The idea of organism, which of recent years has bulked so largely in scientific, and especially in biological, theory has been developed mainly in reference to living organisms, and has been extended to cover such systems as human societies, crystals, molecules and atoms—and indeed the whole universe has been interpreted as an organism. This use of the term, however, includes different ways in which parts may be together in a system. The belief that the principle of organism has been wrongly extended to explain certain co-ordinations of vital processes which require a different type of explanation is the reason for this addition to the immense literature on the subject of organism.

1. Philosophy of Science. The term “philosophy of science” is used here to refer to the study of the approaches and methodologies of the sciences. By “approach” is understood the totality of the presuppositions of a given science (or body of sciences, or scientific product): more precisely, both philosophical and scientific presuppositions—that is, categories, postulates, and premises as conditions—and “existential” presuppositions (organic, geographic, socio-cultural). By “methodology” is understood the intellectual-emotional structure of a given science—that is, its categories, postulates, and premises as characteristics, as well as its concepts, methods, and techniques. Further, I advocate understanding a given science (or body of sciences, or scientific product) through a study of its approach and of its methodology. Finally, I submit that the best understanding of either of the two is impossible without the study of the other. More specifically, I advocate the consideration of a particular science (or body of sciences, e.g., the “social sciences,” or scientific product) as a given, and the interpretation of its intellectual structure or methodology (“immanent interpretation”); and then the study of its presuppositions or underlying approach (“transcendent interpretation”).

1. An epistemological integration. Any proposition which is entertained in any mind will be represented by four points, one located on each of four scales, symbolizing truth, belief, probability, and conviction.

It is widely believed that a study of the dynamics of capitalist development eventuates in a determinate law of economic evolution. If we trace the origins of this assumption, we find that it stems from the influence of the Hegelian dialectic upon economic theory. The metaphysic of determinism has thus obtruded its way into social science, and brought with it the corollary that economic analysis yields an insight into the necessary pattern of capitalist development.

The naive misunderstanding among economists of the relationship between economics and philosophy is as profound as it is prevalent. To be sure, economists have concerned themselves with the philosophy of economics only so much as to familiarize themselves with methodology and its application to economic inquiry. Since economics is the oldest and perhaps the most “respectable” of the social sciences its scholars have developed a phobia for anything they might suspect to be even remotely unscientific. Consequently, they have erroneously narrowed their understanding of the nature of economics. This narrowness prevails largely because most economists possess little or no training in general philosophy and especially in the philosophy of science. As a result of this apparent deficiency there exists in the minds of these economists confusion and inability to distinguish between teleology, axiology, and ethics as they do or do not apply to economics.

Surprising as it may perhaps seem to many, I have found in the upshot of a fairly persistent series of trials that it is easier to define “life” in terms of “culture” than it is to define “culture” in terms of “life.” Searching logistic experiments show that the latter way is strewn with conceptual booby-traps in the shape of such terms as “physical,” “non-physical,” “material,” “immaterial,” “spiritual,” “ideal,” “natural,” “supernatural,” etc. Some important sectors of our intellectual culture have for generations stultified themselves by attempting to account in such unserviceable and deceitful terms for manifest and institutionally important differences in natural phenomena and the practical human affairs to which they appertain. Such desperate jugglery as has been engaged in, although embraced in much received doctrine, is not conducive either to intellectual or to moral integrity. Such dualistic chimeras had best be abandoned, the more peremptorily the better, as leading only to self-contradiction, confusion, and serious temptation to futile logical expedients.

1. Deductive and Inductive Inference. Within the traditional treatments of scientific method, e.g., in (2) and (25), it was customary to divide scientific inference into two parts: deductive and inductive. Deductive inference was taken to mean the activity of deducing theorems from postulates and definitions, whereas inductive inference represented the activity of constructing a general statement from a set of particular “facts.” Deductive inference was relegated to the mathematical (formal) sciences, and inductive inference to the empirical (non-formal) sciences. As a consequence, the whole of science was split into two quite distinct parts: deductive science was conceived to start with precise axioms, postulates, and definitions, and its method consisted in drawing inferences from these “givens” in such a way that if the original assumptions are taken as true, then the theorems must be taken as true also. The obligation behind this “must” of the mathematical sciences was an obligation based on strict rules of deductive inference; in the earlier analyses, it was supposed that these rules were all aspects of the general theory of the syllogism, as it was described in an almost complete form in (2) but in later work the rules have been formalized in more general terms (17). Inductive inference, on the other hand, was supposed to start with observed facts; these facts, or “data,” were presumably given by the senses, and described particular aspects of the external world. If the facts were given in a certain way, then the empirical scientist could “infer” a generalized description; this generalization had the characteristic that if it were granted as true, then all the facts could be deduced as consequences. The inductive process admittedly does not lead to unique generalizations (no more than the deductive process leads to unique theorems), and the philosopher of science searched for other defining characteristics of good inference, such as “simplicity” and “convenience.” These empirical generalizations were taken to be “descriptions of the phenomenal world of the scientist”; a further inductive step might be taken by constructing a set of very general principles out of the more specialized generalizations within specific research problems. These “higher” inductive inferences were regarded as “theories,” which could be studied by themselves within the method of deductive inference. The scientist was then described as “checking” theory by determining whether or not the predicted consequences deduced from theory actually hold in the phenomenal world.