How do we, ‘meaning creating’ agents fit in ‘with a universe that consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles’ (p. 5)?

According to Searle, in order to answer this question we need to understand the ‘basic facts of philosophy’ and the relationships between them. He identifies the basic facts as consciousness, intentionality, language, free will, society and institutions, politics and ethics. The task of the philosopher is to ask questions about them in such a way that answers can be tested in the light of physics and biology. This has been achieved to a considerable degree with consciousness, intentionality and language. What about free will?

Spinoza thought free will is an illusion. He argued that our actions are no less determined than the path of a stone that has been set in a course of flight. Supposing the stone could ‘think’ halfway through the flight that it ‘wanted’ to reach the predetermined destination. If this were so, it would be subject to the illusion of free will.

Searle wishes to salvage our subjective experience of free will as a legitimate expression of freedom. He gives the example of a restaurant diner who is asked by the waiter what he wants to eat. It would be absurd for the response to be ‘Look, I am a determinist. I will just wait and see what I order because I know that my order is determined’ (p. 11)!

Searle draws a distinction between causes and reasons. Human reasons differ from physical causes. Human reasons depend on consciousness, intentionality, language, free will, etc. These are properties of the brain in the same way that solidity is a property of the molecules that constitute a wheel. Solidity matters because it makes the wheel roll down a hill. Does free will matter in a similar way or is it an illusion?

If free will makes a difference and is also biologically founded, Searle argues, we must find a way of relating it to quantum indeterminism in physics. However, he has already warned us in the introduction that the ‘problem of free will is unusual among contemporary philosophical problems in that we are nowhere remotely near to having a solution’ (p. 11). In chapter one he sets out why this is so and concludes that in order to understand free will we need to understand ‘the self’ biologically and this we have also failed to do to date.

In the light of the above ignorance and uncertainty some might conclude that the basic facts of philosophy might not matter at present. In chapter two, which deals with ‘Society and institutions and their relations to politics,’ Searle shows us why this would be wrong.

Politics depends on political institutions such as the presidency, parliament etc. These depend on citizens subjectively agreeing to their status. Institutions have what Searle calls a ‘status function’. It is its status function, agreed socially, that turns a green piece of paper into a dollar note. This is an example of human reasons differing from physical causes and, clearly, being of consequence.

This slim, elegantly written and intellectually rigorous volume which consists of an introduction and two lectures given to general audiences, sets out some core issues on the interface between the philosophy of mind and the sciences. It can be read with profit by all psychiatrists, both those inclined towards Spinoza's and those inclined towards Searle's views.