Hegel is a complicated figure for considering the philosophical significance of sexual difference. On the one hand, he grants an essential place for sexual difference in his analyses of nature and spirit. On the other hand, he treats the telos of sexual difference as a kind of sexual indifferentiation. For Hegel, both life and spirit depend on sexual difference but as something to be sublated, that is, preserved but only in so far as it is negated for a higher truth or purpose devoid of it. This essay examines this sublation of sexual difference in what Hegel characterizes as the ‘universality’ of the living genus and the ‘universality’ of the rational activity of civil society. I argue that Hegel’s conception of this sublation of difference into universality relies in both instances on a teleological reduction of the ontological significance of sexual difference to reproduction and a contestable interpretation of the roles of male and female sexes in it. However, I claim that Hegel’s account of the relational identity of the sexes, each as not-all of the genus given the other, is a fundamental insight for an ontological analysis of sexual difference. As such, I open a critical reappropriation of Hegel's account of sexual difference for a more difference-affirming, non-hierarchal sexual ontology. I argue that overcoming the hierarchal implications of this Hegelian account of sexual difference requires rethinking the natural and rational universal, which amounts to rethinking what Hegelianism might mean today.

Hegel contends that judgements are contradictory, finite and untrue. Prominent scholars argue that Hegel’s issue with judgements is resolved in the later stages of his Logic. Specifically, Ng suggests that this solution is found in Hegel’s discussion of life. In this article, I argue that not only does life fail to resolve Hegel’s problem with judgement—death highlights its insolubility. To support this claim, I examine Hegel’s discussion of judgements in the Logic, showing that judgements are inherently contradictory because they both unite and separate individuals and universals. Instead of being resolved retrospectively, I demonstrate that contradiction, finitude and untruth are intrinsic to judgements. Moreover, since judgements play a constitutive and determinative role in Hegel’s metaphysics, they pass their contradictions, finitude and untruth onto the objects they constitute. Specifically, I argue that for living beings, judgement is literally a matter of life and death, because the contradiction of judgements implies the finitude of the objects they constitute—namely, the perishability of things and the mortality of organisms.

This article is a tribute to Dieter Henrich, the outstanding German philosopher, who died in December 2022. It begins by reviewing his life, academic career and general approach to philosophy. It then tracks the development of his theory of subjectivity, beginning with his classic article of the 1960s on ‘Fichte’s Original Insight’. Subsequent sections of the article consider critiques of Henrich’s position by prominent contemporaries and his response to them, his defence of the possibility of a metaphysics grounded in modern subjectivity, and his philosophy of religion.

Hegel’s early work The Life of Jesus (Das Leben Jesu) of 1795 presents Jesus as a teacher of Kantian morality and ends abruptly with his death, anointing of his body, and burial, such that Jesus could appear to be merely a figure of the remote past. However, within a few years Hegel’s view of the death of Jesus was to change radically. Writing of his death in terms of the ‘death of God’, this individual is transformed into the universality of Spirit who dwells in the community. This paper examines how this fundamental change in Hegel’s thought came about, how Hegel’s mature understanding of the death of Jesus was appropriated by Richard Wagner in his proposed opera Jesus of Nazareth, and how this ‘death of God’ became the model for the death of Brünnhilde in the Ring cycle. For both Hegel and Wagner, the death of Christ can only be understood as a self-involving enterprise, the bringing together of the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. Further, Wagner largely shares Hegel’s immanent understanding of God, although under other influences he can affirm the idea of a transcendent God or a transcendent world.

Hegel’s ‘science of right’ is a philosophical account of spirit’s ‘world’. Accordingly, in this essay, I propose to take it as the model of what I call a ‘political cosmology’. In Hegel’s dialectic-speculative philosophy, cosmology becomes a practical, worldly science. It becomes the account of the ways in which spirit immanently constructs, produces and comes to know its own world and itself as the actuality of the world.

