The bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief

The traditional Chinese calendar was not only a system for organizing time, but also a way of thinking. Scholars and astrologists in various dynasties sought to discern overall patterns of history from the calendar. During the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), an apocalyptic belief began to spread, suggesting that disasters and chaos would break out in the two consecutive years of bingwu 丙午 (a year of the Horse) and dingwei 丁未 (a year of the Sheep). This apocalyptic belief was first recorded after the Jurchen conquest of North China. During the first and second years of the Jingkang period (1126–1127), the Jurchens, a people from northeast Asia, sacked the capital of the Song dynasty and captured both the emperor and the retired emperor. The Song had to retreat to southern China and reorganize its court and government, founding what historians call the Southern Song Dynasty. This disastrous event is called the Jingkang Incident in later historiography.Footnote ¹³ Because the two years of the Jingkang period were a bingwu year and a dingwei year, scholars in the Southern Song dynasty tended to use the phrases the ‘catastrophe’ of bingwu and dingwei (丙午丁未之厄) or the ‘calamity’ of bingwu and dingwei (丙午丁未之禍) when referring to the Jingkang Incident. Consequently, these two years of bingwu and dingwei conveyed a special meaning in writings produced during this time.

In Southern Song writings, the bingwu and dingwei years originally did not represent a chaotic time, but generally referred to a period when influential events would occur. For example, in his imperial memorial submitted to the Xiaozong 孝宗 emperor (r. 1162–1189) in 1178, the renowned irredentist Chen Liang 陳亮 (1143–1194) suggested that the Song court utilize the bingwu and dingwei years to take revenge on the Jurchens. He writes:

Chen Liang here emphasizes changes rather than disasters associated with bingwu and dingwei years. He points out that the Shenzong emperor of the Northern Song, who advocated reform and irredentism, assumed the throne in a dingwei year (1067) and changed the situation of the state. Also, Chen mentions that the Xiaozong emperor was born in the dingwei year (1127) of the Jingkang period, suggesting that the emperor was destined to take revenge on the Jurchens for the Jingkang Incident. Chen Liang urged the Xiaozong emperor to prepare himself to utilize the next bingwu and dingwei period (1186–1187), which would come within ten years. Chen Liang stresses that the way of Heaven would change with the occurrence of the bingwu and dingwei years and create great opportunities.

After Chen Liang, the bingwu and dingwei years in Song writings became associated with disasters more than with changes. In his discussions, the Song statesman, scholar, and writer Hong Mai 洪邁 (1123–1202) displays an apocalyptic mentality towards the bingwu and dingwei years. In a section titled ‘Bingwu dingwei’ in his publication Rongzhai suibi 容齋隨筆 (The Informal Writings of Rongzhai), which was finished in around 1202, Hong Mai writes: ‘Unforeseen misfortunes always break out when the Central State (中國 zhongguo) meets the years of bingwu and dingwei. The calamities either occur domestically or are humiliation inflicted by foreign barbarians.’Footnote ¹⁵ Hong goes on to list many events that occurred in bingwu and dingwei years. For example, Emperor Gaozu (256 bce–195 bce), the founder of the Han dynasty, died in a year of bingwu (195 bce), and in the Tang dynasty, Emperor Jingzong 敬宗 was assassinated in a year of bingwu (826). In the Five Dynasties period (907–960), Khitan troops sacked the capital of the Later Jin 後晉 dynasty (936–947) and captured its emperor in a year of bingwu (January 946–January 947). Hong finally mentions the Jingkang Incident as the latest in this series of events.Footnote ¹⁶

Although these events did indeed occur in bingwu and dingwei years, Hong also makes far-fetched connections between historical events and bingwu and dingwei years. For example, although Emperor Taizong 太宗 (r. 627–650) of the Tang dynasty reigned over a period that covered the two years of bingwu and dingwei (646–647), his rule was marked by a long time of prosperity and peace. Hong, however, claims that these two years were also dangerous to the Tang because during these two years the future Empress Wu Zetian 武則天 (624–705), who later would usurp the Tang throne, was already in the royal palace.Footnote ¹⁷ At the end of this section, Hong writes: ‘Generally the disasters of dingwei (a year of the Sheep) are more severe than those of bingwu (a year of the Horse). This is the way of Heaven, which the power of human beings is unable to influence.’Footnote ¹⁸

