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Comparing Rubin and Pearl’s causal modelling frameworks: a commentary on Markus (2021)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2022

Naftali Weinberger Open the ORCID record for Naftali Weinberger [Opens in a new window]
Naftali Weinberger*
Affiliation:
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany
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Abstract

Markus (2021) argues that the causal modelling frameworks of Pearl and Rubin are not ‘strongly equivalent’, in the sense of saying ‘the same thing in different ways’. Here I rebut Markus’ arguments against strong equivalence. The differences between the frameworks are best illuminated not by appeal to their causal semantics, but rather reflect pragmatic modelling choices.

Keywords

Causationcounterfactual conditionalscausal modelingmanipulabilitydisagreement
Type
Reply
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 39 , Issue 3 , November 2023 , pp. 485 - 493
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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