model highlights how different discursive themes—ecological or economic—are woven into the organization's programs and routines, thereby influencing the organization's intrinsic communicative dynamic.

The polyphonic model also criticizes the attempt of the agency and transaction cost models to study the internal dynamic of organizations solely through an individualistic lens. It emphasizes, in contrast, “the role of institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an organization, social order, or society” (Reference March and OlsenMarch & Olsen 1998:948). Indeed, this study has highlighted the fact that as contexts of identification, trust, and commitment, organizations can deeply influence the state of mind and behavioral choices of the individuals associated with them (Reference Ghoshal and MoranGhoshal & Moran 1995:15; Reference AllenAllen 1993:1401–3).

It is appropriate, in conclusion, to consider several methodological limitations of the study and to highlight potential avenues for future research. As noted above, our findings demonstrate a significant association between certification and various pro-environmental attitudinal factors within the managers and employees in our sample. These findings, we argue, can be interpreted as indicators of ISO 14001 independent causal power in instigating pro-environmental processes within certified firms. Arguably, there might be a possible problem of endogeneity involved in the research design. That is, some of the observed and unobserved factors that influence firms' decision to join ISO 14001, such as the type of business in which they engage or pre-existing institutional or managerial support for the environmental cause, may also affect their institutional and pollution variables post-certification (Reference Prakash and PotoskiPrakash & Potoski 2006:157; Reference BorckBorck et al. 2008).

We employed several methodological techniques in order to deal with the question of endogeneity, combining both discursive and statistical analysis.Footnote 26 These techniques provided a reasonable basis for determining that ISO 14001 had an independent causal impact. Nonetheless, our empirical work constitutes only a first step in analyzing the sociological and psychological processes that take place in firms implementing EMSs. We believe that more effort needs to be made in order to further study the intricate sociological and psychological processes that take place within organizations that adopt environmental self-management schemes. Below we sketch several directions for future research (responding to some of the limitations of our study).

First, studying the structural impacts of certification and the linkage between these structural changes and the attitudes of employees requires longitudinal studies that will examine the dynamic of certified firms over time (against appropriate samples of nonparticipants). It would also be important in this context to gather relevant precertification data, referring, for example, to the firm's (and its employees') environmental commitment. Second, it will be interesting to explore the relation between the environmental commitment variable and other variables that may influence employees' commitment to the organization, such as the firm's policy on gender equality and other factors influencing the work experience. A further valuable extension will be to assess the employees' environmental commitment through richer measures of pro-environmental orientation, such as the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (Reference DunlapDunlap et al. 2000; Reference SchultzSchultz 2001). Fourth, another fruitful direction will be to compare between ISO 14001 and other voluntary initiatives such as Responsible Care and the Forest Stewardship Council scheme. Finally, it will also be interesting to link between the attitudinal measures used in our study and eco-physical or compliance indicators.Footnote 27

Policy Implications

Our study highlights the capacity of ISO 14001 to instigate a pro-environmental dynamic within certified firms. Our results are consistent with the findings of a large number of studies, which have found that ISO 14001 positively influences the environmental performance of subscribing organizations.Footnote 28

The findings of this and other studies that have examined the environmental efficacy of ISO 14001 justify the development of a regulatory program that will encourage firms to adopt the ISO 14001 EMS. Underlying this policy recommendation is the potential gap between the initial stage in which a firm considers whether to go for certification, and the second stage, that of implementation of the ISO 14001 EMS. Our study lends support to the idea that certification can move the organization into a new and more environmentally friendly equilibrium, irrespective of its prior ideological commitments. Since the certification decision is governed by a combination of economic, ideological, and legal considerations, firms that believe that the cost of certification is higher than the associated benefits or are not ideologically “green” may avoid certification, depriving society of the ecological benefits associated with certification. This phenomenon can also reflect a certain cognitive bias on the part of top executives, who may fail to recognize the potential virtuous cycle between certification and the employees' attitudes. The gap between the private considerations affecting the initial certification decision and the public benefits associated with certification constitutes the basic justification for providing regulatory incentives for certification; it could also justify requiring firms with a high-risk profile to obtain certification.

A regulatory scheme seeking to encourage the adoption of EMSs should provide substantial benefits to certified firms. We believe that the EU EMAS scheme constitutes a useful model in this context.Footnote 29 Programs of environmental excellence, which include an in-built requirement for EMS, exist also in the United States and Canada (Reference BorckBorck et al. 2009), although they seem to reflect a more cautious approach in terms of the incentives they provide to participating firms.Footnote 30

Our policy proposal is somewhat incompatible with the current calls—post the 2008 financial crisis—for “re-regulation” (Reference CrookCrook 2008; Reference MandelMandel 2008). These calls reflect skepticism with respect to the capacity of self-regulatory programs to achieve regulatory goals. We do not think that the events of 2008 justify a complete rejection of the self-regulation model. Such rejection would both disregard the creative and pro-social capacities of individuals and organizations and overstate the social-engineering capabilities of regulators. However, we do recognize that self-regulation schemes cannot replace the public regulation system.Footnote 31 They should also be highly selective in their design and the domain to which they are applied.Footnote 32 Further, self-regulatory schemes should also contain mechanisms that will discourage strategic manipulation of the scheme by participating firms (e.g., joining the proposed ISO 14001 scheme in order to gain regulatory rewards, but without a genuine commitment to implement the ISO 14001 EMS).

