Over the past decade, a curious theological parallel has occurred in the UK to that which occurred in the decade preceding in the United States of America. There, in the US, Wesleyan New Testament scholar Joel B. Green spearheaded a move to encourage the Academy and the Church to reconsider their theological anthropology and to distance themselves from belief in an immaterial soul. Here in Great Britain, a similar move has been made by Anglican New Testament scholars N.T. Wright and M.B. Thompson, seeking to challenge both Church and Academy on their long-held belief in the immaterial soul and to encourage them to think more biblically about their anthropology. In some ways, this is not new; in the previous century, scholars of the Biblical Theology Movement, the liberal tradition, those influenced by materialist and late modern ideology, sought to do likewise. They proposed alternative anthropology to the long-held dualistic tradition, seeking to free the Church from such thought as humans having (or essentially being) a soul. But, for the first time in more evangelical circles, two exegetes with a renowned commitment to the (final) authority of Scripture, and a strong commitment to the tradition of the historic Church, have proposed that the tradition is wrong-headed and that actually Scripture teaches the embodied nature of human beings with little or no place for an immaterial soul.
This proposal of both UK scholars is made all the more prominent by the credentials they hold and the influence they emanate across the theological world. N.T. Wright is former Professor of New Testament and Early Christianity at St Andrews University, having previously served as Anglican Bishop of Durham, and is now based at Wycliffe Hall Anglican training college in Oxford – a centre from which he continues to develop his research and writing and continues to receive numerous invitations to speak to audiences worldwide. In effect, he needs no further introduction; his work is widely known, not just in his own Anglican tradition but in many strata of the Academy and Church, and his influence is felt across the theological spectrum. M.B. Thompson is Associate Principal and Lecturer of New Testament at Ridley Hall, Cambridge, and though not known to the extent of Wright, his influence among biblical scholars (as well as now [in a growing sense] among the neuroscientific communityFootnote 2) is also significant and bringing effects in the next generation, particularly of Anglican thinkers.
For neither Wright nor Thompson is philosophical theology their principal discipline, nor philosophy their primary passion; rather their areas of expertise lie in biblical studies – specifically the gospels and the letters of Paul. But both see the question of theological anthropology as a doctrine that needs to be addressed due to the findings their New Testament studies have revealed. The biblical research of both has therefore led to their addressing the subject in oral form as conference lectures, but lectures which are having worldwide impact due to their online accessibility in video or transcript form.Footnote 3
While recognizing the field of their specialism, the implications of Wright and Thompson’s (W+T’s) ideas – and the subject of theological anthropology generally – are wide ranging and cross into further disciplines, affecting related discussions of particular pertinence to today. For example, one’s views of personhood, eschatology, mind-body relation and ethics are all impacted by one’s thoughts on theological anthropology.Footnote 4 So though the views W+T advance are focused in the discipline of biblical studies, they have wide-ranging implications for other key areas of thought and hence praxis.
With this combination of two evangelical biblical scholars, with wide influence, seeking to challenge the Church’s tradition, in an inter-disciplinary arena of theological anthropology, the attention drawn has been significant. Indeed, many in both Academy and Church have shown an interest in such discussion and the ideas W+T expound.Footnote 5 Being a topic of such attention and live interest, the ponderings of these thinkers merit considered and critical reflection, recognizing the ensuing implications the topic has for the related areas of discussion. In what follows, therefore, the article seeks to address the theological anthropology of W+T, to then bring a response. It proceeds by articulating the key anthropological contentions both thinkers want to affirm, before elucidating these further through locating them in their historical heritage of biblical studies. This enables analysis of W+T’s ideas to ensue at a deeper level of critique, facilitating a critical response to their anthropology as a whole. Through implementing this procedure, the limitations of the anthropology they refute and that which they suggest are identified, and a fuller anthropology instead is proposed. With particular focus on the soul in W+T’s thought, a healthier, dualistic, anthropology is promoted, and a richer view of the soul advanced. Through showing itself to be conceptually stronger and more biblically rooted, this view of the soul commends itself as being richer and preferable to the views W+T espouse (as it does also to the views they deplore and renounce).
Wright and Thompson’s Key Anthropological Contentions
The anthropological thinking of W+T arose and was presented in differing contexts, so they naturally had slightly different audiences and intentions in mind when addressing the issue. Wright was asked to bring a biblical contribution to the mind-body discussion at a conference of philosophers,Footnote 6 while Thompson was asked to give a couple of shorter lectures on the ‘Soul in the New Testament’ at the Faraday Institute’s Centre of Science and Religion.Footnote 7 Yet, while bearing in mind those slightly differing contexts, they share much in common anthropologically, and in particular promote two key contentions, to which they both zealously hold.
