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The Soviet Power Play at Changkufeng
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Extract
Power politics and opportunism go hand in hand. Picking the right time to act involves a clear perception of the alternatives, a close estimate of the risks, and a clever gamble on the odds.
The Russians have shown themselves adept at the game. Their use of force or the threat of force has been unusually astute. They try to move when the deck is stacked in their favor.
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1960
References
1 See Vinacke, Harold M., A History of the Far East in Modern Times, New York, 1942, pp. 610–11.Google Scholar
2 Moore, Harriet L., Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–1945, Princeton, N.J., 1945, pp. 98–101.Google Scholar
3 Tinch, Clark W., “Quasi-War Between Japan and the U.S.S.R., 1937–1939,” World Politics, III, No. 2 (January 1951), pp. 174–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Ibid., p. 178.
5 “The Changkufeng Incident,” prepared in 1956 by the USAFFE and Eighth Army Historical Sections, is part of a series entitled Japanese Studies on Manchuria and is one of several dealing with small wars and border problems. Written by Japanese, it was translated and edited by Americans.
6 Ibid., p. 63.
7 Ibid., p. 38.
8 Ibid., p. 51.
9 Ibid., p. 116.
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