In this essay, I explore possibilities for phenomenology beyond Hegel with respect to questions of conscience, guilt, and ethics. In the first section, I briefly introduce Heidegger’s phenomenology. The next section provides an interpretation of conscience in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Like Hegel, Heidegger claims that conscience states my guilt prior to any specific wrongdoings; Heidegger’s ideas around the ‘call of conscience’ are thus considered next. Building on differences and connections between Hegel’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies of conscience, the final section outlines implications for a phenomenologically responsive ethics.

Hegel’s ‘Natural Law’ essay is widely discussed but its substance and the implications of its argument are misunderstood. Hegel’s essay is most often read via other philosophers. Interpretations of this kind are useful but only illuminate those parts of Hegel’s text that intersect with other philosophers’ concerns. This article takes a different approach by focusing on the entirety of the essay and exploring the implications of its two primary arguments: firstly, that there has been a breach between philosophy and natural law; secondly, that without philosophy natural law is thrown back on its own resources, producing two schools of post-philosophical thought—empiricism and formalism—neither of which is adequate to serve as its foundation. I argue that in response to this inadequacy Hegel sublates empiricism and formalism to develop undistorted intuition as a way of thinking designed to effect the re-philosophization of natural law.

This paper compares the views of Hegel and Schelling regarding the problem of individuation, i.e. the question of what makes an individual (a) numerically distinct from others and (b) the very individual it is. My focus is on how Hegel approaches this problem in his metaphysics and how that relates to Schelling’s views as articulated in his ‘negative philosophy’. While Hegelians like Robert Stern and Karen Ng are optimistic that Hegel can solve the problem of individuation, I argue that Schelling puts forward an objection that both challenges Hegel’s account and provides a rationale for taking seriously Schelling’s own insistence on a pre-logical dimension of being.

Based on Hegel’s thesis of the ‘end of art’, this paper aims to explore how to study Hegel’s philosophy of literature by carrying out a dialogue with Francesco Campana. In his recent book, The End of Literature, Hegel, and the Contemporary Novel (2019), Campana demonstrates how literature resists its end by continuous self-transformation and provides a framework of ‘philosophization’–‘poetry’–‘ordinariness’ in understanding the contemporary novel. While, to some extent, I agree with him on the understanding of the ‘end of art’ thesis, I object to his idea that ‘philosophization’ and ‘ordinariness’ are two poles between which poetry moves. I defend the view that, from the perspective of Hegel’s absolute and taking Hegel’s philosophy as a totality, ‘philosophization’ and ‘ordinariness’ are inseparable. Furthermore, I emphasize the significance of Hegel’s thesis of the ‘end of art’, which I argue lies in revealing the problem of modern subjectivity. Literature, as a unique form of art, also reveals this problem and helps to solve it. Therefore, in the study of Hegel’s philosophy of literature, I insist on adopting the perspective of Hegel’s absolute and taking Hegel’s philosophy as a whole so that we can build connections among different disciplines and among different art-forms and art-types. With this perspective, I make some proposals, which include several paradigms for the study of Hegel’s philosophy of literature. Finally, in terms of the thesis of the ‘end of art’, I maintain that the study of Hegel’s philosophy of literature is to address the problem of modern subjectivity.

