4.1.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Indira Gandhi, daughter of the first Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, came to power in early 1966 after the death of her father’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri. Reference BritannicaEncyclopaedia Britannica (2020) describes her as “soft-spoken” with an “attractive personality,” which “masked her iron will and autocratic ambition.” Gandhi ascended to power with support from the conservative Syndicate faction of the ruling India National Congress, who saw her as both popular and easy to manage (Reference LeepsonLeepson, 1976). At the time, she was “seen as a truly progressive democrat committed to secular values and acceptable to all minorities” (Reference MussellsMussells, 1980, 59). Yet, throughout her first year in office, the opposition and media ridiculed Gandhi as a Syndicate puppet, openly referring to her as a goongi gudiya or “dumb doll” in Hindu (Reference MalhotraMalhotra, 1989). Everyone clearly underestimated her strength and popularity.

Gandhi quickly became impatient with the Syndicate’s conservative approach and began to exert greater independence. She skillfully adopted a populist rhetoric, portraying herself as “a radical reformer thwarted in her attempts by these ‘reactionary’ Congress elders” (Reference MussellsMussells, 1980, 56). Throughout the 1967 campaign, Gandhi strategically invoked direct and personal appeals to the people, framing herself as the only politician who really cared about them (Reference MalhotraMalhotra, 1989). She made good on this rhetoric in 1969 by nationalizing India’s fourteen largest banks and forcing out the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Morarji Desai, who was aligned with the Syndicate. Then Gandhi boldly helped V. V. Giri win the presidency over the Syndicate-backed candidate Sanjiva Reddy, securing her popularity as someone who stood up for the people by challenging the old guard (Reference LeepsonLeepson, 1976; Time, 1969). An attempt to expel Gandhi from the party led to a split, with most Congress MPs choosing to side with Gandhi over the Syndicate bloc. This earned Gandhi the nickname Kali for the Hindu goddess of destruction (Time, 1969) – a far cry from her goongi gudiya title just two years prior.

4.1.2 The Autocratization Episode

When the episode begins, Gandhi had achieved the peak of her popularity. Having won a majority of seats in the 1971 election, she went on to oversee India’s resounding victory in a brief war with Pakistan that produced an independent Bangladesh. Thereafter, the 1972 elections saw large majorities for Gandhi’s party in most states. As Reference LeepsonLeepson (1976, 10) observes, “She was supreme in the government, the party, and among the people. Indeed, she was widely thought of by the masses as Durga, the Hindu goddess of war.”

Having achieved total control of her party, the parliament, and most states of the Indian federation, Gandhi developed a cult of personality around herself. Access to party leadership and government positions depended upon loyalty to the Prime Minister rather than based on merit or seniority within the party (Reference MussellsMussells, 1980). Corruption and nepotism became widespread within the government, with scandals over dubious contracts, tax evasion, and loan schemes making headlines on a near weekly basis (Reference BalochBaloch, 2021). Gandhi also strategically chipped away at India’s democratic institutions through amendments, laws, and decrees while insisting that these actions would preserve and safeguard India’s democracy (Reference HendersonHenderson, 1979, 947). Throughout her tenure, Gandhi introduced twenty-five constitutional amendments that greatly increased the powers of the prime minister and limited fundamental rights while also circumscribing the powers of the courts (Reference MussellsMussells, 1980).

However, Gandhi was unable to substantially influence the judiciary, which continued to check her excesses. For example, the courts attempted to limit the government’s nationalization and land reform program by striking down a constitutional amendment that restricted property rights in 1967. Undeterred, Gandhi’s government responded by adopting three constitutional amendments that gave the parliament sweeping powers to alter fundamental rights and limited the court’s jurisdiction in property rights cases (Reference Ueda, Yamamoto and UedaUeda, 2019). In 1973, the courts ruled against these amendments, arguing that the parliament had no power to alter the basic structure of the constitution (Reference SezginSezgin, 2018). In an attempt to rein in the courts, Gandhi appointed pro-government chief justices in 1973 and 1977, “even though they were not the most senior members of the Supreme Court at the time, superseding more senior judges who had refused to take her side in court cases” (Reference Ueda, Yamamoto and UedaUeda, 2019, 59).

Gandhi’s popularity began to wane by early 1974. High oil prices combined with the nationalization of key industries and government control over essential commodities led to rising inflation, poverty, and unemployment (Reference LeepsonLeepson, 1976). Anti-government demonstrations grew to a size not seen since the independence period (Reference PlysPlys, 2020). Many of these protests centered in Bihar and Gujarat states, where university students led strikes and demonstrations that often turned violent, including setting fires in university, government, and newspaper offices as well as looting. The far-right Hindu nationalist and far-left Maoist parties were often responsible for these protests (Reference LeepsonLeepson, 1976). Railway workers also staged a mass strike for twenty days in May 1974, leading to an estimated $1.5 to $2 billion in losses for the Indian economy (Reference WeinraubWeinraub, 1974).

While initially leaderless, protests eventually coalesced around a single leader – Jayaprakash Narayan (or JP) – “a major national figure with a high reputation for integrity” once considered Nehru’s successor (Reference JoshiJoshi, 1975, 89). Calling for “total revolution,” the JP movement drew support from across the political spectrum, presenting a major challenge to Gandhi’s rule despite its ideological incoherence. It pitted Gandhi as an “authoritarian premier against JP; an ‘aging people’s hero”’ (Reference AnkitAnkit, 2021, 215). The government labeled the movement “reactionary, subversive, and even ‘fascist”’ (Reference JoshiJoshi, 1975, 90), responding with violent repression that led to untold deaths and arrests in the hundreds of thousands (Reference PlysPlys, 2020; Reference WeinraubWeinraub, 1974). However, reflecting the growing anger with unemployment, inflation, and corruption, the JP movement quickly spread and evolved to include a cross-section of students, business elites, politicians, and activists. In March 1975, the JP movement led a procession of 500,000 people to the Indian parliament to deliver a list of demands (Reference BalochBaloch, 2021).

The crisis escalated in June 1975 when a court convicted Gandhi of corruption during her 1971 election campaign. Under the law, the conviction invalidated Gandhi’s parliamentary election and barred her from holding public office for six years. Gandhi refused to step down and lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court. The ruling emboldened the JP movement, which launched major protests throughout the capital and organized a nationwide civil disobedience campaign calling for Gandhi to resign (Reference ParkR. L. Park, 1975). On the morning of 26 June 1975, Gandhi’s government declared a state of emergency, suspending all civil liberties (Reference LeepsonLeepson, 1976; Reference SterlingSterling, 1975). Officially, she justified the state of emergency as necessary to restore law and order. She blamed the mass demonstrations, particularly the JP movement, for undermining economic progress. Yet, as Reference PlysPlys (2020, 131–132) notes, “the declaration of Emergency did not occur until there was a real threat that risked removing Gandhi from office.”

Over the next twenty-one months, India’s democracy virtually broke down, and Gandhi ruled by decree.Footnote ⁸ Thousands of opposition supporters across the political spectrum, including from within Gandhi’s own party, were arrested (Reference BalochBaloch, 2021). India’s Supreme Court validated these detentions when it ruled that the right of habeas corpus could be suspended under a state of emergency (Reference PalmerPalmer, 1977). Media restrictions imposed by the government resulted in the expulsion of foreign journalists and widespread censorship (Reference SinghSingh, 1980) – with one commentator observing “the Indian press has issued papers that have an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ appearance: one would think nothing of political note is happening in India, except favorable actions of the Government and successful economic growth (Reference ParkR. L. Park, 1975, 1006).” Meanwhile, the government postponed elections twice, extending the rule of the parliament and insulating Gandhi from vertical accountability through the ballot box (Reference PalmerPalmer, 1977).

With major opposition groups banned, most of the opposition lawmakers in prison, and the judiciary severely weakened, Gandhi began changing India’s fundamental legal frameworks in a more authoritarian direction. In late 1975, the government pushed through an amendment to the electoral laws that retroactively cleared Gandhi of her criminal conviction (Reference BordersBorders, 1975). Afterward, the courts had no choice but to vacate the sentence. Then, in 1976, Gandhi’s government passed sweeping changes to the constitution that restricted civil liberties, reduced the judiciary’s review function, and awarded greater power to the Prime Minister. Thus, despite Gandhi’s insistence that the Emergency was a temporary inconvenience for national security, observers noted that her behavior suggested she aimed to remake India into a lasting dictatorship (Reference PalmerPalmer, 1977).

4.1.3 End of the Episode

Things seemed to be going well for Indira Gandhi. Two good monsoon seasons helped to drive down inflation and India’s overall economy improved. In January 1977, she seized on this opportunity and announced that elections would be held in March. To facilitate the poll, Gandhi also agreed to relax some of the Emergency restrictions on media freedom and public meetings and released thousands of opposition members from jail (Reference HardgraveHardgrave, 1979). Congress expected to win a large majority due to the good economic conditions and splintered opposition. An electoral victory would legitimize the state of emergency, codify many aspects of it into law, and set Gandhi’s son Sanjay up to become the next Prime Minister (Reference WeinerWeiner, 1977).

However, Gandhi miscalculated her own popularity. An opposition coalition called the Janata Alliance mounted a successful campaign against the ruling Congress party. They were able to successfully build support among both urban elites disenchanted with the Emergency’s draconian measures and rural Indians who had suffered under Gandhi’s expansive and often coercive sterilization programs aimed at curbing population growth (Reference WeinerWeiner, 1977). Gandhi lost her parliamentary seat, and Congress was roundly defeated. After the election, the Janata Alliance lifted the state of emergency and oversaw the renewal of Indian democracy.

4.2.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Before Sirimavo Bandaranaike emerged as Ceylon’s newly elected leader in July 1960, she was largely viewed as a “politically naive, withdrawn, and recently bereaved widow” (Reference BuultjensBuultjens, 1982, 12). Her unlikely emergence as the world’s first woman prime minister came about due to a political vacuum in the left-wing Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). In September 1959, a Buddhist priest assassinated Bandaranaike’s husband, who had founded the SLFP and was then serving as prime minister. Thereafter, the SLFP struggled to identify a new leader, forcing Bandaranaike “to come out of her mourning and save her husband’s party from total decay” (Reference RangnekarRangnekar, 1960, 373). While Time Magazine warned “ that she had not the foggiest idea of how to run a government” (Time, 1960), throughout her time as prime minister, Bandaranaike defied expectations.