After Hong Mai, another Song scholar named Chai Wang 柴望 (1212–1280) further elaborated on the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief. Chai was a student at the Imperial College and also served as a staff member in the Central Secretariat of the Southern Song. In 1246, a year of bingwu, Chai submitted a book entitled Bingding guijian 丙丁龜鑒 (The Bing and Ding Tortoise Mirror) to the Southern Song imperial court. Modelled on Sima Guang's 司馬光 (1019–1086) Zizhi tongjia 資治通鑒 (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government), the book was written to offer advice to the Southern Song court. Chai warned the Song court about the two years of bingwu and dingwei, saying they would be very likely to bring disasters. In the book, Chai investigates in detail the events occurring in bingwu and dingwei years over a long period of time, ranging from the Qin 秦 dynasty (221 bce–207 bce) to the Five Dynasties (907–960). He writes: ‘From the Qin and Han down to the Five Dynasties, there were twenty-one periods of bingwu and dingwei, and the time covered 1,260 years. [During these periods of bingwu and dingwei], disasters, calamities, and unfortunate incidents were numerous.’Footnote ¹⁹

Although Chai Wang claims that disasters and chaos would ensue in the time of bingwu and dingwei, he suggests that if the Song emperor observed Confucian virtues and rituals, it would be possible to avoid the disastrous effect of the two years.Footnote ²⁰ Chai Wang ended the book at the Five Dynasties period, omitting the events that occurred in the Song dynasty.

Chai's book and his systematic narrative of apocalyptic belief attracted attention from his contemporaries. In his Kunxue jiwen 困學紀聞 (Observations Culled from Arduous Study), Wang Yinglin 王應麟 (1223–1296) recorded Chai Wang's submission of the Bingding guijian to the Southern Song court. Although Wang made no mention of the contents of this book, he agreed with Chai's argument that sage rulers should be aware of previous disastrous events and take measures to prevent them from reoccurring.Footnote ²¹

During the Yuan dynasty, the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief continued to circulate, and some Daoist hagiographies used the trope of the bingwu and dingwei disasters as evidence of the supernatural power of Daoist priests. Zhang Jixian 張繼先 (1092–1127), a renowned Daoist priest of the Celestial Master 天師 branch of Daoism during the Northern Song dynasty, featured prominently in later literature as an immortal, an astrologist, and a fortune teller.Footnote ²² One of his hagiographies compiled during the mid-Yuan states that before the Jingkang Incident took place, he had warned the Song court of the Catastrophe of the Red Horse and Red Sheep, which refers to the Jingkang Incident.Footnote ²³ Zhang's hagiography suggests to us that during the Yuan the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief was circulating among Daoist believers.

Zhang Jixian's prediction of the Catastrophe of the Red Sheep and Red Horse was not only recorded in Daoist texts, but also mentioned in writings by Confucian scholar-officials. In his poem written in memory of Zhang Jixian, Yuan Jue 袁桷 (1266–1327), a scholar official from the Zhejiang region, describes the Jingkang Incident as ‘the oceanlike misery of the Red Sheep and Red Horse’ (紅羊赤馬悲滄海).Footnote ²⁴ Discussing the establishment of the Southern Song dynasty, another Yuan scholar Zhang Zhu 張翥 (1287–1368) uses ‘the Red Sheep year of transformative apocalypse’ 紅羊換劫年 in reference to the Jingkang Incident.Footnote ²⁵ Other Yuan private writings also contain references to the principle that disasters take place during bingwu and dingwei years. For example, Song Ben宋本 (1281–1334) attributes a serious plague outbreak in 1306 (a bingwu year) and 1307 (a dingwei year) to the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic principle.Footnote ²⁶

During the Yuan, this apocalyptic belief circulated widely in society. Chai Wang's Bingding guijian ends at the Five Dynasties period, omitting the events in the Song dynasty. During the Yuan, an anonymous author supplemented Chai's book by adding a new volume covering the events taking place in the bingwu and dingwei years of the Song dynasty. In the preface to the supplementary volume, the anonymous author tells how popular this apocalyptic belief was in Yuan society. According to the author, although the apocalyptic belief had circulated for generations, he had not believed it at first. But in his lifetime the droughts, floods, and plagues that led to numerous deaths broke out during these two years (1306–1307). This prompted him to supplement Chai Wang's book to show the accuracy of this apocalyptic principle.Footnote ²⁷

