Experience is a major source of knowledge. Could institutions be improved by eliciting the additional knowledge held by experienced individuals? I show here that in several areas of the law experienced individuals are more critical of institutional quality than inexperienced individuals. Moreover, performance indexes built with experienced subsamples substantially alter country rankings. Assuming no unmeasured confounders, more knowledge arguably leads experienced individuals to revise the more benign view held by the general population, composed mostly of inexperienced individuals. Moreover, experience is a stronger driver than alternative sources of knowledge, including education, which might therefore be reinforcing milder and, arguably, incorrect assessments of institutional quality. After observing how this ‘experience effect’ varies systematically across countries, I conclude by proposing that evaluations of institutional quality pay greater attention to experienced individuals and cautioning against basing inferences on assessments made by the general population.

An increasing volume of literature has shown that human development is related to economic institutions. But previous literature has not considered that the effects of economic institutions on human development are contingent on culture. In this study, we contend that the effects of economic freedom (as an indicator of economic institutions) on human development are dependent on generalized trust (as an indicator of culture). Using panel analysis on a sample of 29 OECD countries during 1990–2015, we find that generalized trust positively moderates the relationship between economic freedom and human development. The policy implication is that free market institutions foster human development only in high trust societies, not in low trust countries.

While confidence in the business sector is crucial for well-functioning markets, there is surprisingly little empirical work on its sources. Available research recognizes generalized social trust and macroeconomic performance (especially unemployment and economic growth) as major forces explaining confidence in institutions and organizations in general. By assuming that confidence in companies hinges on rules, formal procedures, and practices that shape how organizations function, economic regulation is frequently advocated to foster confidence in companies, not least as it is supposed to reduce the scope for opportunistic behavior. Based on individual-level data from World Values Survey/European Values studies and economic regulation data from the Economic Freedom of the World project we investigate statistical associations of confidence in major companies with generalized social trust and macroeconomic performance as well as the intensity and quality of business regulation. From an economic policy perspective our findings suggest that confidence in the business sector can be facilitated by an implicit guarantee from governments of fair and impartial treatment.

The background conditions for the emergence of the rule of law are important but underdeveloped. This paper discusses current theories of the origin of the rule of law, arguing that they are useful but incomplete. In addition to those theories, the Jewish and Christian concept of all human beings as God's image bearers is an important contributor to the rule of law in Western civilization. The formulation of universal human equality is not, however, a sufficient condition for the emergence of the rule of law. The concept has taken centuries of articulation in different institutions and social settings. It only reached full fruition when it was joined with an understanding of appropriate legal and political systems as expressed by political theorists such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison.

Buchanan's first writings about federalism and fiscal justice were “'Federalism’: One Barrier to Labor Mobility” and “A Theory of Financial Balance in a Federal State,” two term papers that he wrote before his dissertation and that have never been discussed before. Studying them allows us to complete the recent literature on the origins of Buchanan's fiscal federalism. We show that most of Buchanan's ideas about fiscal equity were already in these works, and also that Buchanan made other claims and used other arguments – about mobility, for instance – that were absent from the dissertation but remained important to him for a long time. We also analyze these essays in the context in which Buchanan was at that time, namely the economics department of the University of Chicago. We show how Buchanan fed on, not to say was influenced by, the courses for which he wrote these essays. This allows us to shed new light on the role Theodore Schultz, D. Gale Johnson, Henry Simons, and Roy Blough, played at the beginning of Buchanan's career.

The paper interrogates the argument put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson or North et al. that capitalism and democracy are supportive to each other. It analyzes the development of political and economic institutions in Germany before and after World War I. It is shown that the lack of democracy in Imperial Germany furthered a liberal economic order and gives reasons why the transition to full-scale parliamentarianism would have impaired the quality of economic institutions. This also explains why such a transition was not completed. The Weimar Republic established a modern democracy but was unable to secure the quality of economic institutions achieved before. Not only in Germany did the politicization of the economy impair the economic order. This empirical outcome helps to explain why Eucken and other liberals identified democracy as part of the economic problem during the interwar period. It also gives reasons to rethink the complex relationship between capitalism and democracy.

This paper analyzes the Peruvian highland tradition of Takanakuy, a public brawling ritual occurring each Christmas to resolve conflicts between local community members. We argue that Takanakuy provides an effective way for locals to resolve disputes that Peru's formal judicial system is unable or unwilling to settle. Using insights from ethnographic fieldwork, journalistic articles, reports, and academic sources, we find that brawling during Takanakuy encourages social cooperation by preventing potential violence and offering community members a credible mechanism of law enforcement in an orderly fashion with social acceptance.

In 2014, the State Council of the Chinese Communist Party announced the institution of a social credit system by 2020, a follow-up to a similar statement on the creation of a social credit system issued by the State Council in 2007. Social credit ratings of the type being developed by the State Council in partnership with Chinese companies go beyond existing financial credit ratings in an attempt to project less-tangible personal characteristics like trustworthiness, criminal tendencies, and group loyalty onto a single scale. The emergence of personal credit ratings is enabled by Big Data, automated decision-making processes, machine learning, and facial recognition technology. It is quite likely that various kinds of personal and social credit ratings shall become reality in the near future. We explore China's version of its social credit system so far, compare the welfare and epistemological qualities of an ecology of personal ratings emanating from polycentric sources versus a social credit rating, and discuss whether a social credit system in an ideologically driven state is less a tool to maximize social welfare through trustworthiness provision and more a method of preventing and punishing deviance from a set of party-held ideological values.

The choice of whether to regulate firms or to allow them to compete is key. If demand is sufficiently inelastic, competition entails narrower allocative inefficiencies, but also smaller expected profits, and thus weaker incentives to invest in cost reduction. Hence, deregulation should be found where cost reduction is less socially relevant and consumers are more politically powerful, and it should produce lower expected costs only when investment is not sufficiently effective. These predictions hold true under several alternative assumptions and are consistent with data on the deregulation initiatives implemented in 43 US state electricity markets between 1981 and 1999 and on the operating costs of the plants that served these markets. Crucially, these empirical results help rationalize the slowdown of the deregulation wave and are robust to considering the other determinants of deregulation emphasized by the extant literature, i.e. costly long-term wholesale contracts and excessive capacity accumulation.