This paper addresses the problem of patriarchy in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right by focusing on his conceptualization of family life. The question is not whether the social order envisaged by Hegel is patriarchal or not: his account of the domestic relations between the sexes, in the first place, leaves no doubt about the fact that what he has in mind is a society ruled by men at all levels, while women have no access to public life broadly conceived (from the labour market to corporations and political affairs). The point is rather to ask what kind of patriarchal order this is. Through an analysis of Hegel’s joint criticism of both the social contract and the marriage contract, I intend to show how a specifically modern form of patriarchal rule, understood as pure masculine domination, has emerged as the product of the contractualist interpretation of social relationships. Hegel helps us indeed acknowledge that a peculiar kind of dominion, one that systematically places the structure of arbitrariness at the heart of politics, is inscribed in the rationale of contractualism in so far as it has progressively become the theoretical basis of legitimate authority in modern European states. Patriarchy, in this context, surfaces as the negation of traditional patriarchal rule: it consists in the formalistic and thus arbitrary absolutization of a masculine order that is no longer articulated in society’s constitutional arrangement but is ideologically subsumed from an unproblematized social experience. Hegel’s patriarchal order, on the contrary, remains a strictly political-constitutional feature of the organization of ethical life. Although his views in this regard are both despicable and unviable for us, then, his speculative contribution concerning the conceptual framework of social domination can help us better frame modern and contemporary forms of patriarchy.

Kierkegaard presents his critique of a Hegelian philosophy of history in the works of his Climacus pseudonym, the Philosophical Fragments and the corresponding Concluding Unscientific Postscript. It has been contested whether he addressed his arguments toward Hegel directly. In this paper, I argue that these arguments are systematically pertinent to central issues both of Hegel’s as well as any other philosophical engagement with history. To make this point I proceed in three steps. First, the basic outlines of Hegel’s philosophy of history are given concerning its exact subject matter, what the aim of history is, and whether the reason inherent in it allows us to conceive of historical events as necessary. Second, I will show that, though agreeing with Hegel on some points, Climacus holds that we can ascribe neither a determinist nor a conceptual kind of necessity to historical events. Finally, I will expand on Climacus’s account of radical metaphysical contingency and its ethical implications which prompt some objections against philosophy of history in general.

In this essay, I argue for a reinterpretation of F. H. Bradley's theory of feeling based on the underemphasized influence of Hegel's phenomenology on Bradley's philosophy. While traditional interpretations of Bradleyan feeling often understand it to have strong metaphysical connotations, I argue that such interpretations result in an important distortion of the overall structure of Bradley's thought. Contra the metaphysical interpretation, I argue that Bradley's account of feeling can only be properly understood by interpreting his theory in light of his own explicit attributions of the theory to Hegel. By taking Bradley at his word that feeling truly is derived from Hegel, I argue that we are better able to understand the overall structure of Bradley's thought and the way in which he belongs to the neo-Hegelian tradition of philosophy. Through explaining the debt that Bradley owes to Hegel regarding feeling, an important source of disagreement between Bradley and Hegel will become apparent, namely, the ability for feeling to be subsumed within thought, thereby differentiating Bradley's and Hegel's ultimate characterizations of reality.

Trisokkas raises two objections to my defence of Heidegger's claim against Hegel. Heidegger's claim is that Hegel had dogmatically assumed the priority of ‘logic’ in any inquiry into the meaning of being, thus inheriting the metaphysical tradition's dual assumptions that what must be said to matter most of all in our attempt understand our place in the world and a possible reconciliation with the world is the knowability of being. Everything else can only matter if the world is first of all available as knowable. The claim is not that Hegel cannot develop a ‘science of logic’ or, to use Hegelian shorthand, that Being cannot be understood as Concept. The issue is the status of the Logic, what significance it has in our attempt to understand ourselves and the meaning of being in general. Ultimately Hegel counts as the culmination of the metaphysical tradition because he believes, citing Aristotle, that ‘nous rules the world’, that everything is primordially available to us as rationally available, explicable. This means that even the meaning of the being of human history, sociality, religion and art is as expressions of reason, even as modes of rationality. Trisokkas objects that it is question-begging to saddle Hegel with a question that he is not, in the Science of Logic at least, attempting to answer. He puts this by saying that Hegel is simply not addressing the question of the status or significance of the Logic, that he has not ‘chosen’ to raise any question about what matters to human beings or to Hegel himself, but has chosen an inquiry into being. (‘Mattering is irrelevant at the beginning of Hegel's Logic.’ ‘All being is taken to be, is simply being.’) According to Trisokkas the Logic is simply an inquiry into being's possible determinacy. Trisokkas's second objection is a classic Hegelian objection, the one he himself raised against Schelling. He alleges that any philosophical understanding, even of the nondiscursive sources of meaningfulness, must itself be discursive in some way, as in Heidegger's own analysis or as in my book, and he cites this as evidence against the priority, at least for philosophy, of a nondiscursive attunement to significances. Mattering is a concept and our account of its significance must remain conceptual, not itself ‘poetic’.