Not all Song and Yuan scholars accepted this apocalyptic belief. Some Song scholar-officials denounced it as a groundless hypothesis. The Song official Fang Yue方岳 (1199–1262) argued that the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief consisted only of rumours and slanders that were used by soothsayers. He warned that if the Song emperor perceived catastrophes as something that were predestined, it would obstruct the emperor from nurturing his virtue.Footnote ²⁸

In a funerary inscription for the literatus Zhao Keqin 趙克勤 (fl. 1240s), the Song poet and official Liu Kezhang 劉克莊 (1187–1269) tells of differing attitudes toward this apocalyptic belief among Song court officials. He writes that, in the bingwu year of 1246, the Song court and society worried about the disasters that these two years might bring to them. But a Confucian scholar-official named Zhao Keqin publicly proclaimed his disagreement with this belief in a court discussion. He argued that this apocalyptic belief was not a tradition and people subscribed to it because the controversial reformer Wang Anshi's assumption of the office of Prime Minister and the Jingkang Incident both coincidentally occurred in the bingwu and dingwei years. Zhao, quoting the Book of Changes, insisted that rulers could transform bad luck into good opportunities by being aware of small omens.Footnote ²⁹

Harsh criticism of this apocalyptic belief came from the compilers of the Siku quanshu 四庫全書 (Complete Collections of the Four Treasures) in the Qing dynasty. These compilers did not fully preserve the work Bingding guijian in their compendium but only categorized it into the cunmu 存目part (works not included in the Siku, except for title and brief abstract in the catalogue). In the abstract for the Bingding guijian, the compilers explain why the Bingding guijian did not qualify for formal preservation:

The different attitudes held by Confucian scholars about this apocalyptic belief reflect the changes and continuity of the political culture since the Song. As mentioned before, during the Song, scholars began to attack the prophetic discourse as deluded. The many criticisms of the bingwu and dingwei theory exemplify this change. However, the fact that many Confucian scholars adhered to this belief shows the continuity of the political culture. Although the prophetic discourse waned after the Song, it still maintained its influence in society. Interestingly, sources show that the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief has been preserved and circulates even in modern times.Footnote ³¹

The Wu family state prophecy

One day in the last month of a bingwu 丙午 Horse year (1 January 1367–30 January 1367), Han Lin'er 韓林兒 (?–1367), the figurehead emperor of the anti-Mongol Song state established by the Red Turban rebels, drowned in a boat accident.Footnote ³² Immediately, Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 (r. 1368–1398), at that time the Prince of Wu and de facto ruler of the Song state, abandoned Han Lin'er's reign title longfeng (龍鳳 Dragon and Phoenix) and declared the next year (a dingwei 丁未 Sheep year) to be the first year of his own reign title Wu 吳.Footnote ³³ In the preceding four years Zhu had maintained his titular allegiance to Han Lin'er and the Song state. When Zhu issued an order, it would begin with the phrase ‘at the imperial edict of the Emperor [Han Lin'er] and the order of the Prince of Wu [Zhu Yuanzhang]’ and end with dates numbered according to Han Lin'er's reign title longfeng.Footnote ³⁴ Zhu's adoption of the reign title Wu in early 1367 was an event of profound importance, signifying that he had officially become an independent ruler. In the Chinese tradition, a reign title normally consisted of a few characters that could straightforwardly reflect a ruler's political and social ideals. The meaning of the reign title Wu, however, was unclear. Curiously, Zhu neither explained its meaning, nor gave his reasons for adopting it.