First, they are resolute about the value of the human body, and the resurrection body of the age to come. In contrast to Platonic dualism,Footnote 8 with its devaluing of the body – locating the value of a human in the soul (to which the body functions as a prison), W+T are unyielding in their commitment to the value of the human body as being a part of God’s good creation. Additionally, the value of the body is affirmed by the nature of the incarnation, and indeed the new creation; and within that doctrinal framework, they further passionately argue that salvation in biblical thought is something applied to the whole of the person, not just to a special immaterial soul, as demonstrated by the doctrine of resurrection.Footnote 9
This aversion for views which overly emphasize the soul’s importance is also turned towards (Classic) Cartesian dualism, a view that likewise devalues the body by separating the soul’s higher, ‘spiritual’ and moral functions from the body’s physical and appetitive ones.Footnote 10 Furthermore, they are convinced that such dualism is countered by neuroscience as it steadily maps the specific neural correlates involved in human functioning, specifically those previously attributed to the soul; this leaves W+T persuaded of the perception that such neuroscience is eliminating any (hiding) place for a ‘soul-of-the (neuroscientific)-gaps’ type of dualism, leaving no credibility for such belief in an immaterial soul.Footnote 11
In W+T’s minds, anthropological dualism (in its varieties), while elevating the place of an immaterial soul, denigrates the place of the human body; a view they find entirely incompatible with Scripture, which gladly emphasizes the value of the body.
Secondly, they are firm in their contention that the term ‘soul’ in Scripture means something different to the connotations it has taken on in both philosophical circles and popular culture today. They admonish that, rather than reading the contemporary understandings the term has gained into Scripture, the careful thinker should be exegeting the biblical authors’ understanding(s) out of Scripture. Current views that are commonly read into the scriptural term ‘soul’ are often those that view it as (something like) an immaterial entity – the essential spirit of a person. This is something different to what both scholars argue the term means in its intended scriptural sense(s).
Drawing upon his previous Old Testament (OT) studies, before his New Testament (NT) specialization, Thompson identifies that the Hebrew word nephesh (translated traditionally as ‘soul’ in English) is used in a number of ways in the OT: initially it referred to a person’s throat or their neck, but it came, as the OT progressed, to be seen as a term referring to a human as a whole, as a living/needy/longing/desiring/striving/yearning/relational being.Footnote 12 He then traces the Greek equivalent – psuche – through the NT to reveal its sometimes being accurately translated as ‘soul’, but more often translated as ‘life’ or ‘living being’,Footnote 13 or, as Wright prefers, ‘living being/creature’.Footnote 14 Both W+T see these understandings as particularly prevalent in the gospels and in Paul, bringing a different understanding to what Scripture is referring to when it talks about the ‘soul’ to the (mis)conceptions that are read into ‘the Bible’s’ anthropology in popular and (some) philosophical thought. Indeed, Thompson’s main aim is to show how the term ‘soul’ has been given more careful attention by Bible translators recently, and how the idea of its being an immaterial entity is an eisegetical mistake, coloured by modern understandings of the word, as opposed to the biblical authors’ use of the term.
The Biblical Studies Heritage of Wright and Thompson
The theology of W+T, and specifically their theological anthropology, receives fuller elucidation through a knowledge of their disciplinary heritage. Their discipline of biblical studies, with its twentieth-century shaping, casts light on their ideas and illumines their anthropology.
Within that disciplinary heritage, a claim of particular significance recurred throughout the twentieth century: that traditional exegesis and theology has been polluted by Greek (non-biblical) thought. This claim of biblical scholars, heard throughout the twentieth century, was that the theology of the (Church) Fathers had been influenced by (Middle) Platonism; the scholars then further contending that that influence was later bequeathed by the Fathers to their theological descendants – the subsequent generations of the Church so inheriting this Platonic colour. In illustration of the former, the early Augustine is cited, in particular his anthropological thought;Footnote 15 in depicting a soul and body as like a ‘captain steering a ship’ Augustine portrayed a human person as primarily being a soul, who operates within the world by means of her physical body.Footnote 16 The biblical scholars claimed that such thinking was derived from Platonism, which Augustine had imbibed and read back into the pages of Scripture.Footnote 17 This error was also traced in Augustine’s theological descendants, with subsequent thinkers like Calvin identified as similarly Platonic-coloured.Footnote 18 From here the argument progressed that traditions descending from Calvin additionally inherited this influence, and so traditions such as Anglicanism – with its dualistic anthropologyFootnote 19 – received a dualism from its forebears that was Platonic in essence. By contrast to what they perceived, the desire of these biblical scholars was to renounce this Platonic eisegesis and affirm exegesis instead. And for applying the method correctly, they stressed the Hebraic horizon of Scripture as the appropriate worldview and backdrop for carrying out this exegetical work. This aversion to Greek-coloured theology, and contending the Hebraic instead, brought much potential for change – in multiple strands of theology – not least in the area of theological anthropology.
While illumining W+T’s thought to a degree, additional light is added through focus on certain key thinkers, who particularly shaped W+T’s heritage of twentieth-century biblical studies.