In particular, Bandaranaike carried on her husband’s legacy with fervor by pushing the Sinhalese national project. The SLFP exploited ethnic divisions in Ceylon, framing them as a “life and death struggle” for the majority Sinhalese against the minority Tamil population (Reference DeVottaDeVotta, 2002, 86). They perpetuated a colonial myth that the Sinhalese were descendants of a great civilization linked to the Aryan race. The SLFP used this myth to activate a sense of “ethnic entitlement” among Sinhalese voters over the minority Tamil population, who they portrayed as “invaders” (Reference De Silva WijeyeratneDe Silva Wijeyeratne, 1996). Bandaranaike’s government imposed Sinhalese as the official state language, requiring that civil servants resign if they could not speak it. This led to protests, followed by a government-imposed state of emergency in the Tamil areas of the country. While these programs suggested a “rising authoritarianism” to come, Ceylon’s democracy scores remained fairly high throughout this period (Reference BarrowBarrow, 2014, 798). Bandaranaike was also able to thwart a coup conspiracy in 1962.

Over time, however, the government’s socialist policies led to severe deficits and depleted the country’s cash reserves (Reference AbeynaikeAbeynaike, 1963). The nationalization of private schools, insurance companies, and the oil industry brought criticism at home and abroad (Reference KodikaraKodikara, 1973). As a result, the SLFP lost the 1965 elections. Out of office, Bandaranaike continued to lead the SLFP, stoking anti-Tamil sentiments among the Sinhalese population (Reference BarrowBarrow, 2014).

4.2.2 The Autocratization Episode

The onset of the episode coincides with the May 1970 elections. The incumbent United National Party (UNP) failed to deliver economic progress over its five-year term and thus faced a resounding loss at the polls. Bandaranaike regained the top post, and over the next seven years, her government eroded democratic norms and went about implementing policies designed to replace the thriving and multi-ethnic democracy with a regime that was unapologetically exclusionary to ethnic and religious minorities (Reference BarrowBarrow, 2014, 799).

In 1972, the government promulgated a new constitution that changed the country’s name to the Republic of Sri Lanka (Government of Sri Lanka, 1972). It concentrated power in a unicameral parliament with supreme authority to make and repeal laws, undermining judicial autonomy. It also rescheduled elections from 1975 to 1977, extending Bandaraniake’s term by two years. Buddhism was given “the foremost place,” and Sinhalese was again recognized as the country’s official language. This alienated the large Tamil population and other minorities in the country. It effectively meant the end of Ceylon as a secular state and the beginning of Sri Lanka as a Buddhist-Sinhalese-Socialist republic (Reference De SilvaDe Silva, 2005).

Bandaranaike’s second term stoked ethnonationalist sentiments while failing to address the country’s economic situation. For the first time, schooling occurred in two separate languages, encouraging the Sinhalese and Tamil to grow and think as distinct communities. Changes introduced to university admissions strayed from the principles of merit and fairness and were designed to emphasize regional and ethnic identities (Reference WickramasingheWickramasinghe, 2012). The government also nationalized newspapers and the financial sector, imposed restrictions on land holdings, and reintroduced rice subsidies (Reference BarrowBarrow, 2014). These policies, combined with high oil prices, led to rising costs of living and high unemployment rates (Reference BarrowBarrow, 2014). As a result, Bandaranaike’s popularity slipped.

Actions meant to favor the majority Sinhalese population destroyed relations with the Tamil minority group, who developed deep grievances over feelings that their rights could be arbitrarily taken away or circumscribed by the Sinhalese-dominated government without recourse to due process. This led to unrest and eventually the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an insurgent group agitating for an independent Tamil homeland in northern and eastern Sri Lanka (Reference BajoriaBajoria, 2009). The Bandaranaike government responded by imposing a state of emergency across the island.

In July 1977, Sri Lanka held its first elections under the 1972 constitution. According to Bandaranaike, “I felt we would win. but in the last week, I knew that the trend was against us. By election night, I felt we would lose, but the size of our defeat surprised everyone. Even my opponents never expected it” (Reference BuultjensBuultjens, 1982, 15). The UNP won by a landslide, taking 140 out of 168 (83 percent) seats in the parliament. Meanwhile, the SLFP only won eight. Afterward, Bandaranaike accepted defeat, arguing “I firmly believe in democracy” (Reference BuultjensBuultjens, 1982, 15).

Armed with a super-majority in an all-powerful parliament, Prime Minister J. R. Jayewardene now had virtually unchecked authority, which he used to wage an all-out assault on Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions. A veteran politician from the independence struggle, Jayewardene rose through the ranks of the UNP, serving as a cabinet minister for fifteen years and the leader of the opposition throughout Bandaranaike’s second term. Jayewardene admired “the developmental results achieved by his more authoritarian contemporaries elsewhere in Asia” and, thus, viewed electoral democracy as an impediment to economic progress (Reference VenugopalVenugopal, 2015, 676).

In particular, he sought to create a strong executive who could “stand above the petty bickering and fickle alliances of parliament” and make unpopular decisions free from the “the heat of electoral pressures” (Reference VenugopalVenugopal, 2015, 675–676). Shortly after taking office, Jayewardene introduced a constitutional amendment establishing a presidential system. The amendment redirected power from the prime minister to a president who acted as the head of government. The government did not allow public consultation on the issue, and the discussion in parliament included only six speeches before the amendment was adopted (Reference WarnapalaWarnapala, 1979).

The following year, the parliament adopted a new constitution that consolidated power in an elected president and established a proportional representation system for legislative seats. The 1978 Constitution reinforced the ethnoreligious character of the state by including similar language concerning the preeminence of Buddhism but also tried to ease tensions by recognizing Tamil as a national language.

Afterward, Jayewardene narrowed the space for political opposition. Two laws adopted in 1978 provided the government sweeping powers to investigate and strip individuals of their political rights. Those subject to such “civic disabilities” could not defend themselves or appeal the decision (Reference WarnapalaWarnapala, 1979, 182). In 1980, Jayewardene used these laws to disqualify Bandaranaike and her son from serving in public office for seven years.

Going one step further, Jayewardene enacted legislation that expanded the government’s power to censor the press and gave the executive sweeping authority to intervene in political organizations, order detentions, and seize property. After enacting a ban on strikes for essential services, Jayewardene faced “remarkably few strikes” and easily crushed those that emerged, such as the railway strike in 1980 (Reference WrigginsWriggins, 1981, 206). Restrictions imposed on local media houses led to self-censorship; meanwhile, foreign press faced expulsion or discrediting if it published articles critical of the regime (Reference BourneBourne, 1983).

The judiciary was also not spared. Jayewardene introduced a constitutional amendment in 1983 requiring that all public servants make an “oath against separatism,” which he then used to get rid of judges who opposed his rule (Reference BourneBourne, 1983). According to one observer, “rules and regulations, formerly invoked in times of emergency, have now been made ordinary statute law” (Reference WarnapalaWarnapala, 1979, 183)

In 1982, Jayewardene’s government strategically decided to move up the date for elections, which were originally due for president in February 1984 and parliament in August 1983 (Reference SamarasingheSamarasinghe, 1983). The government’s market-oriented policies could not overcome the economic consequences of poor export earnings, declining tourism, and a severe drought. It faced increasing pressure from international financial institutions and foreign donors to implement structural adjustment programs. Thus, Jayewardene held elections early to avoid potential fallout from budget decisions in the coming year.

During the 1982 presidential campaign, Jayewardene promised to dissolve parliament immediately after being elected so that it could receive a fresh mandate. Given the overall climate of suppression, Jayewardene won with 53 percent of the vote. However, the results suggested that SLFP held large support at the grassroots and UNP would not be able to attain a sizeable majority under the proportional representation rules for parliament (Reference SamarasingheSamarasinghe, 1983).

Now facing the loss of a super majority, Jayewardene instead called a referendum to extend the life of the parliament by six years. Jayewardene argued that the presidential poll had given the UNP a fresh mandate and that extending the life of parliament was also necessary for national security and development (Reference SamarasingheSamarasinghe, 1983; Reference WarnapalaWarnapala, 1983). He claimed that there was a conspiracy against his life amongst radical opposition elements; thus, holding parliamentary elections could possibly allow them access to the legislature (Reference BourneBourne, 1983).

The referendum occurred nine weeks after the presidential election. During the campaign, several opposition members were in jail over the conspiracy, and a state of emergency was in place (Reference SamarasingheSamarasinghe, 1983). As a result, the referendum passed with 55 percent of the vote. Afterward, the conspiracy against Jayewardene evaporated, with some suggesting that he had fabricated the plot (Reference BourneBourne, 1983).

4.2.3 End of the Episode

According to the ERT data, Sri Lanka’s democracy broke down after the events of 1982. Jayewardene went on to rule for another six years. During that time, Sri Lanka descended into political chaos and civil war.

In 1983, conflict broke out between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan military. The war lasted over three decades, making it one of the longest-running civil conflicts in Asia (Reference BajoriaBajoria, 2009). India eventually sent a peacekeeping mission in 1987, but it failed to secure the separatist region, and they evacuated amidst escalating conflict three years later. This gave the Jayewardene government the pretext to further restrict the political space, circumscribe the powers of the judiciary, and censor the press and civil society, something his successor, Ranasinghe Premadasa continued but with less popularity (Reference HouseFreedom House, 1993).

Sri Lanka’s democracy recovered after the 1994 election, when Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the SLFP candidate and Sirimoavo Bandaranaike’s daughter, won the presidency with over 62 percent of the vote. Kumarantunga appointed Bandaranaike as Prime Minister, leading to her third term in the post. Since then, however, Sri Lanka’s democracy has experienced ups and downs, largely due to persistent ethnic and religious tensions.

5.1.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Amidst popular demands for reform, the ruling Bulgaria Communist Party (BCP) implemented a piecemeal reform process from above, resulting in the transition from a one-party communist regime to a multiparty democracy in 1990. Since then, the country has held regular competitive elections, with several turnovers in power and general respect for its people’s political and civil rights.