The modern Chinese scholar Wu Han 吴晗 (1909–1969) regarded this reign title as unusual, and his understanding of it has changed over time. In a paper published in 1941, Wu Han pointed out the oddities about the reign title Wu, casting doubt on the authenticity of this account. Wu Han claims that this reign title has only one Chinese character, whereas in all other cases in Chinese history the reign title of a ruler consisted of at least two characters. He also holds that the reign title Wu was the same as Zhu's title the Prince of Wu, which had never happened before. Wu Han suspects that Zhu never actually adopted the reign title Wu and that this record was fabricated.Footnote ³⁵ But Wu Han later changed his mind. He argues that Zhu did indeed adopt the unique reign title Wu in order to satisfy a widely circulating prophecy that a Wu Family State would rise in a certain Sheep year (hereafter the Wu Family State prophecy).Footnote ³⁶ Wu Han, however, neither interpreted the meaning of this prophecy, nor explained why Zhu intended to fulfil it.

The Wu Family State prophecy is recorded in both the official history Yuanshi 元史 (Official History of the Yuan), completed in 1370, and the contemporary private history Gengshen waishi 庚申外史 (Unofficial history of the Gengshen emperor [born in 1320]), written by Quan Heng 權衡 (fl. 1370s) between 1368 and 1370.Footnote ³⁷ Texts of this prophecy recorded in these two sources are the same. The Yuanshi writes:

The meaning of this prophecy appears relatively straightforward. It urges people, no matter whether rich or poor, not to spend resources building houses and huts. It predicts that in a certain Sheep year, a state named Wu will rise (and replace the Yuan).Footnote ³⁹

Quan Heng associates this prophecy with the abovementioned Zhu Yuanzhang's adoption of the Wu reign title, claiming that this prophecy was a symbol of the mandate given to Zhu Yuanzhang by Heaven. He argues:

Quan Heng perceives this prophecy as proof of Zhu Yuanzhang's political legitimacy. His view was followed by many Ming and Qing historians such as Huang Yu 黃瑜 (1426–1497), Wang Qi 王圻 (1530–1615), Guo Zhizhang 郭子章 (1543–1618), Jiang Yikui 蔣一葵 (circa 1600s), Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582–1664), and Qian Daxin 錢大昕 (1728–1804), who all regard the Wu Family State prophecy as an omen of Zhu Yuanzhang's political legitimacy.Footnote ⁴² For example, the mid-Ming historian Huang Yu mentions this prophecy in his own book as a demonstration of Zhu Yuanzhang's Fire Agent.Footnote ⁴³ The late Ming and early Qing historian Qian Qianyi follows Quan Heng's narrative, regarding the Wu Family State prophecy as a manifestation of the Mandate of Heaven that Zhu received.Footnote ⁴⁴

Modern scholars have also addressed this prophecy. As mentioned above, Wu Han attributes it as the motivation for Zhu Yuanzhang adopting a reign title as unusual as Wu. The modern scholar Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing 蕭啟慶 (1937–2012) argues that this prophecy reflects a popular mentality in the late Yuan. The mentality was that ‘a dynastic change would take place, and people, no matter whether rich or poor, should stop working and awaiting changes’.Footnote ⁴⁵

Neither Wu Han nor Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing addressed why the prophecy predicted a Wu state to replace the Yuan. Nor do they explain why people needed to stop working and await changes during this dynastic transition. In Chinese history some dynastic transitions did not cause widespread chaos and people did not need to stop working during that time.

I argue that a consideration of the original medium of the prophecy can lead to a different reading which sheds light on the question of why the prophecy specified a Wu Family State. According to the two sources, the prophecy first circulated in the form of a children's song, that is, it was originally an oral lyric without a written text. In Chinese, the pronunciation of wu has many matching characters, including the surname Wu 吳 and the character wu 無, which means ‘no’ or ‘none’. Thus, the original meaning of wu in the children's song was not limited to the surname Wu. In the case of this prophecy, the character wu 無, meaning ‘no’, can be seen as a likely reading of the prophecy. The phrase of wujiaguo (無家國) could refer to ‘families being lost and the state being destroyed’ rather than ‘a Wu Family State’.Footnote ⁴⁶