At the outset of the century, H. Wheeler Robinson is particularly significant, with the shift he brought to biblical studies in its anthropological thought. Contending that Scripture’s anthropology is different to what Platonic (and Cartesian) dualism(s) had advocated, he exposed the view’s functional bifurcation and claimed it was scripturally mistaken. Such previous dualism(s) had espoused a separate division of labour – the soul having one set of functions (e.g. thinking/deciding/acting) and the body having another (e.g. eating/excreting/reproducing). In contrast, Wheeler Robinson highlighted the functional holism of Scripture – its depiction of a human as being a holistically functioning unity. Through close(r) examination of terms (such as leb, basar, nephesh), he proposed this functional unity and argued a scriptural case for a united body and soul.Footnote 20
Ensuing Wheeler Robinson’s work, Rudolf Bultmann progressed this biblical holism – in the anthropological section of his Theology of the New Testament. In a passage of particular renown, through lexical study of his own, he responded to Augustine’s theology, advancing a new and distinctive anthropology. Discontent with the traditional understanding of the biblical term soma (body) and appealing to what he saw as the NT’s actual meaning of the word, Bultmann famously stated: ‘Man does not have a soma, he is soma’.Footnote 21 What lay behind the dictum was his alternative understanding of soma, conceiving the ‘body’ not just as physical flesh but as a term synonymous with the self. For him, the soma meant the ‘person’ – the ‘body’ was synonymous with the ‘ego’. This revisionist understanding of the soma led Bultmann further than just affirming anthropological holism; he advanced, in fact, beyond anthropological dualism into the territory of anthropological monism. This was a major shift of thought in the history of theological anthropology, which – until this point in time – had predominantly affirmed some form of anthropological dualism.Footnote 22
Oscar Cullmann further progressed this thought with his eschatological contention (which arose in a series of lectures, published in the mid-1950s). Cullmann’s major contention asserted that the goal of biblical eschatology is the resurrection of the body not the immortality of the soul. The latter he regarded as imported from Platonic (Greek) philosophy, whereas the former he viewed as the actual – the Hebraic eschatology of Scripture.Footnote 23
These three publications were landmarks in biblical studies, and shaped and formed the basis for much anthropology that followed. Succeeding these milestones, numerous works resulted contending that Paul was Hebraic in his anthropology and that humans, in biblical thought, are ‘holistic/monistic’ beings.Footnote 24 While critiques of Bultmann did follow, particularly from Jewett and Gundry,Footnote 25 their effect on the tide was limited; the ‘holistic/monistic’ model, by this point in the twentieth century, had become the favoured anthropological understanding for scholars in biblical studies.
At the end of the twentieth century James Dunn advanced the opinion yet further, through the anthropology contained in his work The Theology of Paul the Apostle. Footnote 26 In that text he argued that Paul’s anthropological terms – such as kardia, psuche, soma – should be understood ‘aspectivally’ in a Hebraic and holistic sense. In contrast to viewing them ‘partitively’, in a Greek, constitutive, sense,Footnote 27 Dunn affirmed instead that Paul uses the terms to depict a human in the whole/entirety of her being – each term denoting the person by way of a particular aspect. Paul’s use of the term ‘soul’, on Dunn’s aspectivalist view, is to describe the entire person as a living, creaturely being; his use of the term ‘body’ denotes that same entire person but referring to her now as an appetitive physical being; ‘mind’ is his term for the same whole person as a thinking or rational being; ‘spirit’ is the whole of the person in orientation/relation to God.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, these themes received further enhancement by the work of Joel Green. Through focus on the image of God, with extra neurological study, Green drew on additional fields to corroborate the monistic view. In a multi-disciplinary work, Green joined with a cohort of scholars from related anthropological fields, to contend that biologically, psychologically, philosophically – as well as indeed biblically – humans are monistic beings.Footnote 28 In continuing subsequent works, Green continued to make this case, with his 2013 lecture summating his established position. Entitled ‘On Doing Without a Soul: A New Testament Perspective’,Footnote 29 Green argued his explicit contention, showing the modern-day preference of translators to opt for alternative words such as ‘life’ (or ‘I’, ‘living being’ or ‘person’) when translating the NT term psuche.
This biblical studies heritage casts light on W+T’s thinking, showing the ideas and voices of influence in their anthropological thought.
Considering the heritage’s influence in Thompson’s anthropological lecture, first, Green’s work is explicitly prominent as Thompson traces the meanings of anthropological terms through the Old and New Testaments. While bringing additional thought from his OT survey of terms, his NT survey is clearly coloured by Green as Thompson seeks to establish the NT meaning(s) of psuche. In that part of his lecture, and very similarly to Green, Thompson identifies the leading translation of psuche – in 46 of its 103 NT appearances – as ‘life/living being’.Footnote 30 He later refers to Green as a leading authority on the subject, confirming Green’s obvious influence in Thompson’s anthropological thought.