Yet, several weaknesses in Bulgaria’s budding democracy were apparent by the late 1990s. As a carryover from the communist era, journalists tended to view themselves as social and political leaders rather than mere informers, resulting in a “highly politicized and partisan” media landscape (Reference GrossGross, 2002, 38). In addition, the judiciary remained weak and the least reformed branch of the government (Reference MeloneMelone, 1996, 236). While the ruling party generally respected the courts’ decisions, even when it had a large majority of the parliament (Reference Drezov, Pridham and GallagherDrezov, 2000), budgetary constraints and uncertainty over the courts’ composition and structure meant that there was “little reason to expect bold decisions” (Reference MeloneMelone, 1996, 236).

Within this context, Bulgaria’s last Tsar – Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha II – reentered public life. Simeon II, who had been forced into exile as a nine-year-old following the communist abolition of the monarchy in 1946, spent much of his childhood in boarding schools in the United Kingdom and United States before settling in Spain. The New York Times later characterized him as “a man resigned to an outsider’s role” (Reference WhitneyWhitney, 1997) and someone “anxious not to give offense” (Reference SimmonsSimmons, 1997). In 1996, Simeon II returned to Bulgaria to be greeted by crowds estimated to number a half million, larger than those who turned out in the successful pro-democracy protests in 1989 (Reuters, 1996). Yet polls showed that only about one-in-five Bulgarians supported restoring the monarchy (Reuters, 1996).

5.1.2 The Autocratization Episode

The episode began in 2001 with declines in freedom of association and expression. In February, the government appointed Ivan Borislavov as director general of the Bulgarian National Radio. Journalists protested his appointment as politically motivated. While the Bulgarian Supreme Court agreed and rescinded his appointment, the government dismissed journalists who had protested and replaced them with those loyal to the ruling party (Freedom House, 2002).

Later that year, the government replaced the National Council for Radio and Television, a regulatory body considered to be biased in favor of the government, with the Electronic Media Council. However, this council was also not free from possible political influence, being appointed by the president and parliament. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) at the time reported that many journalists felt constrained in their reporting due to government influence and also media management and outside pressures (State Department, 2002).

Meanwhile, in April 2001, Simeon II declared the formation of the Simeon II National Movement (NDSV) at his residence outside Sofia. The courts attempted to block the registration of the NDSV because their “papers were not in order” (CNN, 2002), and Simeon II was only able to register the NDSV after joining a coalition with the Party of Bulgarian Women and the Movement for National Revival (Freedom House, 2002).

Less than two months later, the NDSV secured exactly half the seats in the parliament, and Simeon II became the first deposed European monarch to hold a Prime Minister position (Reference CharyChary, 2011). Amidst growing antiparty sentiment and declining trust in democratic institutions (Reference Karatnycky, Motyl, Schnetzer, Karatnycky, Motyl and SchnetzerKaratnycky et al., 2002), the NDSV gained support from virtually every corner of society, “regardless of income, age, or education and in 28 of the country’s 31 regions” (Reference Karatnycky, Motyl, Schnetzer, Karatnycky, Motyl and SchnetzerKaratnycky et al., 2002, 128), without putting forward much by way of their policy proposals (Reference TagliabueTagliabue, 2001).

The royal nostalgia that arose during the 2001 campaign led some to question whether Simeon II had plans to restore the monarchy. Instead, over the next five years, his party pursued a political agenda not all that different from his predecessor. According to Reference GanevV. I. Ganev (2006, 82), “It eschewed dramatic policy reversals and, overall, displayed a degree of concern for strengthening effective governance.” As shown in Figure 3, the state of Bulgaria’s democracy remained fairly consistent from 2001 to 2005, suggesting that not much backsliding occurred. The episode nearly ended there due to stasis.

The European Union (EU) accession process may have led to limited autocratization under the Simeon II government. After being left out in 1997 due to questions about its governance and economic reforms, Bulgaria was invited to talks in February 2000. Over the next several years, Bulgaria attempted to position itself as accession-worthy through piecemeal reforms in response to EU conditionalities. It had the benefit of comparison with Romania, another laggard much farther behind Bulgaria on reforms (Reference Noutcheva and BechevNoutcheva & Bechev, 2008). After French and Dutch voters rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty in May 2005, Simeon II went to the polls for re-election under a cloud of uncertainty about Bulgaria’s EU prospects, with accession plans facing potential delays.

The NDSV lost control of the parliament in the 2005 elections, but it served in a coalition government with the BSP until 2009. This discredited the party’s claims to populism and monarchism given the baggage associated with the former communist party. Despite being characterized as an “almost forgotten episode” (Reference Wien and NewmanWien, 2021), the rise and fall of the Simeon II government had important consequences for Bulgaria’s democracy going forward. It showed the extent of dissatisfaction with the prevailing political elite and the immense opportunities this situation posed for political entrepreneurs (Reference Gurov and ZankinaGurov & Zankina, 2013).

Out of these conditions arose a new personalist-populist party, the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB). Founded in 2006 by Boyko Borisov, GERB has been characterized as having “no particular ideology” and “no coherent vision of Bulgaria’s future” (Reference GanevV. I. Ganev, 2018, 96). Borisov’s charisma is GERB’s main resource, and he “leaves no doubt that he has full control of the party and the final say on all cabinet and party decisions” (Reference Gurov and ZankinaGurov & Zankina, 2013, 6).

Borisov spent most of the 1990s running a private security company before serving as a bodyguard and head of police for Simeon II. This experience allowed Borisov to successfully reinvent himself as a politician, winning the mayoral race in Sofia in 2006 (Reference Smilov, Mesežnikov, Gyárfášová and SmilovSmilov, 2008). Since then, Borisov has experienced a love-hate relationship with the Bulgarian people. Between 2009 and 2021, he served as prime minister three times, resigning twice due to protests in 2013 and the defeat of GERB’s presidential candidate in 2017. Each time, Borisov returned to power. He did so by normalizing a personalist and highly corrupt regime and painting his critics as “hysterics with no feel for the realities of governing” (Reference GanevV. I. Ganev, 2018, 99).

As illustrated in Figure 3, Bulgaria experienced further erosion in democracy throughout the rest of the episode. Judicial independence and press freedoms suffered particularly large setbacks. This came despite Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in January 2007 under unusual circumstances, which included continued monitoring of its judicial system (Reference Noutcheva and BechevNoutcheva & Bechev, 2008). At the same time, the EU appears to have played a “passive” role during the episode. While the EU did withhold some funding from 2007 to 2009, the Borisov government experienced few repercussions for its failure to implement recommended reforms to the judiciary (Reference Gherghina and BankovGherghina & Bankov, 2023). Rather, the opposite appears to have unfolded throughout the rest of the episode.

Under Borisov, executive aggrandizement primarily took the form of weakening and weaponizing judicial institutions. The judiciary became largely compliant with ongoing government corruption by subjecting proceedings to lengthy delays and dismissing charges on technicalities (Reference Ganev, Smilov and PrimatarovaG. Ganev et al., 2013). The non-transparent appointment procedures for judges and the non-random allocation of cases opened the courts to “political meddling” (Reference SpirovaSpirova, 2015). As Reference GanevV. I. Ganev (2018, 98) observes, “public figures who oppose[d] the government might run into legal trouble, and several former members of non-GERB cabinets have been placed under investigation”; however, this never rose to the level of “elaborately prepared abuses of judicial power.” Still, the perception that the “[r]ule of law in many cases is only a fiction” drove down support for GERB and continued to erode public trust in elites and the democratic system (Reference KrastevKrastev, 2016, 38).

The media environment also worsened with increased hate speech, violence against journalists, lack of transparency in media ownership and funding, and the “fusion of media and politics” (Reference Zankina and GurovZankina & Gurov, 2018). Between 2006 and 2018, Bulgaria dropped from 36th to 111th place on Reporters Without Borders press freedom rankings (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Several independent print media outlets closed due to insolvency, and online sources with “questionable quality” rose in their place (Reference SpirovaSpirova, 2017). Meanwhile, journalists faced the threat of violence for speaking out against corruption and organized crime (Freedom House, 2011a). They were often pressured to support political actors (Reference SpirovaSpirova, 2017). The concentration of media into large monopolies owned by individuals with ties to Borisov and a lack of transparency over their ownership and funding sources reduced access to alternative sources of information (Reference Zankina and GurovZankina & Gurov, 2018).

5.1.3 The End of the Episode

By 2019, Bulgaria’s democracy had reached its lowest point since the post-communist transition. Despite disapproval from the EU for its lack of reforms, Borisov’s government faced few repercussions from the regional bloc. Fragmentation of the opposition also allowed Borisov to continue weakening Bulgaria’s democratic institutions without many consequences (Reference Gherghina and BankovGherghina & Bankov, 2023). Nevertheless, the subtle erosion of democracy under the three GERB governments did not lead to a breakdown of democracy. Instead, a major blunder in mid-2020 eventually led to the conclusion of this episode.

In July 2020, a video on social media showed bodyguards from the National Protection Service stopping a center-right politician – Hristo Ivanov – from docking on a public beach. Later it came to light that the government had reserved the beach for Ahmed Drogan, a former politician, who had established a private port there for the summer (Reference Barzachka and YordanovaBarzachka & Yordanova, 2020). The video sparked outrage, and mass protests erupted. After the president criticized the incident, the prosecutor-in-chief raided his offices in retaliation (Reference DimitrovaDimitrova, 2022). This sparked further protests calling for the dissolution of the GERB government over the politicization of the Prosecutor in Chief’s office, among other emerging scandals. Borisov refused to resign, and instead proposed a new constitution to placate the protestors’ demands (Reference Gherghina and BankovGherghina & Bankov, 2023). This strategy bought the government time while doing little to respond to the protests. Meanwhile, these events forced the fragmented opposition to form a cordon sanitaire, with the understanding that they would reject any agreement with GERB to a post-election coalition. This strategy effectively isolated GERB, leading to its loss of power in April 2021.

Since then, the political situation in Bulgaria has remained highly unstable (Reference Yovcheva and BértoaYovcheva & Bértoa, 2023). There were five parliamentary elections between April 2021 and April 2023. As of this writing, Borisov has stepped back, refusing to take up a cabinet position or run for prime minister. However, GERB is a major partner in the coalition government formed in June 2023, and the prime minister position will rotate to Mariya Gabriel, a GERB member, in nine months (Reference CamutCamut, 2023).

