The paper proposes a novel (even if not wholly unprecedented) solution to an old and fundamental problem: What should be the scope of political studies? Arguments have long been directed against the conventional equation of the scope of the field with the study of “state-organizations” and structures that directly impinge upon such organizations. The arguments are convincing. However, the principal proposed alternatives have important flaws of their own. These alternatives are the extension of the scope of the field to phenomena “functionally” similar to state-organizations and the inclusion in polititcal study of all “asymmetrical” social relations—power, influence, or control relations. By means of the classificatory method of “progressive differentiation,” an alternative that seems preferable is worked out: equating political study with the study of authority patterns in any and all social units. That conception of the subject matter of the field, it is argued, avoids all the difficulties raised by other conceptions and affords all of their advantages. Above all, it reconciles subjective interests with scientific (or disciplinary) imperatives and achieves a proper trade-off between the numerousness and homogeneity of phenomena covered by the field—a trade-off critical for the achievement of general, testable, informative empirical theory. A concluding section discusses the place in political study, thus conceived, of the study of international relations and of recent work in “political economy,” which appears to focus on symmetrical, not asymmetrical, interactions.

Studies of American states and their policies are severely handicapped by the use of a single level of analysis. The operations of American politics and the assumptions of correlation methodology imply that only a multi-level approach can adequately comprehend state politics. All major aspects of politics, but particularly policies, are distorted by the single level approach. The extent of distortion suggests that relations among states and between states and the national government are the prime determinants of state politics and that the study of states ought to be organized around these relations. This approach accounts for the salient characteristics of state politics, indicating that states are not political systems but collections of tangentially related components of a national system. States which appear systematic derive their coherence from interactions with the national pattern, a process with important residual effects on the legitimacy of state governments.

This study focuses on a nonmonetary dimension of public policy—innovation by states in the fields of education, welfare, and civil rights. Innovation is considered equivalent to the adoption of a law by a state. From the literature on diffusion (or spread) of innovations, the explanation of user interaction is taken, and a simple model with an interaction term is constructed. The model performs fairly well when evaluated by several common criteria. The results do vary somewhat from one issue area to another; other types of supplementary analysis also indicate variation in diffusion patterns according to the issue involved. Political and economic differences among states are found to account for differences in time of adoption, and “innovativeness” is shown to be an issue- and time-specific factor.

This article seeks to apply the hypotheses and findings presented by Ronald Inglehart in his “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies,” to the Japanese scene. Inglehart argued that affluence had produced changes in value priorities in Western Europe: the older generation has acquisitive values, while the younger age groups have postbourgeois values. An analysis of Japanese data collected by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in four national surveys in 1953, 1958, 1963, and 1968 suggests that value changes in Japan produced by rapid economic growth may be somewhat different. Three types of change were found, namely intergenerational, life-cycle, and adult. Compared to its elders, the younger generation is less acquisitive, more democratic, and somewhat more inclined to value freedom. The most important value change, however, appears to be intergenerational change from collectivity orientation toward individuation. It is suggested that individuation has led to a tendency toward privatization and less concern for the electoral process on the part of youth. Whether or not this is a temporary phenomenon is not clear.

The purpose of this research note is to suggest a potential general paradigm for the study of foreign policy processes. It is explicitly synthetic in that it combines Arnold Wolfers's notion of a continuum, the extremities of which he labels the pole of power and pole of indifference, with Theodore Lowi's efforts to affirm the nexus between issue and policy process. Two questions prove crucial in the determination of issue area: Is or is not the domestic impact of the issue symmetrical? And are the political goods at stake exclusively tangible or not? With the answers to these questions it becomes possible to specify the issue area (distribution, regulation, “interaction-protection,” redistribution) in which an event may be classified and to hypothesize the nature of the policy process (the identity of the major actors, the intensity of conflict) to be observed. Particular attention is paid to limited war as a redistributive issue area in order to make the case that redistribution, contrary to Lowi's view, is an important foreign policy process. Finally an effort is made to suggest how issue-based propositions could be utilized in the transnational comparison of foreign policy processes. It is suggested that differences in the policy process across issue areas within a given state may be as great as differences in process within a particular arena of power for two states as different in political system as the United States and the USSR.

Senators who seek re-election usually achieve it. Yet it is not clear whether they tend to win mainly because they are incumbents or because their party is strong in their states. Thus, the two principal questions motivating this study are the following: (1) What is the relative importance of party and of incumbency in influencing the outcomes of Senate elections? (2) How has their relative importance changed over the last quarter-century? To answer these questions, a theory is developed accounting for the outcomes of Senate elections in terms of the major potential sources of electoral support given to the candidates, namely, party loyalty, incumbency, “national tides,” and idiosyncratic factors (e.g., issues, personality, local conditions). The theory is then represented in a formal model for which are generated multiple regression estimates of the respective roles of party and incumbency in all postwar Senate contests.