Two other prophecies recorded in the Yuanshi reinforce this interpretation of the meaning of wujiaguo. During the late Yuan period, the expression ‘no families’ (wujia 無家) was used in prophecies to refer to the miserable situation of people losing their families in chaotic times. According to the Yuanshi, in 1356 a blackthorn tree (lishu 李樹) in the Zhangde area bore a fruit that was said to be as big as a cucumber. Thus, a prophecy arose that ‘a blackthorn bears a cucumber, and all people will have no families (李生黃瓜, 民皆無家)’.Footnote ⁴⁷ Also, according to the Yuanshi, in 1355 a popular prophecy circulated in the Dadu (present-day Beijing) area, as follows: ‘A blast of yellow wind and a blast of sand; there are no people or families for a thousand and ten thousand li (一陣黃風一陣沙,千里萬裡無人家)’.Footnote ⁴⁸ The phrases ‘no families (wujia)’, ‘no people or families (wurenjia)’, and ‘no families or states (wujiaguo)’ have similar meanings in reference to chaotic times that would cause people to lose everything. These records of wujia and wurenjia in the Yuanshi support the identification of ‘no families or states’ as the original meaning of wujiaguo.

With the phrase wujiaguo understood as ‘no families or states’, the original meaning of the Wu Family State prophecy can be interpreted in the following way: ‘No matter whether rich or poor, people should not spend resources on building houses and huts. In a year of the Sheep, chaos will break out and people will lose everything, including their families and state.’ Examining this prophecy in the context of the bingwu and dingwei apocalyptic belief suggests why the prophecy specified the Sheep year. This prophecy originally predicted that in a dingwei Sheep year, Yuan society would fall into chaos. Consequently, the state and people's families would be destroyed, and people, no matter whether rich or poor, would lose all their property. Thus, there was no point in expending resources on building house and huts. Originally this prophecy suggested that people should stop working and wait for changes not because of a dynastic transition, but because of an imminent apocalypse.

The meaning of ‘wujiaguo’ (無家國 no families or states) can be better understood in the context of the narrative of ‘having families and states’ in the Chinese classical tradition. Confucius had a famous saying in regard to ‘having families and states’. The Analects relates:

Confucius suggests that rulers who have states and families should make society stable by ensuring that wealth was evenly distributed and that people lived in harmony and society in peace. On the contrary, ‘no families or states’ refers to a situation where wealth is unevenly distributed, people are in turmoil, and society is in chaos.

The late Yuan was in the situation of ‘no families or states’. Throughout the dynasty, the Yuan had to deal with a serious problem of unequal distribution of wealth and by the late Yuan, things were getting worse.Footnote ⁵⁰ When the large-scale anti-Yuan rebellion broke out in 1351, the rebel leader Liu Futong 劉福通 harshly criticized the Yuan on the grounds that ‘while poverty is extreme in Jiangnan 貧極江南 (in China), wealth is boasted of in Saibei 富誇塞北 (in Mongolia)’.Footnote ⁵¹ According to contemporary accounts, the poor people ‘gladly joined the rebellion’ and they ‘joined the rebellions like coming home’ 從亂如歸 because of the ‘disparity between the rich and poor’ 貧富不均.Footnote ⁵² A group of anti-Yuan Chinese rebels chanted the slogan ‘destroying the rich and benefiting the poor’ 摧富益貧during the warring late Yuan. Footnote ⁵³

My hypothesis for how this prophecy came into existence is as follows. It originally arose as a response to the serious problem of the unequal distribution of wealth in Yuan society. It predicted that during the dingwei Sheep year, the Yuan would fall into chaos, leading to families lost and the state destroyed. Everyone, no matter whether rich or poor, would lose their property. Thus, this prophecy suggests that people stop working and wait for change. As a result of this upheaval, the problem of the disparity between the rich and poor would be finally solved. This extreme solution would have resonated with poor people, and this might be considered as one of the reasons for the prophecy's popularity.

The difference between the original oral meaning of this prophecy proposed above and that of the written texts recorded in the Yuanshi and the Gengshen waishi indicates that this prophecy underwent changes during its circulation. It transformed from predicting an apocalyptic future to forecasting the rise of a Wu state. Existing sources give no hint of whether this transformation occurred naturally or whether someone intentionally changed the prophecy's meaning. But clearly the changed text was highly conducive to Zhu Yuanzhang's claims to political legitimacy. When the dingwei Sheep year arrived in January 1367, Zhu Yuanzhang had already been associated with the name Wu for many years. In 1361, the Song state conferred the title of the Duke of Wu on him, and in 1363 Han Lin'er, the titular emperor of the Song state, further promoted Zhu to the rank of the Prince of Wu.Footnote ⁵⁴ On the first day of the dingwei Sheep year (31 January 1367), Zhu began to use his own reign title Wu, further reinforcing his status as the ruler of Wu. With all his links to Wu, Zhu Yuanzhang's regime seemed to be the Wu Family State predicted by the prophecy.