5.2.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Despite unfavorable conditions (Reference Mainwaring and MasoudMainwaring & Masoud, 2022), India established the world’s largest democracy immediately after independence. For the next fifty years, various factions of the centrist Indian National Congress party dominated politics. As discussed in Section 4, the 1970s saw a period of executive aggrandizement under Indira Gandhi that nearly destroyed India’s democracy.

While democracy bounced back, the Emergency Period had a lasting impact on Indian politics. It saw the emergence of the first non-Congress government formed from a contradictory constellation of political parties unified solely in their opposition to Gandhi (Reference MendelsohnMendelsohn, 1978). Unsurprisingly the Janata government fell apart, but from its ashes arose the ethnonationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Reference GouldGould, 1980).

The BJP is “a typical populist radical right party” (Reference Leidig and MuddeLeidig & Mudde, 2023, 360) that draws heavily upon Hindutva. Because Hindutva considers all “indigenous religions” as part of one Hindu nation, it is best described as an ethnonationalist ideology. To restore India to a mythical golden age, Hindutva claims that loyal Indians “should have superior rights and privileges; the less than fully loyal should have inferior rights, or maybe none at all” (Reference VarshneyVarshney, 2022, 108). It ascribes a superior place to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains, who are “presumed to have natural fidelity to India, for their religions were born in India” (Reference VarshneyVarshney, 2022, 108). Through this distortion of history, Muslims and Christians are cast as foreigners and invaders with less loyalty and are, thus, less deserving of certain rights. With connections to fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Hindutva first emerged in the colonial period. Early Hindutva thinkers argued that Hindus are the true Aryan race (Reference LeidigLeidig, 2020; Reference ThaparThapar, 1996). Relegated to the fringes of political life throughout the first fifty years of Indian independence, Hindutva slowly gained prominence after the Emergency period.

Although the BJP performed poorly throughout the 1980s, it slowly developed a grassroots basis for support, eventually allowing it to gain power. A cadre-based system of local cells – or morchas – and training camps helped to “strengthen cadres’ ideological commitments and organizational abilities” (Reference Basu, Kohli and SinghBasu, 2012, 84). Capitalizing on growing discontent with Congress and its neoliberal economic reforms, the BJP took the most seats in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections (Reference PaiPai, 1996). However, its fragile coalition government collapsed within 13 days, leading to a period of political instability and party realignment. The BJP again won the most seats in the Lok Sabha in 1998, but its government collapsed the following year, prompting fresh polls. Finally, with support for Congress at an all-time low, a BJP-led coalition was able to form a stable government in 1999.

5.2.2 The Autocratization Episode

The episode begins under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a veteran politician “virtually unknown outside India for most of his 50 years in politics” (Reference McFaddenMcFadden, 2018). According to his obituary in the New York Times, Vajpayee was a moderate who supported equal rights for all religions, “championed women’s rights and the eradication of castes,” and ”pushed back against militants in his own coalition” (Reference McFaddenMcFadden, 2018). A careful reading of history contradicts this flattering portrayal. As a teenager, Vajpayee joined the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu-nationalist paramilitary organization, before helping to form India’s first Hindu nationalist party in 1951 – Jana Sangh – the predecessor of the BJP. During his term as prime minister, Vajpayee made subtle but fundamental shifts away from secularism, including mandated Hindu prayers in state-sponsored schools and revisions to history books to legitimate the Hindutva narrative (Freedom House, 2002; Reference RupareliaRuparelia, 2006).

More disturbing, however, was the state-sanctioned political violence in Gujarat in March 2002 (Freedom House, 2003). After a railway fire in Gujarat killed sixty people, mostly Hindus returning from prayers, mobs swept through Muslim neighborhoods destroying property and killing thousands (Reference PatilPatil, 2017). Vajpayee refused to condemn the attacks and instead appealed to post-9/11 Islamophobia by suggesting that Muslims are inherently violent (Reference TullyTully, 2002).

Seeking to capitalize on good economic conditions, Vajpayee called for early elections in 2004. The BJP had won several key state elections in late 2003, suggesting that it would easily secure a renewed mandate. In a surprising upset, however, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition secured the most seats (Reference WaldmanWaldman, 2004). The UPA reversed many of the BJP’s education policies. It emphasized the importance of the civil and property rights of all Indians, especially minorities (Freedom House, 2010) and sought to enact broad civic entitlements covering information, work, education, forest conservation, food, and even basic services (Reference NilsenNilsen, 2018; Reference RupareliaRuparelia, 2013). However, the UPA’s efforts to restore India’s secular statism could not stem the growing popularity of the BJP’s Hindu nationalist agenda, especially once it embraced a more hardline leadership under Narendra Modi in late 2013.

Described as a “first-rate orator with impeccable timing” (Reference WaldmanWaldman, 2002), Modi built a cult of personality for himself based on the “Gujarat model” of rapid economic growth and Hindu nationalism (Reference Ding and SlaterDing & Slater, 2021). Modi rose to the spotlight as the Chief Minister for Gujarat state, where he was complicit in the 2002 communal violence. He then capitalized on anti-Muslim sentiments to expand the BJP’s majority in the state assembly through snap elections (Freedom House, 2003). Modi claimed credit for Gujarat’s rapid economic growth, which outpaced other states. He promised to bring this “minimum government, maximum governance” model to the rest of India, giving him a strong following from the business and middle class, as well as youth and women (Reference MustafiMustafi, 2013; Reference WaldmanWaldman, 2002).Footnote ⁹

Riding Modi’s charisma, the BJP swept April/May 2014 national elections with 282 out of 545 seats (52 percent) – becoming the first ruling party since 1984 to win a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014). Armed with a parliamentary majority, Modi almost immediately began undermining accountability mechanisms by consolidating powers within the executive. Within months of taking office, Modi had declared “all important policy issues” part of his portfolio and sidelined ministers by taking control of bureaucratic appointments (Reference Daniel and NairDaniel & Nair, 2015). In the Lok Sabha, the BJP sidelined the opposition by refusing to recognize the leader of the opposition and using a “guillotine” procedure to vote on legislation without debate (Reference KhaitanKhaitan, 2020, 67).

The courts, hitherto noted for their “judicial sovereignty” (Reference MehtaMehta, 2007, 70), showed “signs of subservience to the government” Reference VarshneyVarshney, 2022, 116). After the courts blocked a constitutional amendment in 2015 that would have given the government more control over judicial appointments, senior BJP members publicly attacked the judiciary and the government delayed appointing judges. Since then, there have been several surprisingly favorable judgments for the Modi government, which analysts describe as motivated by ideological solidarity or self-preservation (Reference VaishnavVaishnav, 2021).

The Modi government has systematically used security laws, criminal defamation, hate speech legislation, and contempt of court charges to silence critical voices (Freedom House, 2015; Reference GangulyGanguly, 2023). Indian journalists face intimidation and physical violence for running stories critical of the government (Reference GopalakrishnanGopalakrishnan, 2018). Twenty-two journalists were killed during Modi’s first term, twice as many as under the previous government (UNESCO, 2023). Meanwhile, Modi’s social media platform, launched in 2015, has amplified propaganda and disinformation by obliging members to follow BJP leaders (Reference OzturkOzturk, 2021).

In addition, Modi’s government shut down critical civil society organizations, particularly those that promote minority rights. Between 2015 and 2022, seventeen thousand civil society organizations were denied registration or renewal (Reference VarshneyVarshney, 2022). When these tactics failed, the government targeted organizations with constant “surveillance, harassment, intimidation, imprisonment, injury, and death” (Reference TudorTudor, 2023, 126). Meanwhile, groups promoting Hindu nationalism were supported and rewarded (Reference VarshneyVarshney, 2022). The Modi government has put to effective use the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), which saw a 72 percent increase in arrests, almost all of which deny the opportunity for bail (Reference TudorTudor, 2023).

5.2.3 The End of the Episode

Drawing on direct appeals to Hindu nationalism, Modi’s BJP has succeeded in dismantling the world’s most populous democracy from within through a combination of legal and extralegal maneuvers. According to the ERT data, India ceased to be a democracy sometime in 2017. Since then, conditions have continued to erode under Modi’s second administration.

In the April/May 2019 elections, the BJP secured even more seats (56 percent), and its coalition held a commanding majority (65 percent) of the Lok Sabha. Less than two months later, the government introduced amendments to the UAPA that provide greater powers to designate individuals as terrorists and jail them indefinitely without bail. These amendments went into law in August 2019, and since then, the Modi government has detained thousands of protesters and opposition figures (Reference Schmall and YasirSchmall & Yasir, 2021).

In March 2023, Modi’s greatest potential challenger, the grandson of Indira Gandhi – Rahul Gandhi, was sentenced to two years in prison for defamation, the minimum amount necessary to disqualify someone from holding public office. The Indian Supreme Court overturned the sentence but also seemed to side with the ruling party when it cautioned Gandhi “to be more careful as a public speaker” (Reference TravelliTravelli, 2023).

Under Modi’s second term, the government has become more open about its Hindutva vision for India. In August 2019, the government granted “an old Hindu-nationalist wish” when it revoked the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir – India’s only Muslim-majority state – placing it under direct rule from Delhi (Reference VarshneyVarshney, 2022, 110). Shortly thereafter, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) came into law, providing a fast-track to citizenship for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsi, and Christians who illegally migrated to India from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh prior to 2015, thereby discriminating against Muslim migrants (Reference TudorTudor, 2023). The government continues to revise the educational curriculum to remove or limit material about India’s history and politics that is “inconvenient to its Hindu nationalist vision for the country” (Reference RajRaj, 2023). The opening of the Hindu Ram Temple in Ayodhya, constructed where a Mosque stood for centuries before being destroyed by a mob in 1992, was strategically timed in early 2024 to coincide with the launch of Modi’s reelection campaign. According to the New York Times, the event “was both a religious ritual and a made-for-TV spectacle for a broadcast media co-opted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi” (Reference Mashal and KumarMashal & Kumar, 2024).