When considering the lecture of Wright, it is particularly the writing of Dunn that colours Wright’s own constructive proposal, but the wider heritage is apparent when considering the whole of his lecture. Wright preludes his constructive proposal with warnings against anthropological dualism(s), fuelled evidently by the heritage’s dualistic concerns. The Classic Cartesian position, or the philosophical idealism of Kant, he views as erroneous dualistic foundations; and dualisms foreign to Judaism, those denigrating the body, or those entailing eisegesis of terms, are likewise anthropologies he admonishes as those to be avoided.Footnote 31
After this cautionary prelude, Dunn’s influence is prevalent as Wright forges his own constructive proposal, one he names that of ‘eschatological integration’. Wright frames and colours this work by his meta and regular theme, with his Dunn-styled anthropology then formed and inserted within. Wright’s meta and oft-sounded theme is the God-given human vocation: to bear and reflect God’s image, in, and to, his creation – a telos finding its ultimate fulfilment in and through the person of Christ.Footnote 32 This motif then informs his proposal, which adapts Dunn’s ‘aspectival monism’, using the familiar anthropological terms (such as soul, body, mind, heart, spirit) to describe the whole of the human person from different aspects of her being. Adopting this idea of Dunn but changing his terminology, Wright articulates the following by way of his summary: ‘…when Paul thinks of human beings he sees every angle of vision as contributing to the whole, and the whole from every angle of vision. All lead to the one, the one is seen in all.’Footnote 33 But Wright’s adaptation of Dunn goes further in what it asserts, claiming that full integration of a human – in all the aspects above – occurs fully and only ultimately at the point of the eschaton. Wright’s own unique construction, built upon the foundation of Dunn, attempts to advance eschatologically this aspectival monism of Dunn. In short it can be summarized, with an analogy that Wright employs, that like the church in its diversity of members, whose (eschatological) goal is unity in Christ, so the telos of the individual human is eschatological integration in Christ.
As this overview illumines, the heritage of W+T has influenced their thought. Their citing the heritage’s maxims,Footnote 34 and building on Dunn and Green respectively, reveal a deep imbibing of that heritage with its colouring their anthropology. Any sense of Platonic import is viewed with theological aversion and, in union with their disciplinary heritage, W+T have distanced themselves from dualism, appearing, instead, to prefer an anthropological monism.Footnote 35
In addition to what has been seen, a closer look at W+T’s anthropology, and indeed their biblical studies heritage, reveals their thought being particularly influenced by the ‘Biblical Theology Movement’ (BTM).
The BTM (developed through the 1940s–60s) was a response to the Fundamentalist-Liberal debate (of the 1910s–30s), which sought to value and retain the historical-critical tools of liberalism while applying those more fully in a theologically confessional framework. The BTM viewed the Scriptures as writings to be handled critically, but also regarded them collectively as a divinely authored unity – a book revealed progressively through centuries of human history. In addition to this understanding, they saw the viewing of these divine-human Scriptures in a Greek (or modern) philosophical sense as a deficient and inapt approach; Scripture instead was to be regarded in a more appropriate sense as a Jewish Hebraic revelation – one that had originated out of a Jewish and Hebraic horizon. Appreciating this Hebraic horizon, the aim of the BTM was to understand God’s revelation in history – and its development of theology through history – in the writings of the progressively revealed Old and New Testaments.
In the movement’s golden era (the 1940s–60s), scholars such as (the familiar) Wheeler Robinson, Bultmann and Cullmann were key in its development of thought; and although its popularity waned following Barr’s critiques of it during the 1960s, biblical theology has persisted (in a variety of forms) through and up to the present. Indeed, a version of biblical theology has been embraced by contemporary evangelicalism – their enthusiasm for biblical overviews (or for the [Wright-coined] ‘big sweep of Scripture’) is fuelled by biblical theology. And recognized now not just as a method, but by way of its content as well, biblical theology’s modern-day form has been defined by (evangelical scholar) Don Carson (in distinction from systematic theology) as: ‘a collation and restatement of biblical data, without the logical analysis and dialectical correlation between texts that systematic theology emphasizes’.Footnote 36
In addition to the prior-seen influences, these specific features of biblical theology are also evident in W+T’s work, and together with Carson’s (biblical theology) definition help further illumine their thought enabling assessment of their anthropology.
Assessment of Wright and Thompson’s Ideas
It is evident from the above that the Hebraic horizon of Scripture is a theme prevalent in W+T, and when applied anthropologically this Hebraic understanding of a human results in their putting a helpful emphasis upon the value of the human body. The doctrines of creation, incarnation and (re)new(ed) creation very much confirm such an emphasis, and this affirming of physical bodies is a strong and helpful contention. Likewise, their desire for scriptural terms to be understood in their proper and biblical sense is also a valuable contention, with their seeking the meanings of nephesh and psuche through biblical exegesis. The warning of eisegesis is the converse of this helpful contention, again maintaining the importance of Scripture’s anthropological terms being discovered through exegesis not buried through eisegesis. These two and foremost contentions are valuable emphases of W+T and those to be gladly affirmed; theological anthropology benefits healthily from applying and upholding these themes. But while affirming these both and retaining these helpful themes, W+T’s anthropology beyond these ideas is not as strong in comparison. In fact, by contrast to these healthy contentions, their wider anthropology is diminished by a number of philosophical frailties contained in the thinking thereof. A closer look at such work reveals limitations in analytical scrutiny and dialectical correlations between (biblical) texts, and so problematic exegesis hence follows of certain significant verses. The effect of these limitations is that their wider anthropology then suffers, so the insights of such work are curtailed beyond their two key contentions.