Zhu Yuanzhang was not, however, the only ruler who chose to utilize the Wu Family State prophecy. His long-standing rival Zhang Shicheng 張士誠 (1321–1367) also had the opportunity to fulfil the prophecy. Zhang, originally a salt smuggler, organized a strong army during the late Yuan period, and his loyalty often fluctuated between the Yuan court and anti-Yuan rebels. Zhang and his army controlled a vast area centred on Suzhou in the lower Yangzi River area. Zhang's regime bordered Zhu Yuanzhang's territory, and battles between the two sides continued for more than a decade. In the middle of 1363 Zhang Shicheng changed his state name from ‘Da Zhou’ 大周 to ‘Wu’ 吳 and proclaimed himself to be the Prince of Wu.Footnote ⁵⁵ When Zhu Yuanzhang was promoted to Prince of Wu in the next year, there were two regimes with the name Wu 吳.Footnote ⁵⁶ To distinguish between the two, contemporaries referred to Zhu's regime as the Western Wu (xiwu 西吳) and to Zhang's as the Eastern Wu (dongwu 東吳).Footnote ⁵⁷

Both Zhang and Zhu had reasons to identify their own regimes with the Wu Family State. They both arose in the Huai river area, where the prophecy had first emerged. Each ruler had associations with both the place and title of Wu. Suzhou, the centre of Zhang's territory, was the capital of an ancient Wu state, which can be traced back to the Spring and Autumn period (770 bce–476 bce). The area surrounding Suzhou had been called Wu ever since then. Zhu also had his reasons. For a time Jiankang (present-day Nanjing), his power base, had been the capital of a Wu kingdom during the Three Kingdoms period (220–280). Strictly speaking, Suzhou had a longer history of being called Wu than Nanjing had, but this was not of much help in Zhang's battles against Zhu Yuanzhang. After a decade of seesaw victories, Zhu began to gain the upper hand. In the middle of 1366, half a year before Zhu adopted his reign title Wu, he launched a large-scale campaign against Zhang Shicheng. After almost a year of fierce fighting, Zhu finally conquered the capital of Eastern Wu, and he captured Zhang Shicheng in the seventh month of the Sheep year (August 1367). The fall of Suzhou marked the end of Zhang Shicheng's Eastern Wu state. Therefore, in the middle of the dingwei Sheep year (1367) Zhu Yuanzhang became the only Prince of Wu.

The above analysis addresses the concern of Frederic Mote (1922–2005), who was curious about the fact that Zhu did not proclaim his imperial Ming dynasty in early 1367 but waited until after his conquest of Zhang Shicheng's Eastern Wu regime.Footnote ⁵⁸ This can be explained by the Wu Family State prophecy. In 1367 Zhu sought to strengthen his legitimacy by fulfilling this prophecy. His title as Prince of Wu was useful in associating his regime with the prophetic Wu state. Thus, it was better for him to maintain his Wu regime in early 1367 rather than to establish a new one. Furthermore, the conquest of Zhang Shicheng's Eastern Wu was a necessary step for Zhu to construct himself as the only Prince of Wu. In the middle of the dingwei Sheep year, Zhu defeated Zhang Shicheng and strengthened his legitimacy by seemingly fulfilling the Wu Family State prophecy, after which he was ready to establish his own imperial dynasty.Footnote ⁵⁹

Different narratives of the prophecy

While both the private history Gengshen waishi and the official history Yuanshi preserve the Wu Family State prophecy, they offer different narratives of it. The Gengshen waishi treats this prophecy as proof of the Mandate of Heaven given to Zhu Yuanzhang. But the Yuanshi includes the prophecy in the Treatise of the Five Elements (五行志Wuxingzhi), which talks about the relationship between abnormal natural phenomena and political malfunction, making no mention of its link to Zhu's reign title or his legitimacy.