6.1.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Ecuador experienced a major financial crisis and several changes in government in the decade leading up to the backsliding episode (Reference StoyanStoyan, 2020). Mass protests led to the pre-mature ouster of three presidents from 1997 to 2005, twice by legislative vote and once via a military coup. Citizens increasingly viewed traditional political parties as ineffective (Reference Sanchez-SibonySanchez-Sibony, 2017). Public support for these parties “declined from an average of 70 percent between 1984 and 1998 to under 30 percent in 2006” (Reference Haggard and KaufmanHaggard & Kaufman, 2021, 41). The low levels of confidence in the government and political system ahead of the 2006 presidential election created a beneficial environment for the anti-establishment and populist candidate Rafael Correa (Reference Sanchez-SibonySanchez-Sibony, 2017).

Before running for president, Correa was an economics professor and briefly served as the Minister of Economy and Finance in 2005. Frequently described as a populist technocrat, Correa capitalized on the public’s cynicism and launched a campaign centered around restructuring the entire economic and political order (Reference De la Torre and Ortiz LemosDe la Torre & Ortiz Lemos, 2016; Reference SelçukSelçuk, 2016). Riding a left-turn in Latin American politics, Correa pledged to recenter the state’s role in the economy to help it recover from the failures of neoliberalism (Reference De la Torre, Sánchez and PachanoDe la Torre, 2020). He also vowed to rewrite the constitution to “cleanse the body politic of its dysfunctional institutions” (Reference ConaghanConaghan, 2008, 49). Correa’s campaign proved successful; he won a runoff election in November 2006, becoming Ecuador’s eighth president in a decade.

6.1.2 The Autocratization Episode

Almost immediately after taking office in 2007, Correa sought to remake Ecuador’s political institutions. Following through on his campaign promise to replace the constitution, Correa issued an executive decree that mandated a referendum on establishing a constituent assembly. The decree created significant tension between the newly elected president and the Congress, as the latter believed Correa was overstepping his power (Reference ConaghanConaghan, 2008). Despite winning the presidential run-off, Correa’s party held no seats in the right-wing-controlled Congress.

However, Correa was able to move ahead with a nationwide vote in April 2007, and an overwhelming majority of the electorate supported creating a Constituent Assembly (Reference De la Torre and Ortiz LemosDe la Torre & Ortiz Lemos, 2016). Another national vote in September 2007 handed Correa’s party 80 out of the 130 seats (62 percent) in the assembly, enough of a majority for his party to act without support from the opposition (Reference ConaghanConaghan, 2008; Reference Haggard and KaufmanHaggard & Kaufman, 2021).

Soon after its session started, the Constituent Assembly passed a mandate that substantially altered the distribution of power in the government. The mandate transferred all legislative authority from Congress to the assembly, forcing Congress into a temporary recess until the new constitution was finalized (Reference StoyanStoyan, 2020). This was a crucial move to help Correa solidify his influence over the new constitution and government during this period. Sidelining the right-wing controlled legislature removed a potential obstacle. Doing so through the popularly elected constituent assembly rather than by executive decree helped prevent pushback from below, especially since citizens were already dissatisfied with the existing Congress. This was all the more important given the recent history of Congress prematurely removing presidents from office.

Empowered by his majority in the Constituent Assembly, Correa oversaw the creation of a new constitution with a powerful executive branch. The document gives the president the power to dismiss Congress, hold national referendums, and veto or amend laws (Reference ConaghanConaghan, 2016). It also allowed individuals to serve for two presidential terms, a change from the previous restriction barring consecutive terms in office. After the constitution was enacted, Correa called for new elections “as a symbolical move towards a brand new start for the country” (Reference SelçukSelçuk, 2016, 581). The 2009 elections were a victory for Correa, and his party picked up a plurality of seats in Congress.

Beyond the constitutional changes, media freedoms were one of the primary victims of Correa’s executive aggrandizement. The government confiscated radio and television stations, sued journalists for defamation, and pressured businesses not to advertise with opposition sources to economically weaken competitors (Reference De la Torre and Ortiz LemosDe la Torre & Ortiz Lemos, 2016). In 2009, the government passed a series of laws that regulated media reporting during election periods and put a moratorium on private media coverage of candidates forty-five days before an election (Reference Cleary and ÖztürkCleary & Öztürk, 2022). Since the same restrictions did not apply to state-owned media outlets, the law allowed Correa to use government resources to build support for himself and his allies while reducing media coverage of opposition candidates in the immediate run-up to elections (Reference Sanchez-SibonySanchez-Sibony, 2017). In 2013, Congress also passed a communication law establishing an agency responsible for regulating media content (Reference ConaghanConaghan, 2016). This provided Correa another avenue through which he could monitor and silence media outlets that might be critical of his rule. Meanwhile, Correa frequently used the government television station to air mandatory national broadcasts highlighting the successes of his government while also discrediting his political and media adversaries (Reference SelçukSelçuk, 2016). These broadcasts aired for nearly 12,000 minutes during his first five years in power (Reference De la Torre and Ortiz LemosDe la Torre & Ortiz Lemos, 2016).

Civil society also suffered throughout the episode. Correa required all organizations to register with the government and to abide by a series of vague rules that limited their operations (Reference GoeuryGoeury, 2021). His government used terrorism laws to restrict civil society organizations and to penalize individuals for engaging in protests (Reference De la TorreDe la Torre, 2018). An executive decree issued in 2013 prohibited non-governmental organizations and movements from engaging in political activity or “interfering in public policies in a way that contravenes internal and external security or disturbs public peace” (Reference De la Torre and Ortiz LemosDe la Torre & Ortiz Lemos, 2016, 229). In addition to these coercive measures, Correa attempted to co-opt opposition groups by offering government jobs and other benefits (Reference De la Torre and Ortiz LemosDe la Torre & Ortiz Lemos, 2016; Reference Laebens and LührmannLaebens & Lührmann, 2021).

Finally, Correa’s executive aggrandizement undermined the judiciary and the fairness of elections. A combination of laws, constitutional changes, and executive decrees allowed Correa to weaken and pack institutions like the judiciary with allies (Reference ConaghanConaghan, 2016). Control over the courts helped insulate Correa from any legal challenges posed by political opponents (Reference Cleary and ÖztürkCleary & Öztürk, 2022). Members of the National Electoral Council, the institution responsible for overseeing elections, were also loyal to Correa (Reference Sanchez-SibonySanchez-Sibony, 2017). With the election-related media restrictions and bias of the National Electoral Council, the opposing presidential candidate in 2013 compared running in the election to “playing a soccer match on a tilted field and with a referee purchased by the other team” (Reference De la Torre and Ortiz LemosDe la Torre & Ortiz Lemos, 2016, 227).

6.1.3 End of the Episode

Throughout the episode, Correa relied on oil rents to fund his extensive social programs and patronage-based appointments (Reference MazzucaMazzuca, 2013). However, when the commodity boom ended, and the price of oil dropped in 2015, Correa could no longer keep up with these high levels of spending. As a result, support for his government declined (Reference Laebens and LührmannLaebens & Lührmann, 2021; Reference Sanchez-SibonySanchez-Sibony, 2017). Correa’s popularity suffered further when he pressured Congress to remove presidential term limits to allow himself to run for a fourth term. Declining economic conditions, proposed tax increases, and growing frustrations with Correa’s pursuit of another term sparked protests nationwide.

With his popularity sinking, Correa attempted to evade electoral defeat by setting up a caretaker government. He agreed not to run for the presidency and endorsed an ally, Lenín Moreno, as the ruling party’s candidate (Reference Cleary and ÖztürkCleary & Öztürk, 2022). With someone loyal in office, Correa could potentially still influence the government and return to power in 2021. However, this strategy proved to be a mistake.

After Moreno won the 2017 election, he worked to roll back the harmful reforms that took place under Correa’s administration (Reference Cleary and ÖztürkCleary & Öztürk, 2022; Reference De la TorreDe la Torre, 2018) and pursued corruption charges against Correa and his associates (Reference Laebens and LührmannLaebens & Lührmann, 2021). Moreno actively worked to de-personalize politics, reinvigorated Ecuador’s political institutions, and lifted restrictions on media and civil society (Reference StuenkelStuenkel, 2019). Thus, although Ecuador’s democracy appeared to be headed toward a breakdown, an economic downturn combined with Correa’s miscalculations eventually allowed democracy to recover through a top-down process (Reference StuenkelStuenkel, 2019).

Since then, things have not fared well for Correa, who has been living in exile in Belgium.Footnote ¹⁰ In 2018, he returned to Ecuador to campaign against the referendum restoring term limits. Far from a warm reception, “voters threw tomatoes and eggs at him on several occasions” and “he had to be evacuated by helicopter after rocks and trash were thrown at his car” (Reference Ayala and RochabrúnAyala & Rochabrún, 2018). The result of the referendum effectively eliminated Correa’s chances of returning to power, with 63 percent of voters supporting the restoration of term limits (IFES, 2018). In 2020, Ecuador’s courts convicted Correa of accepting millions in bribes for public contracts, sentencing him to eight years in prison and banning him from political activities for 25 years (Reference CabreraCabrera, 2020).

6.2.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Turkey’s protracted democratization throughout the 1980s and 1990s occurred under the watchful eye of its military with “a clear doctrine of modernization and a secularizing mission” (Reference YavuzYavuz, 2009, 31). By the early 2000s, Turkey was considered a model for democracy, secularism, and modernity in the Muslim world (Reference AltunisikAltunisik, 2005). However, it struggled to contain Islamist opposition.

The courts engaged in a Sisyphean response to Islamist political activities, banning thirteen parties from 1991 to 1998. In the 1995 elections, the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) secured the most seats and led a brief coalition government from June 1996 until the military toppled it in a coup-by-memorandum in February 1997. The Constitutional Court banned the RP in 1998; it was promptly replaced by the Virtue Party, which the courts banned in mid-2001. This ban gave rise to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2001.

The AKP’s ideology is populist and ethnonationalist, with Muslimhood and Ottoman heritage as the core elements defining Turkishness, while also being moderate in its position concerning the West and capitalism by embracing neoliberal economics and making EU accession a high priority (Reference Saraçoğlu and DemirkolSaraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2015). Erdoğan, an Islamist politician and the former mayor of Istanbul, had first joined politics in the 1970s as a youth winger for the Islamist National Salvation Party (MNP), the banned precursor to the RP. The closure of multiple Islamist parties made Erdoğan pragmatic in his approach to the APK. For example, after the RP was banned in 1998, Erdoğan told the New York Times, “If we want to attract more than 40 percent of the vote and come to power, we need a new image” (Reference KinzerKinzer, 1998). As a businessman, Erdoğan “hoped to reach beyond religious voters and appeal to the Turkish mainstream” by selling the AKP as a neoliberal Islamist party (Reference FrantzFrantz, 2001).