Beginning with Wright in this regard, this philosophical shortcoming is evident through substantial portions of his anthropological lecture. To begin with his constructive proposal, his view he terms ‘eschatological integration’ displays an unfortunate conceptual blurring of the category of human vocation with that of human constitution. His attempt to contribute theo/teleologically to an ontological mind-body discussion results in his focusing on vocation when the actual topic in focus is constitution. While Wright might claim they are one (implied by the closing comments of his lecture) a closer examination reveals this instead to be a lack of conceptual precision.
Wright’s meta and regular theme is of a theological and teleological quality. The human vocation he expounds is a biblical theological narrative – one helpful for understanding the God-given purpose of humans. To highlight the eschatological goal of humanity as being renewal and resurrection in Christ (enabling humans to fully reflect the image of God in, and to, his world) brings a biblically rich meta-principle for appreciating the human vocation.Footnote 37 Wright’s understanding of the Church related – as an eschatological ‘differentiated unity’ (or eschatological ‘integrated whole’) – is also theologically beneficial; but while helpful regarding vocation (and indeed, the communal human vocation), the attempt to apply this to ontology does not make conceptual sense. A person could become more integrated in function – for instance, her heart (will), body, mind, spirit could become more unified in purpose – but she could not become more integrated ontologically – in her fundamental constitution. Wright’s blurring of the categories is a lack of conceptual precision and results in his discussion and proposal suffering – his anthropology hence being diminished in substance as well as in clarity.Footnote 38
On a similar train of thought, his earlier dualistic admonishments against the views (he thinks) modern philosophers hold are rather under-informed conceptually and caricatures of their actual views. His eisegetical warning is valid, like his concern for denigrating the body,Footnote 39 but his unawareness of philosophical dualism – in its best and contemporary form(s) – mean his other dualistic admonishments are unfortunately strawmen-directed.Footnote 40 These philosophical inadequacies appear through much of his anthropological lecture, rendering its benefit somewhat (unusually) limited in what it can proffer the topic in focus.
The lack of conceptual analysis is additionally prominent in Thompson. The matters of personal identity (through time) and that of human free will are issues that in particular reveal conceptual holes in his view.
The first of these is exposed when considering the probing and pertinent question as to how a person at death could be identical with herself at the time of her resurrection (a person’s death = [time] t 1 and her resurrection, t 2). Dualists answer the question by reference to the immaterial soul, which ontologically grounds personal identity between these two moments. But having rejected that position, the view Thompson espouses instead reveals a philosophical hole; its absence of ontological continuity, between the events of t 1 and t 2, gives no grounds for exact identity persistence between those two moments. On the view Thompson holds, the person is re-created at t 2 as opposed to being resurrected. While raising an interesting distinction, the implication that follows (from the re-creation view) is that at the point of t 2 the exact identity of the person who dies at t 1 is lost.Footnote 41 As John Locke famously stated ‘One [identical] thing cannot have two beginnings’;Footnote 42 and when Locke’s dictum is applied to the issue here being considered, this insight helpfully discloses that the person re-created at t 2 would not be (personally) identical to herself at the point of t 1; rather, the person at t 2 would be just a replica of herself at t 1. When questioned along these lines (in the Q+A session[s] following his lecture[s]), Thompson’s attempted responses were theological in nature, suggesting God’s love for or his remembering a person as possible grounds for addressing this specific conceptual problem. But such theological attempts are weak and inadequate responses to a precise and philosophical issue – an issue of human ontology and persistence of personhood through time.
In addition to the issue above, the fully monistic view raises philosophical problems for the affirming of human free will. If humans are constituted entirely of just atoms and physical ‘stuff’, then determinism follows. Green had previously recognized this issue and attempted a response in 2008 (though with comparable limits philosophically, that response was likewise conceptually thinFootnote 43); but Thompson had apparently not conceived of this issue, so when raised at the end by his audience, could give little by way of reply.Footnote 44 This lack of philosophical analysis, in a manner similar to Wright, means that his anthropology also suffers, putting limits on what it can offer.
This importance of philosophical method for anthropological understanding is actually acknowledged by Green (even if needing further employment in his anthropological work). In his book entitled Body, Soul and Human Life, he highlights the implicit nature of Scripture’s anthropology. He states that at times Scripture assumes an anthropology, at others it counters alternate views, and still others it implies a position (as opposed to being explicit from exegesis).Footnote 45 The importance of deducing and inferring Scripture’s implicit anthropology is thereby revealed by Green and shows the importance of logic and reason for the theologian engaged in this task. While theological anthropology is reliant on exegesis for understanding the verses of Scripture, the philosophical tools are likewise essential for discerning the scriptural view. (Indeed, the extent to which these tools are required for fully engaging this doctrine might emphasize the topic’s location in the discipline of philosophical theology.)Footnote 46
Given the level of philosophy required, an exegete might be wise in displaying caution before attempting to leap from a survey of biblical terms to the conclusion of a monistic anthropology. Such a leap results in an error of logical thought – a fallacy commonly seen in monistic biblical scholarship. It is commonly assumed that if psuche in all its appearances were aptly translated as above, then monism necessarily follows as the logical biblical anthropology. But such a conclusion is weak, based on fallacious and erroneous logic. For even if the translations above (namely ‘life’/‘living creature’/‘self’/‘person’ [+]) were exhaustive of the meaning(s) of psuche, an immaterial aspect of a person might still be scripturally implied, but just never termed in Scripture as psuche (or [OT] nephesh). Such a prospect arises in 2 Cor. 12.1-4 concerning Paul’s heavenly vision and experience.