The major finding is that the relative importance of party and incumbency has changed dramatically over the last quarter-century. Party has undergone an overall decline in influence, while incumbency has experienced a roughly proportionate increase. At the same time, the importance of idiosyncratic factors has grown. The implications of these results for broader theories of American politics, including the argument that the United States has been experiencing a “critical realignment,” are noted.

Although, conventionally, vote trading in legislatures has been condemned as socially undesirable by both scholars and lay citizens, a recently popular school of scholarship has argued that vote trading improves the traders' welfare in the direction of Pareto-optimal allocations. This essay is an attempt to reconcile the disagreement by showing formally that vote trading does improve the position of the traders but that at the same time trading may impose an external cost on nontraders. In sum, it turns out that sporadic and occasional trading is probably socially beneficial but that systematic trading may engender a paradox of vote trading. This paradox has the property that, while trading is immediately advantageous for the traders, still, when everybody trades, everybody is worse off. Furthermore, vote trading may not produce a stable equilibrium that is Pareto-optimal either for individual members or for coalitions of members.

The world is complex, and yet people are able to make some sense out of it. This paper offers an information-processing model to describe this aspect of perception and cognition. The model assumes that a person receives information which is less than perfect in terms of its completeness, its accuracy, and its reliability. The model provides a dynamic description of how a person evaluates this kind of information about a case, how he selects one of his pre-existing patterns (called schemata) with which to interpret the case, and how he uses the interpretation to modify and extend his beliefs about the case. It also describes how this process allows the person to make the internal adjustments which will serve as feedback for the interpretation of future information. A wide variety of evidence from experimental and social psychology is cited to support the decisions which went into constructing the separate parts of the schema theory, and further evidence is cited supporting the theory's system-level predictions. Since the schema theory allows for (but does not assume) the optimization of its parameters, it is also used as a framework for a normative analysis of the selection of schemata. Finally, a few illustrations from international relations and especially foreign-policy formation show that this model of how people make sense out of a complex world can be directly relevant to the study of important political processes.

This paper focuses on the requirement of the U. N. Charter that members shall promote human rights “without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” It asks: (1) whether “without distinction” means “without any differentiation” or “without discrimination”; (2) whether the naming of race, sex, language, and religion means that “distinction” on other bases remains permissible, or whether what is ruled out is discrimination of any kind that affects human rights; and (3) whether the search for equality has not been internationalized, at least in principle, and what the implications of the internationalization may be. The inquiry can be classified as legal/philosophical.

The third question leads to an analysis of the “without distinction” clause of the Charter in terms of the principle of equality. Claims to nondiscrimination are negative claims to equality, and they have as their counterpart claims to affirmative action on behalf of equality—often for groups. The problem is that affirmative action promoting equality for groups entails differentiations among individuals that may be discriminatory. To resolve the dilemma, the test of reasonableness is endorsed—and the search for standards for judging it goes on—at both the domestic and international levels.

Frequent elections and a long tradition of census taking in India should combine to provide excellent scope for aggregate data analysis, but so far they have not, largely because the electoral constituencies and the census tracts do not match. A number of ways have been devised to surmount the problem, none of them very satisfactory. This paper offers a new solution in the form of isoplethic mapping, a method that avoids the shortcomings of other approaches and permits use of demographic and voting data at the level of the state legislative assembly constituency.

Substantively the paper traces patterns of voting for Muslim candidates to the Bihar Legislative Assembly and the relationship between Muslim population distribution and vote polled by different political parties over six elections. Instead of becoming more integrated over time within the general body politic, it appears that the Muslim minority group has become more politically cohesive and better able to elect Muslims to office where their numbers are strong. At the same time, Muslims have become less able to win elections where they are fewer in numbers. This tendency has not reached a state of political polarization between the Hindu and Muslim communities, however.

Students of political participation have generally taken as given that nonparticipation in politics is a result of apathy, and that apathy is a function of low income, low education, and low status. This article suggests that there are two additional potential explanations of political participation rates besides that offered by the conventional wisdom. One of these acknowledges that political participation for some people in some circumstances involves considerable risk, so that nonparticipation can be explained more accurately in terms of fear than in terms of apathy. The other views political participation as a response to a sense of “relative deprivation” or discrimination. After each of these three “models” of political participation is translated into operational terms, it is tested by determining how well it accounts for the variations in black political participation rates in Mississippi during the first half-decade following the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The conclusion that emerges from these tests is that political scientists have erred seriously by overlooking the role of fear in political life. In situations like those faced by blacks in Mississippi, situations that are probably similar to those in parts of the “developing world,” apathy compares poorly with fear as an explanation of political participation.