Outsourcing Repression is a study of everyday forms of repression that the Chinese state exercises to minimize the costs and backlash of its routine coercion on society. By using three methods— field qualitative interviews, quantitative analysis of newspaper reports, and content analysis of government documents—I demonstrate both the costs and benefits of outsourcing repression and the conditions under which the “average” gains will turn into liabilities for local authorities.
The analysis of newspaper reports, despite its usual caveats, allows me to discern the “average” returns to the autocrats of using violent thugs for hire. Even though thugs are (unsurprisingly) more likely to use violence against their subjects than will government agents, they are less likely to cause backlash compared to either the police or government officials. However, violent outsourcing strategies fail when excessive or undisciplined violence is used or when principal-agent problems occur. I illustrate the “failed cases” through in-depth case studies that I discovered through newspaper reports, which helped me identify potential field sites. Qualitative interviews in the case studies help me discern the mechanisms and conditions under which the violent strategy broke down and became a liability for the hiring authority. In short, the “average” quantitative data and “failed” qualitative case study complement each other to provide a more complete picture of the success and failure rate of the strategy.
I believe that the mixed-method approach is the strength of the study. If it was a purely quantitative study, I could have used other approaches, including a survey experiment, to further identify the causal mechanisms. Newspaper reports as a source of data are not without their problems, which the book acknowledges. But, given the time period the data cover—as far back as the 1990s—social media or other similar sources were not an option available to me.
To clarify the role of brokers, the book distinguishes three types: political, social, and economic. Although reducing information asymmetry is one of their essential functions, they also play a repressive role, albeit drawing on different power sources. Neighborhood aunties and uncles—social brokers who have lived in the communities for decades and thus possess informational advantages—can wield enormous social capital over the residents. By mobilizing these nonstate actors to “persuade” citizens—a repressive strategy on its own—the state can take advantage of their social capital by extension. In effect, social brokers who use their own social capital are doing the state’s bidding of mobilizing the masses or persuading citizens to comply with its edicts.
Finally, as Victor Shih points out, the sudden reversal of China’s zero-COVID policies has called into question the foundation of this repressive—and, more generally, governance— model, a point I made in my recent article (“China’s Epidemic of Mistrust: How Xi’s COVID-19 U-Turn Will Make the Country Harder to Govern,” Foreign Affairs, 2023). The functioning of social brokers is largely based on trust, which has been eroded in the recent COVID policy debacle. Erosion of citizens’ trust in brokers and the state may have significant implications for “everyday state power” in China. Furthermore, outsourcing also consumes the financial resources of local authorities. With declining GDP growth and rising local government debt, the availability of “stability maintenance” or Wèi Wèn funds available to hire thugs is dwindling. Under Xi Jinping’s tight grip, the state–society dynamics in China that the book portrays from the Maoist era to the present day (with an emphasis on the contemporary period) are undergoing fundamental change, a topic on which I offer some preliminary observations in the concluding chapter.
