One of the most enduring legacies of Reza Shah's rule is the problematization of dress in Iranian politics. In the course of the twenty years that he was in power, the state promulgated a number of policies that had a deep, and at times traumatizing, effect on the everyday lives of Iranians. Following the example of Turkey, but unlike other Muslim governments in the Arab world, in South Asia, or in Southeast Asia, the first Pahlavi state set out to standardize and Europeanize the appearance of its people. This policy led to state-society and intra-societal conflicts that flared up again after the Islamic revolution of 1979. This article analyzes the state's dress policies, argues that they were mainly meant to promote nation-building, and ends with a translation of a short story that, better than any official documents or historical accounts, illustrates the impact of these policies on the everyday lives of ordinary people.

Iran's geography ensures that transport is a major problem for economic activity. Much of the country is sparsely settled; the major cities are hundreds of miles apart, with some roads running through inhospitable deserts. The population centers are separated from the oceans by high mountains. There are no rivers suitable for transportation over any distance. In short, transport is overwhelmingly by land through difficult terrain.

These natural barriers provide an explanation as to why Iran's economy consisted for many centuries of a series of local or regional markets, more than a national market. Producers and merchants did not consider their natural market to be Iran but rather their local region and, beyond that, the areas to which they could easily transport their goods, which could well mean nearby foreign regions rather than other parts of Iran.

Introduction

The reforms initiated by Reza Shah's urban modernization drive led to changes not only in cultural patterns of urban life in Iran and the economic structure of the country, but even in spatial organization. The full effect of these initiatives only started to be felt under Mohammad Reza Shah, who continued to pursue the policy of his predecessor. For our specific purpose—urban change under Reza Shah—we will focus on an analysis of the development of the Iranian city, specifically the following three aspects: spatial reorganization; economic changes; and consequences of urban change.

Our basic assumption is that the city, unlike any other phenomenon, became the symbol of political and socioeconomic transformation in Iran and that, to this day, it has preserved this character of Pahlavi modernization and change like no other institution or phenomenon.

This article examines the impact of modernization and Westernization on the clerical community in Iran between 1925 and 1941, and discusses briefly the reactions and attitudes of various factions and strata of the ulama toward the modernization efforts of the state. The study also demonstrates that the clergy's reaction to modernization was not one of outright opposition and resistance. While the clerical community as a whole rejected Westernization, its reaction to the government's modernization policies varied greatly.

The process of modernization in Iran was accompanied by a considerable degree of change in social stratification. New social classes and occupational groups emerged and the power of the old and traditional elites declined. In contrast to popular assumptions, the ulama as a traditional elite showed a remarkable degree of adaptability in response to modernization and social change.

The Reza Shah period (1921–1941) continues to be one of the most understudied as well as controversial episodes in Iran's modern history. Assessments of the period tend to be politically charged and reflect the widely diverging opinions about the extent and quality of its transformative nature. They rarely involve an appreciation of the effectiveness of the measures taken in this period in relation to stated policy objectives and allowing for the circumstances and conditions of the time—something which is quite common when it comes to evaluating, say, the reforms of Peter the Great in eighteenth-century Russia or those of Muhammad ‘Ali in nineteenth-century Egypt. Instead, they frequently narrow down to a moral verdict that weighs the entire age on a retrospective scale of Iran's historical development since the mid to late nineteenth century.

When Presbyterian missionaries entered Iran, they did so with the intention of introducing modern, Western civilization to the country. Regarding themselves as “servants of God sent to render service to man,” they favored a future for Iran in education, society, and politics much like what they foresaw for America: a nation that would be Christian, scientific, vigorous, cooperative, and democratic. In the inter-war years, it seems, they sought to achieve this vision by supporting Reza Shah's military dictatorship.

This seeming pro-Pahlavism can be explained, in part, by Jesus‘ exhortation to “render … unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's” (Matt. 22:21). Serving but one God—that of Abraham, Isaac, Moses, and Jesus—the missionaries had to contend with two “caesars.” While they were patriotic Americans, loyal to the United States, they lived and worked in Iran, and therefore served at the pleasure of the Iranian government.

Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, many causes have spurred a renewal of interest concerning the reign of Reza Shah, unmatched perhaps since his fall. Firstly, one must mention the increasing interest and curiosity about the modern history of Iran, manifested in this country and abroad. Secondly, the opening of government and some private archives has provided new perspectives on the era. Thirdly, one can point to a kind of nostalgia for the period, as reflected by the many popular histories and biographies of debatable value published in recent years.

Several archival repositories, such as the National Archives (sāzmān-e asnād-e mellī), the Institute for Cultural Studies and Research (mo'assaseh-ye moṭāle'āt va pazhūheshhā-ye farhangī), and the foreign ministry, began publishing documents rather than opening their archives and making their documents available for research.