Recent studies of Italian Fascism have focused on ritual, spectacle, commemoration and myth, even as they also take seriously the totalitarian thrust of Fascism. But whereas this new culturalist orientation has usefully pointed beyond earlier reductionist approaches, it has often accented style and myth as opposed to their opposites, which might be summed up as ‘substance’. Some of the aspirations fuelling Fascism, responding to perceived inadequacies in the mainstream liberal and Marxist traditions, pointed beyond myth and style as they helped to shape the Fascist self-understanding – and Fascist practice. This article seeks to show how the interplay of substance, style and myth produced a particular – and deeply flawed – totalitarian dynamic in Fascist Italy.

On 11 October 1941 the Vichy government passed legislation mandating the dismantling and smelting of French bronze statues and monuments in the public domain. Crippled by copper shortages and bound by the terms of the Franco-German armistice, the etat français sought to ‘mobilise’ all potential sources of non-ferrous metals, including public statuary. The statue of Mistral in Arles was one of the monuments that were dismantled. The destruction of this tribute to the Provençal poet and founder of the Félibrige sparked considerable protest and opposition, but from an unusual quarter – supporters of Pétain's National Revolution. The case of the destruction of the statue of Mistral in Arles reveals the intersection of regionalism and resistance in wartime France and challenges many of our perceptions about both these movements.

Ame de Mon Pays
Ame éternellement renaissante
Ame joyeuse, fière et vive
Qui hennis dans le bruit du Rhône et de son vent!
Ame des bois pleins d'harmonie
Et des calanques pleines de soleil
De la patrie, âme pieuse
Je t'appelle! Incarne-toi dans mes vers provençaux!

The methods used by the Nazis to control elements of German society have been the focus of intense historical debate. This paper attempts to analyse the implementation of Sippenhaft (family liability punishment) after the 20 July 1944 assassination plot against Hitler. Sippenhaft was advocated for use against the families of the conspirators involved in this plot and also against members of the armed services. Consequently, its implementation became the personal domain of the Reich leader of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, as well as local army commanders, army courts and the Nazi party itself. This article will argue that the inadequacies of its imposition were largely compensated for by its effectiveness as a device of fear.

This article explains the position of Portugal during the first attempt to enlarge the European Economic Community in 1961–3. It first makes clear the motives behind the Portuguese government's policy option in favour of EEC associate membership and future entry. Next, it analyses the attitude of the EEC members and Portugal's EFTA partners to this policy option. The article concludes that such a policy was condemned to failure, due to the authoritarian nature of the Portuguese regime and the country's colonial policy, and that, had the negotiations progressed, Lisbon would probably have had to opt in favour of a provisional agreement.

This article uses recently released archival material to examine the role of the Irish government in the negotiation of the Sunningdale communiqué of 1973, which marked, among other things, an agreement to establish a Council of Ireland and was therefore a key part of the first attempt to establish a power-sharing devolved executive in Northern Ireland. The article will problematise the distinctions which have been made between various strains of political thought held by leading intellectuals and politicians on the national question and show how the discourse of ‘revisionist nationalism’ and reconciliation which sponsored the key institution of the Sunningdale communiqué, the Council of Ireland, was in contradiction to the meaning attached to the functions of the Council, which was in fact closer to traditional nationalist aims.