In 2 Cor. 12.1-4 Paul reflects on the nature of his heavenly vision, musing as to whether he experienced it in or away from his physical body. Conceiving that it might have occurred away from the physical body implies Paul’s possibly entertaining the belief of an anthropological dualism. Although not mentioning the psuche in connection with his heavenly experience, this does nothing to deny the logic implied in Paul’s thought. As much is admitted by Wright in his comment concerning the passage:
the fact that he [Paul] can consider the possibility that the experience might not have been ‘in the body’ does indeed indicate that he can contemplate non-bodily experiences…Footnote 47
But instead of perceiving the logic, or letting that logic take root, Wright returns instead to the strawmen, with his sentence descending as follows:
but as will become clear I don’t think one can straightforwardly argue from this to what is now meant, in philosophical circles, by ‘dualism’, or, in particular, to the conclusion that it is this other non-bodily element which is the crucial, defining part of the human being.Footnote 48
Wright hints at the passage’s logic in the former part of his comment, but his latter return to the strawmen means that that logic is regrettably dropped. For if it were even possible that Paul’s vision could have occurred away from or out of the body, then whatever the entity is termed – that was having this conscious experience – would have to be non-physical in nature. So, the implication of the passage – even if not employing the term psuche – is that there is potentially an aspect of a person that is immaterial in nature that bears/experiences consciousness either in or away from the body.
Related to this point, there are certain eschatological passages – occurring in both the Old and New Testaments – that imply a similar anthropology. From these particular passages a related case can be made that conscious existence continues beyond the death of the body. And if a person’s consciousness continues after the death of her physical (/material) body, then whatever is bearing this consciousness must be immaterial in nature.Footnote 49
Aware of these pertinent passages, W+T give them significant time in their lectures, and in response to the argument above affirm resurrection as the eschatological human telos. As the ultimate goal of a human, this is right and biblically rich, but of the time following death until that resurrection telos, they miss the biblical nuance. This concept of continued existence, beyond the death of the physical body, is potentially hinted at in Psalms 16 and 49. Ps. 16.10 asks God not to abandon ‘my soul’ (naph e shi) to the grave, and Ps. 49.15 more specifically pleads that he would redeem ‘my soul’ (naph e shi) from the grave. The case for a possible existence, in an intermediate state following death, is strengthened by additional passages which imply the OT’s view. A passage of particular insight is the ghostly appearing of Samuel. There Saul goes to a medium in Endor and calls up the spirit of Samuel who appears as a (non-fleshly) ghost – as a ‘shade’ of his original self (1 Sam. 28). ‘Shade’ is an apt Hebrew description because of the un-enfleshed nature of the ghost;Footnote 50 it is a reduced version of Samuel, merely spirit in substance and form.Footnote 51 However, his being called up from the dead in this form implies a spirit existence in the grave, the shade (while a diminished form of the person) being the immaterial essence of a person that survives beyond the death of the body.Footnote 52
This idea of a spirit existence – more explicitly of a conscious variety – receives fuller exposition in certain New Testament verses, verses which likewise imply the intermediate state. In his lecture and earlier books, Wright acknowledges this intermediate state, with his lecture identifying its reality through exegesis of Acts 23.6-9, Phil. 1.23 and Lk. 23.43.Footnote 53 But while acknowledging this existence (which Thompson appears keen to denyFootnote 54), Wright’s lecture decidedly affirms that whatever the entity is called that ‘carries’ one’s consciousness through that intermediate existence, it is never in the NT denoted as the psuche (with the [potential] exception of Rev. 6.9).Footnote 55 But even if this is so terminologically, the logic of dualism still follows; if conscious existence continues beyond the death of the body, then whatever the entity is termed that carries a person’s consciousness, it cannot be physical in nature – rather it is immaterial (/spirit) in nature.Footnote 56 If the physical body dies, but consciousness continues, then humans are dualistic beings, whatever the carrier is called. An implied dualistic anthropology is therefore further illumined by consideration of the logic of biblical eschatology.
But in further response to Wright’s statement about the NT usage of psuche, the term does appear to occur – in certain NT verses – to refer to this immaterial vessel that survives into the intermediate state. As has been already noted, Wright acknowledges the possible instance of such in Rev. 6.9 (though the apocalyptic context and language of this verse might make it difficult to build a doctrinal case upon). But a clearer example of such is the famous passage in Matthew where Jesus says to his disciples: ‘Do not fear those who kill the body (soma) but cannot kill the soul (psuche); rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell’ (Mt. 10.28). This has been normally viewed, by traditional and contemporary scholars alike, as a verse assuming a dualism, and the psuche (here) affirmed as a reference to an immaterial soul.