A program encouraging firms to adopt ISO 14001 should therefore include elements responding to these concerns. A proper regulatory response should be based, we suggest, on the following three pillars: a requirement to publish an annual environmental statement (preferably according to the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines), a requirement to engage in meaningful internal and external dialogue, and the development of closer cooperation between national regulators and national accreditation bodies in supervising the work of EMS auditors.Footnote 33 This threefold strategy should both provide an incentive for organizations to incorporate more demanding environmental goals and strengthen the monitoring and reflexive components of the ISO 14001 system (reducing the capacity of firms to use ISO 14001 as a mere “green wash” instrument). The advantage of this strategy is that it does not interfere directly with the decisional autonomy of certified firms, remaining faithful to the ISO 14001 self-regulatory spirit. The EMAS scheme includes several components that respond to these concerns and could therefore serve as a template for other environmental regulators.Footnote 34

Footnotes

This research was supported by the Chief Scientist of the Israeli Ministry of Environment. We would like to thank Gideon Parchomovsky, Ben Richardson, and Stepan Wood for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and three anonymous reviewers. We are thankful to Haya Greenwald and Shiri Ramon for research assistance. Joel Weill, former VP Quality and Special Projects at Ormat, and Dr. Nitzan Eyal of the Standards Institution of Israel provided us with valuable information regarding auditing practices in Israel.

1 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm. ISO 14001 also dominates the Israeli market.

3 This term was used by other authors, see, e.g., Reference HazenHazen (1993) and Reference Andersen, Hernes and BakkenAndersen (2003). While we share with these writers the conception of the firm as a complex web of discourses, our model takes this argument further by developing a detailed description of the firm's internal dynamic.

5 Communication is conceptualized as the synthesis of three elements: information, utterance, and understanding, each forming an independent selection or distinction (Reference LuhmannLuhmann 1992).

6 Routine involves “a collection of procedures which, taken together, result in a predictable and specifiable outcome” (Reference Nelson and SampatNelson & Sampat 2001:42). See further Reference PelikanPelikan (2003:243).

7 See further on that possibility Reference JensenJensen (2002:252).

8 For the cost of certification, see Reference Jiang and BansalJiang and Bansal (2003:1049) and Reference Prakash and PotoskiPrakash and Potoski (2006:27). For the varied considerations affecting the certification decision, see Reference BorckBorck (2008:118–9).

9 This idea is mentioned by other CSR scholars (Reference ReinhardtReinhardt et al. 2008:226; Reference PortneyPortney 2008:264, 266). However, these authors do not offer a detailed socio-psychological model that can explain the mechanics of this virtuous cycle.

10 This conceptual scheme closely resembles March and Olsen's distinction between the logic of expected consequences and the logic of appropriateness (1998:949–52).

11 It should be noted though that organizational commitment depends also on other factors, such as the work environment and the costs of leaving the organization.

14 Additional independent variables included in the regression equation for control purposes were organizational attributes and the environmental motivation indexes. The organizational attributes included the following variables: firm's size (a variable approximated by computing the natural log of the number of employees in the firm); belonging to the chemical sector (selected based on the assumption that the environmental issue is more salient in petrochemical firms); belonging to a corporate conglomerate; and the natural log of the ratio of the production intended for export. In addition, the interaction between the ISO 14001 certification variable and the conglomerate variable was examined.

15 Additional independent variables included in the regression equation for control purposes were organizational attributes (identical to the ones used above), employee attributes (gender, academic education, length of employment, and environmental role) and the environmental commitment according to the executives' perception. We also examined the interaction between the certification and conglomerate variables.

16 The percentages were calculated from the total of all employees of certified firms (N=400).

17 The regression equation included additional independent variables for control purposes: organizational attributes, employee attributes, and the environmental commitment according to the managers' perception.

18 Additional independent variables included in the regression equation for control purposes were organizational attributes and employee attributes (identical to the ones used above).

19 Among the other organizational and employee variables that were included in the regression equation, the variables representing the employees' number, chemical industry, and environmental role contributed significantly and positively to the explained variance. Thus, the larger the firm was, the greater the organizational environmental commitment according to the employees' conception. In chemical-sector firms, organizational environmental commitment according to the employees' perception was higher than in firms in other sectors. Among employees with an environmental role, the organizational environmental commitment was higher than that of other employees. In addition, we found that the higher the ratio of exports, the lower the organizational environmental commitment. The interaction between ISO 14001 certification and being part of a conglomerate indicated that in ISO 14001 firms that were part of a conglomerate, the organizational environmental commitment was lower than among independent ISO 14001 firms. We did not find such difference among noncertified firms.

20 The environmental commitment according to the managers' perception did not contribute significantly to the explained variance. The results concerning the variables of organizational and employee attributes included in the regression equation for control purposes were similar to those reported in Table 3.