The 2002 election saw a “collapse of centrist politics in the country” (Reference ÇarkoğluÇarkoğlu, 2002, 30). Erdoğan’s populism, combined with the AKP’s promises to right the political and economic excesses of previous administrations, appealed to a wide cross-section of the population, including Islamists, rural nationalists but also the more moderate urban middle class angered by the previous government’s economic policies (Reference CagaptayCagaptay, 2002; Reference Çınar, Esposito, Rahim and GhobadzadehÇınar, 2018; Reference DagiDagi, 2008; Reference TepeTepe, 2005; Reference Yilmaz and BashirovYilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

As a result, the AKP won a landslide victory, taking two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Only one other party – the left-leaning Republican People’s Party (CHP) managed to secure seats (Reference CagaptayCagaptay, 2002). However, Erdoğan was unable to serve in the parliament due to a 1998 conviction for “inciting hatred” (Reference LancasterLancaster, 2014; Reference TepeTepe, 2005), a ban the courts upheld before the 2002 elections (Reference FrantzFrantz, 2002). As a result, Abdullah Gül served as a caretaker prime minister for four months until the AKP government could repeal the ban and Erdoğan could secure a parliamentary seat through by-elections. This new position and the AKP’s powerful majority set the stage for Erdoğan to dismantle Turkey’s democracy from within.

6.2.2 The Autocratization Episode

Upon assuming office, the AKP government began implementing several “monumental reforms” in line with EU integration, including improvements to civilian oversight of the military, reduced restrictions on parties, and enhancements to the rule of law (Freedom House, 2005, 646). According to V-Dem, Turkey’s electoral democracy index even improved from 0.65 to 0.68 during the first two years under the AKP, as illustrated in Figure 4.

The pace of reforms slowed in 2005 (Freedom House, 2006) when the backsliding episode began. Initial declines in democracy were subtle, largely due to a narrowing of space for the media and civil society. For example, in 2005, Erdoğan began to go after critics through defamation suits (Reference BermeoBermeo, 2016), and new legislation allowed the government to restrict activities of civil society groups (Freedom House, 2006; Reference Gottlieb, Blair and Hannah BaronGottlieb et al., 2023).

Backsliding intensified after the 2007 parliamentary election resulted in another victory for the AKP. This success allowed Erdoğan to retain his position as prime minister, and the AKP elected a new president aligned with the party (Reference Szikra and ÖktemSzikra & Öktem, 2023). Despite the initial pushback from the opposition, the AKP successfully elected former prime minister and fellow party member Abdullah Gül as president (Reference ÇarkoğluÇarkoğlu, 2007). With the parliament and presidency now controlled by his party, Erdoğan began to weaken other institutional constraints. The AKP government orchestrated a successful referendum in late 2007 to allow for direct presidential elections (Reference KalaycıoğluKalaycıoğlu, 2012), paving the way for Erdoğan to transform this largely ceremonial office into a strong presidency.

The judiciary became a primary target in 2008 after it ruled that the AKP’s attempt to remove a ban on headscarves at universities was a violation of “the constitutional principle of secularism” (Reference Cleary and ÖztürkCleary & Öztürk, 2022 214), but unlike earlier courts, it stopped short of banning the AKP. In response, Erdoğan worked to curb the judiciary’s power. In 2010, a set of constitutional amendments (by referendum) created judicial term limits, expanded the size of the Constitutional Court, and altered the process for appointing judges (Reference LancasterLancaster, 2014; Reference Varol, Dalla Pellegrina and GaroupaVarol et al., 2017). These changes allowed Erdoğan to appoint individuals more favorable to his party, leading to a collapse of the separation of powers (Reference Haggard and KaufmanHaggard & Kaufman, 2021).

The radically secular military continued to pose a major potential challenge for Erdoğan. In an effort to coup-proof the regime, the AKP made unsubstantiated charges that a secretive ultranationalist group known as Ergenekon was conspiring the topple the regime. Over several years, it used these claims to arrest an ever-widening number of individuals, including journalists and military officers. After securing another term in the 2011 elections, the government arrested a number of military officers leading to the resignation of the chief of staff and heads of the military branches. This gave Erodğan greater control over the selection of loyal commanders (Freedom House, 2012), helping to further insulate the AKP from pressure by secularist military officers.

Throughout the episode, attacks on the media and civil society amplified. Erdoğan and the AKP portrayed critical journalists as “enemies of the nation” and “outsiders of the Muslim community,” evoking enthopopulism by calling into question their loyalty and Turkishness (Reference ÖverÖver, 2021, 347). The AKP has used this as justification to harass and arrest media opponents. Throughout the 2010s, Turkey regularly made the “worst offenders” list for jailed journalists (Reference GetzGetz, 2022). Critical media outlets also faced fines and property seizures, which often forced owners to sell to pro-AKP businessmen, who secured credit from state-owned banks (Reference ÖverÖver, 2021). While Turkey ranked 100 in 2002 on the World Press Freedom rankings, it had dropped to 154 by 2013 (Reporters Without Borders, 2023).

In 2013, Erdoğan’s willingness to violently (and visibly) repress opposition to his regime dramatically escalated. After environmentalists gathered to peacefully protest the AKP’s redevelopment of Gezi Park in May (Reference DamarDamar, 2016), police responded with excessive force (Reference Sarfati and EpsteinSarfati, 2015). Outraged by this repression, demonstrations quickly spread throughout the country, with more than 3.5 million people participating at the height of the protests (Reference Gençoğlu OnbaşiGençoğlu Onbaşi, 2016). Erdoğan’s government violently suppressed the protesters, resulting in eleven deaths, over 8,000 injuries, and more than 5,500 arrests (Reference Akyuz and HessAkyuz & Hess, 2018).

A few months after the Gezi Park incident, news broke of a corruption investigation involving several government elites and individuals connected to the AKP (Reference ÖzbudunÖzbudun, 2014). Erdoğan claimed the accusations were a plot by the Gülen Movement, a rival to the AKP, to overthrow the government (Reference OnbaşıOnbaşı, 2020; Reference TaşTaş, 2015). Afterward, he used the opportunity to purge several individuals suspected to be disloyal to his government from the police force, judiciary, and prosecutor’s office (Reference Akyuz and HessAkyuz & Hess, 2018; Freedom House, 2015) and limited internet access to tighten his control over the narrative (Reference Çınar, Esposito, Rahim and GhobadzadehÇınar, 2018; Reference TaşTaş, 2015).

6.2.3 End of the Episode

According to the ERT dataset, Turkey’s democracy broke down sometime in 2013, and its scores on the V-Dem EDI have continued to decline as illustrated in Figure 4. Turkey’s EDI score fell from 0.68 in 2004 to 0.47 by the end of the episode, slipping further to 0.276 by the end of 2022. Even after the corruption scandal surfaced in late 2013, Erdoğan won the country’s first-ever direct presidential election the following year. His success was partly due to his ability to rally support through populist and nationalist appeals, but he also benefited from an uneven electoral playing field (Freedom House, 2015; Reference TürkTürk, 2018). Observers cited irregularities during the election cycle and claimed that Erdoğan misused the media and other state resources to bolster his campaign (Freedom House, 2016).

In July 2016, a group within the military attempted to remove Erdoğan from office (Reference Esen and GumuscuEsen & Gumuscu, 2017). However, their efforts were unsuccessful, and Erdoğan used the failed coup as justification for further expanding his power. He declared a state of emergency in response to the event, which essentially enabled him to rule by decree until the order expired in July 2018 (Reference Çınar, Esposito, Rahim and GhobadzadehÇınar, 2018). During this period, his government purged thousands of potential opponents from various state institutions and increased crackdowns on media freedom and civil liberties in the name of national security (Reference Akyuz and HessAkyuz & Hess, 2018).

Erdoğan also used his new power to push through a referendum on a constitutional amendment that would transition the country to a presidential system. Although the state of emergency already “facilitated the switch to de facto presidential governance in Turkey,” the constitutional amendment would officially move all executive power from the prime minister to the president (Reference Akman and AkçalıAkman & Akçalı, 2017, 579). The referendum passed in April 2017 and went into effect after the 2018 snap presidential elections (Freedom House, 2019). Erdoğan held on to power in the 2018 and 2023 elections, paving the way for him to continue leading the country further away from democracy.

7.1.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

After ruling for eight years as a military dictator, President Chun Doo-hwan agreed to allow direct presidential elections in 1987 amidst widespread student protests (Reference KooKoo, 2002). Afterward, South Korea transitioned to democracy, but the authoritarian successor party remained in power until the liberal opposition won elections in 1997. The political situation grew increasingly turbulent during Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency. In 2003, allegations surfaced of a corruption scandal involving several government elites and legislators “from across the political spectrum,” including some individuals connected to Roh (Freedom House, 2008, 652). Less than a year later, the opposition-led parliament voted to impeach Roh for violating an electoral rule. While the Constitutional Court reinstated him (Reference BrookeBrooke, 2004), popular support for the ruling party declined throughout the rest of his term (Reference ChaibongChaibong, 2008).

These events set the stage for conservative candidate, Lee Myung-bak, to win the presidency in December 2007. Born to a poor family, Lee spent most of his career as the CEO of Hyundai, earning the nickname bulldozer for his get-the-job-done leadership style (Reference Sang-HunSang-Hun, 2007). Throughout the campaign, Lee promised to implement “populist reforms that would lead to a return to the kind of high economic growth seen previously during the … dictatorship era and connected this to ultra-conservative condemnation of the legacy of ‘leftist’ presidents” (Reference DoucetteDoucette, 2010, 23). Once in office, President Lee began eroding democratic institutions. This backsliding occurred throughout his term and continued under his successor Park Geun-hye, the daughter of former dictator Park Chung-hee.