The consensus among contemporary scholars is that the translations highlighted by Green (namely ‘life’, ‘living being’, ‘creature’, ‘self’, ‘mind’, or ‘person’) are often the best translations for denoting the (NT) meaning(s) of psuche. But while affirming these meanings, that consensus desires to go further when expounding the meaning of psuche in Mt. 10.28. In this commonly cited verse (in discussions of anthropology), Jesus contrasts the physical body – which can be killed at the hands of a human – with the entity here termed the psuche – which cannot be killed by a human. The entities’ difference in nature, and the flow of the passage’s logic, mean the consensus among NT scholars is to opt for a fuller translation of psuche – a meaning of psuche that is richer than can be captured by translations just given. By way of a number of examples: In translating this verse in their commentary, Davies and Allison opt for the word ‘soul’ to bring out the meaning of psuche – a ‘“soul” which can survive bodily death and later be united with a resurrection body’.Footnote 57 Carson, by way of agreement, translates it as the ‘inner man’ of a person – drawing its contrast with a body that can physically die and be killed.Footnote 58 Turner’s exegesis agrees, explicitly commenting as follows: ‘The language of this verse assumes a sort of dualism of body and soul.’Footnote 59 Osbourne is similar in thinking, his commentary on the verse asserting, ‘God alone is sovereign over both the temporal body and the eternal soul’ (though his language might helpfully be modified to avoid misleading and ‘Greek’ connotations).Footnote 60 And in a comment of particular insight, France distinguishes the meaning of psuche, as it stands in Mt. 10.28, from its wider NT’s meaning(s) – while additionally showing the relation:
[Psuche is] … normally more appropriately translated ‘life’, but it often refers to real (spiritual) life as opposed to mere animal existence … Here the saying requires a term which denotes the continuing life of the person after the life of the body has been terminated, and ‘soul’ … is probably the best English word to denote that continuing life …Footnote 61
[he adds] R.H. Gundry, Soma, 87-160, argues that Jews, like Greeks, typically spoke of the soul as leaving the body at death.Footnote 62
These exegeses indicate the consensus of biblical scholars who view the understanding of psuche in Mt. 10.28 as fuller in scope than its meaning in other NT passages. Indeed, the contemporary thinkers above affirm the consensus of tradition – that a dualism is assumed here in Matthew, so affirming an immaterial soul.
In seeking to counter this consensus, W+T appeal to the telos of resurrection as the eschatological framework of Jesus. As seen in earlier sections, this is uncontroversial, but their steps beyond this affirmation are vague and imprecise as they seek to respond more specifically to the consensus surrounding this verse. Wright’s response continues (in a way reminiscent of Green) with a rather opaque assertion: ‘it’s strange, if this [dualism] is meant, that Jesus speaks [in this verse] of the one who can destroy soul and body in Gehenna’.Footnote 63 With no further explication, his counter swiftly continues (and Thompson joins him in taking this step) by drawing attention to Luke’s wording in his own equivalent of the passage (Lk. 12.4-5). He and Thompson suggest that Luke’s avoiding there the term (psuche), is to circumvent misunderstanding in the mind of Luke’s Hellenistic intended reader.Footnote 64
But neither of these comments are reasons for refuting the natural reading of Mt. 10.28 with its assumed dualistic anthropology. As orthodox belief affirms (and both scholars clearly attest), bodily resurrection from the dead is the destiny of both the faithful and the unfaithful – the former to inherit eternal life, and the latter, eternal destruction (in Gehenna). So, the (final day) punishment of the unfaithful in soul and body is standard orthodox belief, and in no way refutes the traditional dualistic interpretation of the verse.Footnote 65 Moreover, the avoidance of the term psuche in the parallel passage in Luke may well be for the reason both scholars advocate but Luke’s avoiding the word psuche does nothing to take away from a dualistic anthropology assumed in Matthew. In fact, as Thompson’s Old Testament anthropology implies, the meaning of the term nephesh developed as the writing of the Old Testament progressed; (according to Russell) its development of meaning then continued through the time of the Intertestamental period, coming further to be used to refer to those in the intermediate state (not just as living bodily beings on earth).Footnote 66 Recognizing this development of meaning, and the intended (Jewish) readers of Matthew, it would not be at all surprising if he were using the word psuche with these connotations it had gained from the Jewish Intertestamental literature. So, while Luke opts to change the language to bear in mind the more Gentile audience he is writing for, Matthew retains the word with his Jewish reader in mind – an audience who would have understood the term with its OT and Intertestamental connotations, hearing the word psuche with its Hebraic and nuanced meaning. None of this gives reason for rejecting the traditional and contemporary dualistic understanding of Mt. 10.28, so W+T’s rejection of such exegesis is unwarranted, and their revisionist exegeses unconvincing.
Responding to Wright and Thompson’s Anthropology as a Whole
In light of the foregoing critique, there appear to be philosophical and exegetical reasons for biblically rejecting monism and embracing some form of dualism. To entertain, philosophically, the possibility of disembodied conscious visions, or for a person’s conscious experience to continue while her material body decays in the earth, a person’s essential core must be immaterial in nature – that immaterial entity being what ‘carries’ a person’s consciousness. And while exegetically vital to realize the (NT’s) actual meaning(s) of psuche, there is, at least, in Matthew a genuine appearance of psuche referring to the person’s immaterial core that survives into life-after-deathFootnote 67 (to be followed, in Wright’s choice of words, by ‘life-after-life-after-death’Footnote 68). From these and the additional issues of identity persistence through time and that of human free will (and possibly exegesis of Rev. 6.9), it appears that W+T’s expressed anthropology falls short, and a dualistic view is instead preferable.