21 The questionnaires included the following question: “To what degree have you become more committed to the environment as a result of the implementation of ISO 14001?”

22 The analysis was based on a t-test: t(333)=−11.65; p<0.001.

23 The organizational environmental commitment according to the executives' perception did not contribute significantly to the explained variance.

24 In building our sample we tried to carefully match non-ISO with ISO firms, taking into account various organizational attributes. We also controlled for some of these organizational variables (e.g., chemical sector) in our regression analysis. It is interesting to note in this context that the employees' perceived organizational environmental commitment within chemical-sector firms, was higher than in firms in other sectors. This positive association was significant in both certified and noncertified firms. This result suggests that in chemical-sector firms the environmental issue receives some institutional salience.

25 We examined the managers' view of the reasons underlying the firm's decision to either go for certification or adopt pro-environmental policy (in noncertified firms). We found that the main reasons were public regulation and environmental considerations. Economic considerations (together with responsibility toward the community) were seen as less important.

26 See the discussion on pp. 603–609 for details and the text above. For the value of multimethod analysis, see Reference Ahrens and ChapmanAhrens and Chapman (2006:822) and Reference Fine and ElsbachFine and Elsbach (2000:53).

27 Another interesting question concerns the relationship between the environmental attitudes of the executives and the effectiveness of the EMS (Reference Coglianese and NashCoglianese & Nash 2001:12–14). We believe that ISO 14001 can influence the organization regardless of the initial attitudes of the executives, although these attitudes can have an enhancing/diminishing impact.

29 See Regulation (EC) No. 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001, allowing voluntary participation by organizations in a community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS regulation). For a detailed survey of regulatory incentives given by EU member states, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/activities/index_en.htm (accessed 28 May 2009). The EU has recently proposed to revise the EMAS scheme, seeking to enhance the incentives given by member states and EU institutions to EMAS companies. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Voluntary Participation by Organisations in a Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), Brussels, COM(2008) 402, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/pdf/com_2008_402_final.pdf (accessed 28 May 2009).

30 See, e.g., EPA Performance Track program (http://www.epa.gov/perftrac), Alberta EnviroVista program (http://environment.alberta.ca/867.html), and Ontario Environmental Leaders Program (http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/general/leadership/index.htm) (all accessed 28 May 2009). EPA decided to halt the Performance Track program on 16 March 2009 in order to review its success.

31 We do not suggest in that context that ISO 14001 can replace the public regulatory framework. This view was shared by many of the managers we interviewed, reflecting, so it seems, a concern that without regulation, their competitors may lower their environmental standards so much that their environmentally friendly companies will not survive in the marketplace. Public regulation thus provides the important function of setting a “regulatory floor” for the entire industry.

32 In this context the literature has been doubtful, for example, with respect to the efficacy of other EMSs, and our recommendations are limited therefore to ISO 14001. See, e.g., the Reference King and LenoxKing and Lenox study of Responsible Care (2000), the Reference Welch, Mazur and BretschneiderWelch, Mazur, and Bretschneider study of the U.S. Department of Energy CO2 program (2000), the Reference RiveraRivera et al. study of the Sustainable Slopes Program (2006), and Reference Darnall and SidesDarnall and Sides (2008).

33 For a review of the U.S. National Accreditation Program and constructive suggestions on how to improve it, see Reference AndrewsAndrews (2001).

34 Thus, for example, EMAS requires participating organizations to engage in an open dialogue with the public (Art. 1(2)(c), Annex B, Section 3, EMAS Regulation 2001), to publish an annual Environmental Statement (Art. 3.2(c)(e), Annex III, EMAS Regulation 2001), and to develop a framework for employee participation (Section 4, appendix B, EMAS Regulation 2001). The European Commission's recent revision proposal attempts to further improve the EMAS scheme in these contexts by proposing to harmonize the rules for accreditation and verification and to reinforce environmental reporting requirements, drawing on newly developed core performance indicators and sectoral reference documents. The EPA Performance Track program includes similar requirements; see http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/program/index.htm (accessed 28 May 2009).

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Figure 0

Table 1. Linear Regression Estimates Predicting Organizational Commitment to the Environment as Perceived by Managers, Using the ISO 14001 Certification Variable (N=47)

Figure 1

Table 2. Differences in the Indexes of Organizational Environmental Motivation Between Executives of Certified and Noncertified Firms (N=47)

Figure 2

Table 3. Estimates of the Linear Regression for Predicting the Organizational Environmental Commitment According to the Employees' Perception, Using the ISO 14001 Certification Variable and Environmental Commitment According to the Executives' Perception

Figure 3

Table 4. Estimates for Predicting Organizational Environmental Commitment According to Employees' Perception in ISO 14001 Firms, Using the ISO 14001 Integration Variable and the Environmental Commitment According to the Executives' Perception (N=400)

Figure 4

Table 5. Estimates of the Linear Regression for Predicting OCB Using the Organizational Environmental Commitment According to Employees' and Executives' Perception (N=576)