7.1.2 The Autocratization Episode

The episode begins in 2008, the first year of Lee’s administration. In April, conservative parties won an “overwhelming majority” of seats in the legislature (Reference ChaibongChaibong, 2008, 128). Shortly thereafter, Lee sought to improve economic relations with the United States by allowing beef imports, banned since 2003 due to concerns about mad cow disease (Reference ChoiChoi, 2022). Hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets of Seoul in mass demonstrations that lasted for over forty days, evolving from the narrow issue of beef imports to include a range of issues such as healthcare, consumer prices, and education. In response, South Korean police raided offices of protest groups, arresting several dozen (New York Times, 2008b). The government also pressed charges against investigative journalists who had published a television program that sparked the protests (Reference ChoiChoi, 2022).

Lee’s attacks on media freedom and civil liberties were not isolated to the 2008 protests. Throughout his time in office, he relied heavily on defamation laws – which are a criminal offense – to silence and intimidate individuals and journalists who were critical of his administration (Reference Haggard and YouHaggard & You, 2015). Lee also filled senior management positions at media companies with his allies and censored online comments (Reference Gottlieb, Blair and Hannah BaronGottlieb et al., 2023). As a result, Freedom House reclassified South Korea from “free” to “partly free” in its annual freedom of the press survey in 2011 (Freedom House, 2011b).

Lee also turned to the National Security Law (NSL) to penalize his critics (Reference Gottlieb, Blair and Hannah BaronGottlieb et al., 2023). The 1948 law was originally presented as a safeguard against North Korea and the spread of communism, but government elites often used the law to punish political opposition. While Lee was not the first South Korean leader to abuse the NSL, the number of arrests under his administration increased substantially compared to those that occurred under the two previous presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (Amnesty International, 2012; Reference Haggard and YouHaggard & You, 2015). Democracy further suffered due to the government’s involvement in illegally surveilling citizens in 2010 (Reference CroissantCroissant, 2019; Reference Laebens and LührmannLaebens & Lührmann, 2021).

The South Korean constitution limits presidents to one five-year term, so Lee could not run for the presidency again in 2012. However, the backsliding episode continued. Rocked by corruption scandals, Lee’s approval ratings stood at around 20 percent, and there was an overall “gloomy outlook for the governing Grand National Party” due to dissatisfaction over the economy amidst the global recession (Reference Sohn and KangSohn & Kang, 2013, 199). Yet conservatives were able to pull off a stunning victory in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 under the leadership of Park Geun-hye, daughter of the former dictator Park Chung-hee.

Described as “a small woman of regal bearing” (Reference FacklerFackler, 2012), Park experienced twin tragedies, with her parents being assassinated five years apart. Later, she joined politics as a member of parliament and rose through the ranks of the GNP. During the 2012 campaign, Park drew on nostalgia for her father’s “fabled high-growth era” to rebrand and reshape the GNP in her own image as the Saenuri Party (Reference DoucetteDoucette, 2010, 851). She attracted throngs of excited conservative supporters like a “movie celebrity, or even a religious figure” (Reference FacklerFackler, 2012). With promises of welfare and “economic democratization,” Park was able to successfully distance herself and the party from Lee’s excesses, reframing the campaign discourse from a retrospective to a prospective election (Reference Sohn and KangSohn & Kang, 2013, 200).

During the 2012 campaign, Park’s party also secretly worked with state security agencies to tilt the playing field. National Intelligence Service (NIS) operatives established thirty teams of experts on psychological warfare who sent over 1.2 million tweets praising Park and criticizing the opposition in an effort to help her get elected (Freedom House, 2014). According to a later NIS report, “The teams were charged with spreading pro-government opinions and suppressing anti-government views, branding them as attempts by pro-North Korean forces to disrupt state affairs”(Reference McCurryMcCurry, 2017). Security services also reportedly leaked transcripts from a meeting between former liberal President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean President Kim Jong Il in an effort to stoke anti-leftist sentiments (Reference DoucetteDoucette, 2010).

Although she publicly apologized for her father’s brutal dictatorship, Park’s behavior in office was “not unfamiliar to citizens who experienced her father’s draconian rule” (Reference CroissantCroissant, 2019, 17). Park’s leadership style was highly personalist and uncompromising. She expected “all within government to follow her lead without questioning” and labeled anyone who expressed a different view as disloyal (Reference Hahm and HeoHahm & Heo, 2018, 650). Despite campaigning on a reformist agenda, Park filled positions with hardline conservatives whose “style of politics reminded many of the dictatorship era” (Reference DoucetteDoucette, 2010, 854). Cronyism was a pressing issue as Park filled several ministerial positions with close personal allies, a practice that often resulted in scandals for her administration (Reference Hahm and HeoHahm & Heo, 2018).

Park continued the trend of curtailing civil liberties and repressing the media. During Lee’s four-year administration, South Korea’s World Press Freedom ranking slipped from 39 to 44. Within the first two years of Park’s rule, it plummeted to 57 (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Censorship became more intense after the 2014 Sewol Ferry disaster. Under Park’s administration, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries improperly licensed the Sewel Ferry, which sank in 2014 killing 304 passengers (Reference Gottlieb, Blair and Hannah BaronGottlieb et al., 2023). Citizens protested the government’s mishandling of the situation and Park’s slow public response in addressing the crisis (Reference Hahm and HeoHahm & Heo, 2018). Park’s administration responded with increased repression. Citing concerns about political rumors, Park had the prosecutor’s office establish an antidefamation cyber-investigation team that censored social media and text messaging. As a result, seven out of ten South Koreans reported being concerned about government surveillance of their online activities (Freedom House, 2015).

7.1.3 End of the Episode

While Park managed to remain in office after the Sewol ferry disaster, another major scandal ultimately ended her presidency and the backsliding episode. In October 2016, news broke that Park’s longtime advisor Choi Soon-sil had access to confidential government information, influenced political decisions, and extorted $65 million from over fifty companies by threatening government retaliation (Freedom House, 2017; Reference Sang-HunSang-Hun, 2016). Mass protests erupted nationwide calling for Park’s resignation. Investigators later ruled that Park was a criminal accomplice in Choi’s influence-peddling schemes (Reference Sang-HunSang-Hun, 2016). This prompted the National Assembly to impeach Park in December 2016, and the Constitutional Court formally removed her from office in March 2017 (Reference Sang-HunSang-Hun, 2017). Park was sentenced to twenty years for bribery and other crimes but received a pardon in 2021 after serving four years of the sentence.

Park’s impeachment in 2016 allowed democracy to recover and remain resilient, thus cementing 2014 as the end of the backsliding episode since the EDI did not decline further between those two years. Since then, South Korea’s democracy has reequilibrated (Reference LinzLinz, 1978) back to levels slightly higher than before the episode.

7.2.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Slovenia was the first among the Yugoslav republics to begin the political liberalization process after pro-reformists gained power in the late 1980s. By the time it declared independence in 1991, Slovenia had ousted the former Communist party through free and fair elections and had adopted a new democratic constitution. As a result, Slovenia became known as “a quiet success story, standing out against the tumult and destruction that marks its Yugoslav neighbor” (Reference HotteletHottelet, 2001). However, given its good relations with the West and the fact that the economy had done well under communism, Slovenia was also “a reluctant reformer, doing very little to actually change its institutional setup from the communist past,” which left the country in a state of “unfinished democratization” (Reference Bugaric and KuheljBugaric & Kuhelj, 2015, 274).

Prior to the backsliding episode, Slovenia was hit particularly hard by the 2008 global financial crises (Reference Krašovec, Lajh, Verheugen, Vodička and BrusisKrašovec & Lajh, 2021). Its GDP fell by 8.1 percent in 2009 and unemployment hit 7.8 percent by December 2010 (Reference GuardiancichGuardiancich, 2012). The ruling coalition, led by Prime Minister Borut Pahor’s Social Democrats (SD), pursued reforms to reduce the debt through austerity measures that decreased spending on social benefits (Freedom House, 2012). Voters rejected these unpopular reforms through a referendum in June 2011. The political situation became increasingly unstable throughout the year as the ruling coalition fell apart and the economy continued to decline. By the end of the year, the president was forced to call for early elections, which resulted in a center-right coalition government headed by Janez Janša’s Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS).

A far-right populist who is often compared to Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump, Janša “applies a strange mixture of populism, egalitarianism, xenophobia, anti-intellectualism, and intolerance toward marginal groups with a political discourse and iconography which reminds one at the same time of Naziism and Stalinism” (Reference Rizman and RametRizman, 1999, 159). Janša began his political career in the communist youth wing before defecting to pro-democracy movement in the 1980s – during which he was imprisoned for eighteen months. As Slovenia’s first postcommunist Minister of Defense, Janša was accused of illegally smuggling weapons to Bosnia and refused to prosecute military police who beat up a civilian (Reference BilefskyBilefsky, 2008; Reference Marquand and BowersMarquand & Bowers, 1994).

Before his party’s success in the 2011 elections, Janša had served as prime minister from 2004 to 2008. His first term contributed greatly to the polarization of Slovenian politics, as his government used its small majority to push through policies without compromise (Reference Krašovec and JohannsenKrašovec & Johannsen, 2016). According to Freedom House, journalists also experienced “indirect political and economic pressure” from government officials who treated them “like political opposition” during Janša’s first administration (Freedom House, 2007b, 273). Support for the SDS fell after allegations surfaced about Janša’s involvement in a major bribery scandal with the Finnish defense company Patria (New York Times, 2008a). However, Janša remained in parliament, ready to return to power once his party won the 2011 election.

7.2.2 The Autocratization Episode

After resuming his role as prime minister in January 2012, Janša quickly began targeting media freedoms. His government repressed critical journalists and expanded its influence over the public media outlet, RTV Slovenia, by ousting members of the supervisory board who were appointed by the previous center-left government (Freedom House, 2013; Reference MilacicMilacic, 2022). However, Janša was unable to significantly weaken other institutions during his second term as prime minister.

After only a year, the SDS coalition fell to a vote of no-confidence amid unpopular economic reforms and continued concerns about government corruption (Freedom House, 2014; Reference Krašovec and JohannsenKrašovec & Johannsen, 2016). Four months later, Janša was found guilty in the Patria bribery case that came to light in 2008. He was sentenced to serve two years in prison, but the Constitutional Court overturned his conviction and the case expired before being retried (Freedom House, 2016).

