In the current situation of societal modernization and transformation of the political system of Ukraine, one of the most important problems facing the country is the formation of a system of local self-government that can act effectively. If this institution is not developed and strengthened, there can be no discussion of the establishment of democratic, social government, of the development of the rule of law, or of an expansion of the infrastructure of civil society.

In 2001, the Republic of Macedonia—the former Yugoslavia's southernmost republic—was on the brink of civil war as the ethnic Albanian “National Liberation Army” (UÇK) was fighting Macedonian security forces and establishing rebel control over parts of the country. The armed conflict took more than 200 lives and displaced, at one time or another, more than 100,000 people. Civil war was prevented by an agreement between the four major ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian parties in the country, signed on August 11, 2001 in the town of Ohrid, thereafter usually referred to as the “Ohrid Agreement.” Far-reaching constitutional and legislative changes would re-construct the Republic of Macedonia as a multi-ethnic democracy. Since then, constitutional amendments and new laws have been passed, increasing the rights and power of minorities, especially the Albanian one. The new constitution combines the concept of civic citizenship with elements of de facto consociationalism, and satisfies the demand of the Albanian minority to help shape the destiny of their country using a collective voice.

The post-1989 rise of ethnic conflicts in the former Eastern Bloc have led to the renewed salience of minority rights and their prominence in international relations. The 1990s witnessed a proliferation of legal instruments and offices dedicated to minority rights at the intergovernmental level (mainly within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe, but also the United Nations). After decades of arguing that rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic or religious minorities can be sufficiently ensured within the framework of universal human rights, attributed to individuals regardless of group membership, liberal political theorists (most notably Will Kymlicka) have started to advocate the need to supplement these traditional human rights with minority rights (meaning certain group-differentiated rights or “special status” for minority cultures) in order to ensure justice in multicultural states.

Nursultan Nazarbayev has been President of Kazakhstan since that country became independent in 1991. Observers expect him to remain in his current position until 2013, and there are clear indications that he has started to prepare for his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, to take over power after 2013. Analyses of Kazakhstan's foreign policy therefore both has had and will continue to have a close focus on the person of Nursultan Nazarbayev. In addition, this is all the more true because foreign policy in Kazakhstan to an extreme degree is a one-man affair. The present article discusses the interplay between personal and national interests as motivating factors in the foreign policy of Nazarbayev. More specifically, it investigates how these different types of motivation have influenced Nazarbayev's attempts to seek partnership with or distance from the USA and Russia.

The five Central Asian Muslim republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) count many Christian—Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian and Protestant—minorities. Unlike the religious communities in the Near and Middle East, most Christians in Central Asia consist of Slavic/European minorities (Russians, Germans, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, etc.), which came in the area during the Russian colonization in the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. The main traditionally Christian nationalities living in Central Asia are Slavs and Germans. Today, Russians are mainly present in Kazakhstan (4.5 million), in Kyrgyzstan (600,000) and in Uzbekistan (at least half a million). There are only several tens of thousand Russians in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Like Russians, the number of the other Slavic nationalities has considerably decreased in Central Asia since the last three decades. There are 50,000 Ukrainians in Kyrgyzstan, 500,000 in Kazakhstan and about 100,000 in Uzbekistan. Byelorussians number 111,000 in Kazakhstan, and about 20,000 in Uzbekistan. According to the 1999 census, there are only 47,000 Poles in Kazakhstan. Today there are 353,000 Germans in Kazakhstan, 21,000 in Kyrgyzstan, and less than 8,000 in Uzbekistan, and their community is nearly nonexistent in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Other nationalities are also present in the Christian communities, though more modestly: among them, Koreans (about 160,000 in Uzbekistan, close to 100,000 in Kazakhstan in 1999), Greeks (10,000 in Uzbekistan), Tatars (248,000 in Kazakhstan) as well as Armenians (there remained 40,000 Armenians in Turkmenistan in 1995, with 42,000 in Uzbekistan today). Armenians have only one cult building in Samarkand. Moreover, after the fall of the USSR, more and more natives have been converted to Christianity: many—especially Protestant—missions, are now acting among Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, etc.

We Greek political emigres celebrate the thirtieth historical anniversary of the GDR as our own holiday since we are vitally connected to this state from its first steps onwards. We feel better than any other foreigner the great joy and the pride of the people of the GDR since, from the foundation of its socialist state, we are marching side by side and since then we by way of our small contribution feel as co-constructors of this grand act. The thirtieth anniversary of the GDR coincides with the thirtieth anniversary of our political emigration to this hospitable country. Today we all remember the first years after our arrival and our caring reception in the GDR. (Speech of the day at the central celebration of the Greek political emigres in the GDR devoted to the thirtieth anniversary of the GDR and the thirtieth anniversary of the political emigration, Dresden, 29 September 1979).