An enduring puzzle for theorists of autonomy in the broadly Kantian tradition is how to theorize failures of practical reason. If norms of practical rationality are supposed to be constitutive of agency itself, how can failures to live up them nonetheless be understood as expressions of that agency? Hegelian diagnoses of these difficulties typically emphasize the dichotomies that structure Kantian theories of autonomy, between activity and passivity, reason and nature, norm and desire. They seek to flesh out an alternative that preserves a recognisably post-Kantian notion of autonomy whilst understanding freedom as something that essentially comes in degrees, insisting that self-determination always involves elements of other-determination, and stressing how free subjectivity is inseparable from socio-historically and institutionally bounded character-formation. This article contributes to articulating a Hegelian corrective to Kantian theories of autonomy by beginning to explain the role of habit in Hegel's conception of agency. Building on recent work on Hegel's metaphysics of expression, it shows how he allows us to see conative responses to the world as integral to character development and thus as expressive of free agency, rather than as interruptions to the proper functioning of practical reason. On Hegel's account, the expressive behaviour of mature, reflective agents is grounded in a pre-intentional, affective dimension of subjectivity and presupposes processes of habituation, which he locates at the level of the human ‘soul’. Habit, far from being ‘lifeless, contingent and particular’, is the means by which agents come to make objective contents their own. Understanding the role of habit in Hegel's system is integral to allowing an alternative conceptualization of autonomy to come into view, one on which rational agents express themselves through their affective and emotional responses, rather than merely being a contingent site of those responses.

This article explores an episode in the reception of Hegel's philosophy of history and historiography of philosophy with reference to the question of the possibility of non-Western philosophy, in particular African philosophy. Section I briefly outlines the contents of the Hatäta Zär'a Ya‛ǝqob and the controversy over its authorship, focusing in particular on the argument of the Ethiopianist and scholar of Semitic languages Carlo Conti Rossini that ‘rationalistic’ philosophy was impossible in Ethiopia. In section II I suggest that a major component of the intellectual background to this notion of the impossibility of philosophy in Africa can be traced to Hegel's philosophy of history. To substantiate this claim I begin by providing an account of the broader historiographical shift between 1780 and 1830, in which Africa and Asia came to be excluded from the history of philosophy, and I suggest that Hegel's philosophy of history was decisive in this process. I examine how Hegel's account of history as the realization and actualization of freedom goes together with the development of cultural production culminating in philosophy, and how both of these processes (if they are really separate processes at all), can be mapped onto particular historical-geographical populations and cultures. I suggest that, even though this was not Hegel's intention, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this served as a cultural justification for political domination: those who are unfree are unfree because they are unthinking (unphilosophical), and those who are unthinking cannot be free. Finally in section III I connect this Hegelian conception to Conti Rossini's work, both his article on the Hatäta and as apologist for Italian imperialism. I conclude by reflecting on what this underexplored connection between Hegel and early twentieth-century theorists of culture might mean for attempts to construct global histories of philosophy.

Robert B. Pippin's new book, The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy (hereafter The Culmination), which discusses Heidegger's ‘confrontation’ with Kant, Hegel and the other German idealists, is, like all his books, an exemplarily researched, thoughtful and thought-provoking text. Pippin has the rare ability to painstakingly lead his readers to the core of a philosophical dispute without ever losing their interest. The Culmination will undoubtedly shape any future research on Heidegger's take on Kant and the German idealists.