Slovenia’s electoral democracy score improved slightly over the next few years, but not enough to officially bring the backsliding episode to an end. Political polarization intensified, and corruption concerns plagued both the center-left ruling coalitions and opposition parties over the next three parliamentary cycles (Reference LovecLovec, 2017, Reference Lovec2018). The coalition led by Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek that took power in February 2013 collapsed by the summer of 2014. It was replaced by a new coalition headed by the Prime Minister Miro Cerar. Cerar’s government ended early in 2018 when the Constitutional Court annulled a railway referendum ruling because the government’s use of funds during the campaign may have unfairly influenced the result, prompting Cerar’s resignation (Reference AndersonAnderson, 2018). Thereafter, a minority center-left coalition was formed but fell apart in early 2020.

The most substantial decline in Slovenia’s EDI occurred after Janša became prime minister for a third time in March 2020. As before, Janša’s SDS-led government targeted media freedoms by verbally attacking and intimidating journalists, changing the leadership of the national media supervisory board, and withholding funding from critical sources while extending additional funding to media allies (Freedom House, 2022; Reference Novak and LajhNovak & Lajh, 2023). Janša also attempted to alter the legal frameworks governing freedom of speech by introducing legislation that would increase government influence over public media, while reducing its funding (Freedom House, 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic provided Janša with greater cover for engaging in executive aggrandizement. His government used the Communicable Diseases Act to crack down on anti-government protests and nongovernmental organizations (Reference LovecLovec, 2021). The Constitutional Court attempted to curb the government’s abuse by declaring some provisions unconstitutional, but Parliament amended the law to allow the government to continue passing certain restrictions by decree (Freedom House, 2022). After the first wave of COVID-19 swept through the country, allegations arose that several government officials were involved in a scandal concerning the procurement of personal protective equipment and ventilators (Reference Krašovec, Lajh, Verheugen, Vodička and BrusisKrašovec & Lajh, 2021). However, Janša’s government had weakened the country’s anticorruption institutions by not appointing public prosecutors to handle the corruption allegations (Freedom House, 2022).

7.2.3 End of the Episode

During his third term as Prime Minister, Janša’s ability to make radical institutional changes to Slovenia’s democracy was severely hampered by the bi-partisan nature of his government, which included center-left parties. Somehow, Janša managed to hold this fragile coalition together until regularly scheduled elections. The backsliding episode ended with the SDS defeat to a center-left coalition in the April 2022 poll.

Janša’s abuse of power, coupled with his government’s mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis, cost his party crucial support at the ballot box. While Janša had taken several steps to erode Slovenia’s democracy, electoral accountability prevented him from permanently damaging it (at least for now). The current coalition government led by Prime Minister Robert Golob and the Freedom Movement (GS) party has taken steps to depoliticize the public media through an independent oversight board (Freedom House, 2023). However, given Janša’s phoenix-like quality for returning to power, the future of Slovenia’s democracy remains uncertain.

7.3.1 Background: Leading up to the Episode

Like Slovenia and South Korea, Hungary’s most recent transition to democracy was an elite-driven affair (Reference RizmanRizman, 2006). Facing an economic downturn, pro-reformists took control of Hungary’s Communist party in the mid-1980s and then strategically encouraged the growth of civil society so that they could stage roundtable talks leading to the democratic transition (Reference BernhardBernhard, 1993). Thus, Hungarian Communists negotiated democracy from a position of strength (Reference RenwickRenwick, 2006) and likely sought to prolong their rule through new legitimation strategies (Reference Slater and WongSlater & Wong, 2013). While the Communist successor party – the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) – was roundly defeated by the center-right in the 1990 elections (Reference RaczRacz, 1991), it returned to power in a landslide victory four years later.

The 1994 election was a turning point for Hungary’s fragmented political right, which subsequently experienced “progressive electoral and organizational concentration in a single party, Fidesz” (Reference FowlerFowler, 2004, 80). Founded as a pro-democracy liberal youth organization in the waning days of Communism, Fidesz performed miserably in the second post-communist elections. Afterward, under the pragmatic leadership of Viktor Orbán, Fidesz remade itself as a socially conservative populist party. This paid off in 1998, with Fidesz winning the most seats in the parliamentary elections. Early on, commentators expressed concerns about Orbán’s “alarmingly nationalist statements” (Reference RosenbergRosenberg, 1998). Once in office, Orbán centralized authority in the executive and reduced oversight of the parliament (Reference RaczRacz, 2003); however, these maneuvers did not seriously undermine democracy, at least according to Hungary’s EDI scores.

Fidesz lost power to the MSzP in 2002 in a narrow election. The left-wing coalition won again in 2006, making it the first incumbent government to be re-elected since the fall of communism. These two electoral defeats further radicalized Fidesz, which began a “transformation from conservativism to illiberalism” (Reference BernhardBernhard, 2021, 596).

7.3.2 The Autocratization Episode

The episode began in the aftermath of the 2006 parliamentary election. Leaked recordings from an MSzP meeting revealed that Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány had lied about the country’s economic performance to boost his party’s electoral chances (Freedom House, 2007a). Fidesz, still angry about losing the election, capitalized on the public’s disapproval and stoked violent protests demanding Gyurcsány’s resignation (Reference DempseyDempsey, 2006; Reference OltayOltay, 2006). Over the next four years, the situation remained fairly stable, without enough improvement to end the episode. However, the fallout from the scandal and the worsening economic situation during the global financial crisis discredited the ruling MSzP coalition.

Fidesz swept the 2010 election by a landslide (Freedom House, 2011a), at which point democratic backsliding intensified considerably. Orbán used his party’s super-majority to unleash a “legislative storm” on Hungary’s democratic institutions (Reference RupnikRupnik, 2012; Reference SzikraSzikra, 2014). The Fidesz government adopted over a dozen constitutional amendments and hundreds of laws in 2010 and 2011, which “profoundly affected the very foundations of the rule of law” (Reference Bankuti, Halmai and ScheppeleBankuti et al., 2012; Reference RupnikRupnik, 2012).

One of these amendments reduced the voting requirements for creating a new constitution, which enabled Fidesz to engage in a “constitutional revolution” (Reference Jenne and MuddeJenne & Mudde, 2012). In 2011, Fidesz hastily adopted a new Fundamental Law of Hungary without public debate or support from other parties. The new constitution substantially weakened the ability of the judiciary and parliament to check executive authority (Reference Bankuti, Halmai and ScheppeleBankuti et al., 2012). The document is “imbued with national and social conservatism” (Reference Pirro and StanleyPirro & Stanley, 2022, 92), including “cardinal laws” on culture, religion, and morality that require a two-thirds majority to change (Freedom House, 2012).

To ensure the judiciary would not reverse these legal maneuvers, Orbán’s government packed the courts with loyalists through twin strategies of replacement and expansion (Reference Kosař and ŠipulováKosař & Šipulová, 2023). The new constitution reduced the mandatory retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 years, forcing 274 judges out of office in early 2012 (Reference Halmai, Nicola and DaviesHalmai, 2017) and increased the size of the Constitutional Court from 11 to 15 members (Reference Rupnik, Dieckhoff, Jaffrelot and MassicardRupnik, 2022). These vacancies opened the door for the Fidesz to pack the judiciary with individuals aligned with the party. While a European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling eventually reversed the reduced retirement age, the damage was already done. Orbán’s government provided financial compensation and reappointed the judges in different positions (Reference Halmai, Nicola and DaviesHalmai, 2017). When the Hungarian courts tried to push back against Orbán’s overreach, his party amended the constitution in 2013 to further curtail the courts’ powers (Reference KelemenKelemen, 2017, 223).

Orbán’s government also made changes to the electoral framework to maximize Fidesz’s success in future elections. These changes included eliminating 187 parliament seats, redrawing constituency borders, and increasing the percentage of votes needed to win a seat in the parliament (Freedom House, 2012; Reference Gottlieb, Blair and Hannah BaronGottlieb et al., 2023). Fidesz undermined the independence of the Electoral Commission by packing it with loyalists (Reference Bankuti, Halmai and ScheppeleBankuti et al., 2012). Changes to campaign and advertisement rules before the 2014 elections also gave Fidesz “an undue advantage … that blurred the separation between political party and the State” (OSCE, 2014, 1). By extending voting rights to ethnic Hungarians living abroad, Fidesz has also been able to capitalize on Orbán’s popularity among the diaspora (Reference Gottlieb, Blair and Hannah BaronGottlieb et al., 2023; Reference Haggard and KaufmanHaggard & Kaufman, 2021). These changes have tilted the playing field, making it easier for Fidesz to maintain its super-majority in parliament.

Beyond constitutional and electoral changes, Orbán also worked to weaken other accountability institutions and actors that could threaten his power. To extend his control over the media, Orbán routinely repressed journalists and media outlets that criticized his government (Freedom House, 2022; Reference ScheppeleScheppele, 2022). In 2011, the Fidesz government required all media outlets to register with the newly established National Media and Infocommunications Authority (Reference Rupnik, Dieckhoff, Jaffrelot and MassicardRupnik, 2022). Media outlets that failed to register or aired content violating the government’s rules could be fined or shut down (Freedom House, 2016). This enabled the government to monitor and restrict critical media sources more easily. Fidesz has also successfully “colonized” the state media allowing it to reach its supporters more easily, outsource programming and advertising to companies owned by its supporters, use state media jobs as patronage, and deny access to rival parties (Reference Bajomi-LázárBajomi-Lázár, 2013). Orbán also has indirect influence over the private media through “government-friendly cronies” who own several of the major outlets in the country (Reference Gottlieb, Blair and Hannah BaronGottlieb et al., 2023; Reference Rupnik, Dieckhoff, Jaffrelot and MassicardRupnik, 2022). As a result, Hungary dropped from 23 to 73 on the World Press Freedom Index between 2010 and 2018 (Reporters Without Borders, 2023).

7.3.3 End of the Episode

According to the ERT dataset, Hungary’s democracy broke down in 2018. For the second straight election, international monitors concluded that Fidesz benefited unfairly from official state resources, adding that “intimidating and xenophobic rhetoric, media bias and opaque campaign financing constricted the space for genuine political debate, hindering voters’ ability to make a fully-informed choice” (OSCE, 2018, 1). Fidesz secured a third super-majority mandate, which it has extended further in the most recent 2022 elections. As of this writing, Orbán and Fidesz remain in power and autocratization continues.