In the Treatise of the Five Elements of the Yuanshi, the Wu Family State prophecy, together with three other children's songs, are labelled as a poetic augury (shiyao 詩妖). According to long tradition, as seen in Ban Gu 班固 (32–92), the author of the Hanshu 漢書, poetic auguries were understood to be indirect expressions of the dissatisfaction of the multitude. ‘The lord is factious and tyrannical, and ministers shut their mouths in fear of punishment. Then resentment will be expressed in the form of songs. Thus, poetic auguries emerge.’Footnote ⁶⁰ According to a definition of the poetic augury given by a modern researcher, ‘poetic auguries were unusual poems created under unusual social circumstances, and they were omens of social disturbance’.Footnote ⁶¹ This definition is fitting to the above interpretation of the original meaning of this prophecy as ‘families lost and the state destroyed’. Thus, the inclusion of the Wu Family State prophecy in the poetic augury part of the Yuanshi implies that the compilers of the Yuanshi understood the original meaning of the prophecy as indicating social disturbances rather than the rise of a Wu state.

This raises the question of why the Yuanshi does not adopt Quan Heng's narrative of the Wu Family State prophecy, which apparently supports Zhu Yuanzhang's claims to political legitimacy.Footnote ⁶² Since the Yuanshi reflects Zhu Yuanzhang's political views, this question can be put another way: why did Zhu Yuanzhang not employ a narrative seemingly conducive to his legitimation? Research shows that Zhu dominated the writing of the Yuanshi, and his influence is seen in all aspects of the work. Before and during the compilation, Zhu Yuanzhang gave the compilers directives, ranging from the writing style of the whole book to the specific wording of a passage.Footnote ⁶³ According to Zhao Fang 趙汸 (1319–1369), a contemporary observer, ‘all the writings and omissions are up to (Zhu Yuanzhang's) wise decisions’.Footnote ⁶⁴ As the Chinese historian Chen Gaohua 陳高華 puts it, ‘to some extent, Zhu Yuanzhang was the real general director of the compilation group’.Footnote ⁶⁵

The transformation of Chinese political culture regarding the role of prophecies in establishing dynastic legitimacy can help explain this seeming conundrum. As mentioned above, during the Song, Confucian elites attacked prophecies as deluded and insisted that virtue was the sole qualification for political legitimacy. In this context, although Quan Heng's narrative seems useful to Zhu Yuanzhang, it was unsuitable for being included in the Yuanshi, which reflects the Confucian view of the Yuan-Ming transition. Zhu Yuanzhang relied heavily on the advice of his Confucian allies to attract support and govern his nascent state and empire. John Dardess points out that Zhu's cooperation with Confucian elites from the Zhedong area in the 1360s set the foundations for the Ming dynasty.Footnote ⁶⁶ Edward Farmer argues that Zhu formulated the Ming law code on the basis of Confucian doctrines and he legitimized his authority by embracing Confucian doctrines.Footnote ⁶⁷ Evidence that Zhu wanted to downplay prophecy and emphasize Confucian virtue as the basis of his legitimacy can also be found in many other Ming official documents. For example, Zhu Yuanzhang's Proclamation of Enthronement makes no mention of any prophecy but emphasizes that Zhu made ‘the people safe in their lands and homes’ 民安田裡.Footnote ⁶⁸ The Veritable Records of Zhu Yuanzhang repeatedly attribute Zhu's success to his virtues, such as ‘humanity’ 仁, ‘lenience’ 寬大, and ‘respecting Heaven and being diligent in people's affairs’ 敬天勤民.Footnote ⁶⁹ Zhu's concealment of the fact that he employed the Wu Family State prophecy is consistent with the transformation of legitimation discourse and a renewed emphasis on the virtue of the ruler as the basis for political legitimacy.

Zhu's efforts to hide his past in the Red Turban Song state were another reason for concealing his exploitation of the Wu Family State prophecy. Qian Qianyi, Wu Han, and the modern scholar Yang Ne 楊訥 all point out that after founding the Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang made it taboo to talk about his service under Han Lin'er.Footnote ⁷⁰ Furthermore, the Yuanshi makes no mention of Zhu Yuanzhang's past in the rebel Song state. On the contrary, the Yuanshi describes Han Lin'er's Song state in a derogatory way as the ‘pseudo-Song’ (weisong 偽宋) and Han Lin'er as ‘the pseudo-Song ruler’ (weisongzhu 偽宋主).Footnote ⁷¹ The Yuanshi anachronistically calls Zhu Yuanzhang's army prior to the establishment of the Ming dynasty ‘our Great Ming’ so as to set it apart from the rebel Song state.Footnote ⁷² This background helps to explain Zhu's treatment of the Wu Family State prophecy in the Yuanshi. If the Yuanshi addressed the links between the prophecy, Zhu's Wu reign title as well as his title as the Prince of Wu would inevitably remind people of his service as the Duke of Wu and the Prince of Wu under Han Lin'er in the Song state, a situation he sought to avoid.

