The textbook image of the California electorate as unusually independent, moderate, antipartisan, and prone to ticket splitting is badly out of date. As in Washington, DC, increased partisan polarization in California's state government reflects increased partisan polarization in the electorate. This study shows that, compared to other American voters, Californians are stronger party identifiers, more loyal to their parties' candidates, less likely to split their tickets, and more extreme ideologically. Moreover, the California electorate, like the national electorate, has become increasingly partisan, loyal, consistent, and prone to ideological extremity since the 1970s. These developments, combined with legislative district lines that have given the parties more politically distinct constituencies, have echoed and reinforced the increasingly polarized partisan divisions in California state government, just as they have at the national level.

Many conventional accounts of lobbying communities emphasize towering differences in political influence between for-profit and not-for-profit and public organizations and between institutions and membership groups or associations. A central cause of these differences in influence is said to be differences in the persistence of these types of groups in a lobbying system. We test this hypothesis by examining the short-term turnover of organized interests in state interest communities in the 1990s. While we find evidence of substantial year-to-year turnover in lobby registrations, we find little support for the conventional wisdom about the distribution of persistence among types of organizations. Contrary to expectations, institutions are markedly less persistent than membership groups and associations, and for-profit interests are no more persistent, on average, than not-for-profit interests.

I re-examine theories of legislative committee organization by using simulation to assess how representative state legislative committees are of their parent bodies. I find that clearly unrepresentative committees are rare and concentrated in a few chambers. I also find that comparing committee and chamber medians leads to very different conclusions about representativeness than does comparing means. My findings tend to confirm the informational model of committees and disconfirm the partisan model, but they cannot directly address the distributive model.

The literature on women in state legislatures has grown dramatically over the last few decades, examining in detail their personal characteristics, behavior, and the impact they have had on state legislatures. Highlighted throughout this body of work are the many ways in which these female officials differ from their male colleagues. While it may once have been necessary to identify and categorize women legislators, we now need to broaden our research to examine both the diversity among women state legislators and the contexts in which they may or may not make a difference. This broader focus should include analyses of state-level forces, such as legislative professionalism and state political culture, and it should also investigate more thoroughly policy outcomes and processes. Interactions between gender and other social forces, such as race, ethnicity, and class, should also be explored in greater depth. This new direction would build on the richness of the existing literature and allow the two fields of women in politics and state politics to better inform and contribute to each other.

I present a measure of legislative professionalism for 41 states based on the degree to which legislators hold outside careers while in office. Higher salaries and longer sessions alter the incentives and opportunities for legislators to maintain outside careers. Consequently, outside career activity provides a behavioral indicator of professionalism to supplement existing measures based solely on institutional characteristics. I use financial disclosure reports to assess outside interests. Aggregated to the state level, my indicator is highly correlated with institutional measures of professionalism; at the individual level, it varies by sex and age. These findings support hypotheses that outside career choices are influenced by labor market participation and the financial opportunity costs of legislative service.