While advocating this case, any preferable dualistic option (whether of a contemporary or historical variety) must be carefully considered and expressed, and maintain the biblical emphases discussed which W+T so clearly affirm and contend. Two particular forms of dualism, namely the Platonic and (Classic) Cartesian varieties, clearly do not pass those criteria, through either downplaying the body or separating the functions of body and soul. But in declining these particular versions, W+T’s following step should be avoided, namely moving from a rejection of these two to a rejection of all anthropological dualisms. To do so inadvertently passes over many healthier dualistic varieties, dualisms that are holistic or integrated in nature and appreciate the soul & body’s unity of function.Footnote 69 These latter varieties of dualism, discussed in the modern-day literature,Footnote 70 affirm an intimate relation between a person’s body and soul, thereby heartily affirming the contentions established above. All of these varieties welcome and are consistent with the findings of neuroscience and indeed affirm the value of the physical body. Moreover, these same varieties of dualism allow for continued and conscious existence beyond the death of a person, so are fully consistent with the scriptural eschatology of intermediate state followed by ultimate resurrection. Indeed, these holistic types of dualism (comparable to that of Wheeler Robinson) healthily emphasize both body and soul and so avoid the mistake of the reactive pendulum swing – swinging from an unhealthy version of dualism, which denigrates the body, to a poor substitutionary monism, which denigrates the soul.Footnote 71
When further seeking the advancement of a preferable form of dualism, it is likewise important to heed the other of W+T’s contentions – that of avoiding the common error of reading a present-day meaning of ‘soul’ back into the scriptural term(s). The understanding and employment of language as the disciplinary context demands is essential for the progressing of strong and healthy anthropology. But this being true for philosophers, so it is similarly true for the exegetes; while philosophers need precision when exegeting the actual meanings of biblical terms (and avoid eisegeting present-day understanding[s] into biblical words such as ‘soul’Footnote 72) so biblical scholars need similar care in recognizing the nuanced understandings of philosophical terms (and not by default assuming a Platonic/Classic Cartesian understanding when hearing the word ‘soul’). In contemporary anthropology, this principle (has been and) is being demonstrated by leading Christian philosophers. These thinkers are carefully modelling that meanings of biblical anthropological terms can be disciplinarily respected, making sure that the biblical meanings of terms are not confused with the technical and specific sense(s) in which those terms are employed in the philosophy of mind/philosophical theology. This work set and sets a precedent for the development of preferable anthropological dualism(s), combining biblically responsible exegesis with rigorous philosophical precision.
In so drawing towards a conclusion, the contentions of W+T are valuable reminders for scholars seeking to advance anthropological thought. Theological anthropology does well to affirm the (physical) body and avoid eisegesis of terms. Yet while these contentions are helpful, the rest of W+T’s anthropology is representative of (too) much theological anthropology in its problems in need of addressing before healthier anthropology can ensue. For over a century now, there has been a theological tirade against the dualisms of yester-year – the Platonic and Classic Cartesian views receiving (ongoing) extensive critique.Footnote 73 But in continually attacking the strawmen, the views of the soul that are stronger have been and are being missed, the result of this trend being the stagnation of the advancement of theological anthropology (particularly in biblical studies). In further addition to this trend, the lack of adequate application of the necessary philosophical tools is further impeding the progress of theological anthropology. By contrast and in response, this article has sought to uphold the importance of both biblical studies and philosophy to the theological anthropological venture – drawing upon the insights of both disciplines to promote a healthier, dualistic, anthropology. Specifically, within this endeavour, it has displayed the essential factors for proposing a richer view of the soul – one that is conceptually stronger and more biblically rooted than the views the trend highlighted above tends to pendulum-swing to instead. To view the human soul as ‘an immaterial entity that is the seat/carrier of consciousness, which (in normal, embodied, condition) functions in holistic unity with the body’, allows for the affirmation of the (ordinarily) embodied nature of a human, but enriches our anthropological understanding further by likewise affirming the immaterial soul. In response to W+T’s concern, then, that to emphasize the soul leads to denigrating the body, such a definition demonstrates the contrary in its valuing both body and soul. And in defining the soul in this manner, so affirming both body and soul, the view carries seeds of potential for contributing to pertinent questions in related topics of interest, as opposed to being an anthropology that encumbers the Church and Academy. Related topics of interest, such as personhood, mind-body relation, ethics, disability, eschatology and more, are all potentially enriched through engagement with anthropology of this kind; and both the Academy and Church – the latter both theologically and missionally – have much of potential to gain from this anthropology, with its affirming both body and soul.Footnote 74 So in response to W+T’s challenge, and the anthropology they have expressed, this article has proposed in rejoinder a healthier, dualistic, anthropology, with a richer view of the soul – a view that is conceptually stronger, and one more biblically rooted – anthropology that furthers enrichment of the human in both body and soul.Footnote 75