Zhu Yuanzhang's suppression of popular religion and prophecies after his enthronement was another reason for the concealment. Before 1367, Zhu was part of the Red Turbans who circulated prophecies to mobilize supporters of their rebellions.Footnote ⁷³ Although existing sources make no direct reference to Zhu's attitude towards prophecies at this time, his status as a subordinate of Han Lin'er indicates that he did not openly oppose the prophecies that Han Lin'er and other Red Turbans circulated. In the Red Turban Song state, Zhu was promoted to the position of the Duke of Wu and then the Prime Minister. Zhu's career in the Song state laid the foundation for him to found the Ming dynasty. After the founding of the Ming, however, Zhu harshly suppressed popular religion and outlawed prophecies. In the first year of the Ming (1368), Zhu issued an edict outlawing the White Lotus society, Manichaeism, the White Cloud sect, and other ‘heretical’ practices.Footnote ⁷⁴ The Great Ming Code, which was finished in the sixth year of the Hongwu period (1373), prescribes capital punishment for those who used the names of Maitreya Buddha, the White Lotus, Manichaeism, the White Cloud, and other ‘heretical’ sects.Footnote ⁷⁵ The Great Ming Code also specified that those who created and spread prophecies, heretical books, and deluding words would be executed.Footnote ⁷⁶ Zhu's changing attitude towards popular religion and prophecies was understandable. As a rebel leader, he could make use of prophecies to mobilize soldiers to fight against the incumbent government, the Yuan, but when he became the ruler of the Chinese empire, prophecies, which could be used to mobilize a large number of people, became dangerous to the stability of his rule. In the context of suppressing prophecies, Zhu's treatment of the Wu Family State prophecy can be better understood. While outlawing prophecies, Zhu did not want people to know that he ever utilized prophecies to legitimize his rule. Thus, he did not want the text of the Yuanshi to address his association with the Wu Family State prophecy.

Zhu's exploitation of the Wu Family State prophecy and later concealment of this exploitation offer important clues to understanding the role of prophecies in Chinese politics after the Song. Existing scholarship has largely emphasized the fact that the Yuan and Ming governments did not publicly discuss their legitimacy by interpreting prophecies, leading to the impression that prophecies completely lost their influence in politics. The above analysis of the Wu Family State prophecy, however, shows that the situation is more complicated. While the official discourse on legitimation had changed after the Song, many commoners and elites in the Yuan still embraced the prophetic idea. Zhu had successfully attracted support by employing the Wu Family State prophecy, but in the context of Confucian ideas that virtue was the most important qualification for legitimacy, he downplayed the role of prophecy in his legitimation.

This analysis of the Wu Family State prophecy shows that after the Song, the prophetic discourse may have died out in official documents, but it did not lose its importance in politics. It continued to exert influence, even if unacknowledged in official sources. The examination of the Wu Family State prophecy shows tensions between official documents and private writings. Although Zhu dismissed his association with the Wu Family State prophecy in official documents like the Yuanshi, the Proclamation of Enthronement, and the Veritable Records, his efforts to conceal his exploitation of the Wu Family State prophecy were ironically unsuccessful. In his private writings, Quan Heng provided a different narrative of the prophecy, regarding it as a portent of Zhu Yuanzhang's rise. Quan's view was much more influential on later writers. Ming and Qing Confucian scholars, such as Qian Qianyi and Qian Daxin, all recognized the Wu Family State prophecy as an omen of Zhu Yuanzhang's Mandate of Heaven. And none of them refers to this prophecy as a poetic augury, as claimed by the Yuanshi. These private writings demonstrate that after the Song, many Confucian elites still, at least partially, accepted the prophetic discourse of political legitimacy.