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The ‘rest of medicine’ and psychiatry: why paradigms would differ

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Anindya Das*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, AIIMS Rishikesh, Virbhadra Road, Rishikesh, Uttarakhand-249201, India. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Type
Columns
Copyright
Copyright © Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2013 

In their paper, Bracken et al Reference Bracken, Thomas, Timimi, Asen, Behr and Beuster1 have cogently put forth the limitations of psychiatry comparing its differences with the ‘rest of medicine’. They turn our attention to some moral and ethical notions viz relationships, meanings and values, which not only have therapeutic scope but also humanistic importance. Applying evidence-based logic, they show the inadequacy of technological interventions (psychopharmacotherapeutics or therapy-specific aspects of psychotherapies), and at the same time cite evidence of effectiveness of ‘non-technical’ aspects of care. Considering some of these aspects and the online response it generated, it is important that we refocus our attention to a central and some associated issues.

First, unlike what Bracken et al propose, medicine's assumptions on causal mechanisms are still a hotly debated issue. Medicine's apparent authority over human health was convincingly questioned in a historical analysis by Thomas McKeown and his arguments much advanced by Simon Szreter. In short, rather than technical innovations in medicine (such as the advent of antibiotics or immunisation), social and political interventions had a decisive role in advancing human health.Reference Szreter2

Second, as the field of epidemiology progressively advances and uses newer analytic techniques, monocausal explanations (as the germ theory of disease propounded) gave way to multicausal (as in the case of chronic disease epidemiology) and finally to complex eco-epidemiological causal explanations.Reference Krieger3 In fact, an active engagement with the notion of embodiment that explains how biological processes are influenced profoundly by environmental determinants (e.g. social, cultural, economic, political) lies at the heart of social epidemiology.Reference Krieger and Smith4 And biological outcomes are not often mediated by our psyche, although the latter may be similarly affected.

Third, an attempt to compare the effect sizes of pharmacological interventions in both general medical disorders and psychiatric disorders show, barring a few exceptions, that effect sizes of psychiatric drugs are in the same range (i.e. small to medium) as most other pharmacotherapeutics.Reference Leucht, Hierl, Kissling, Dold and Davis5

Moreover, the oft referred crisis in psychiatry also bothers the ‘rest of medicine’ and healthcare. Some features of this crisis are the increasing difficulty of grappling with the explosive boom in health-related technologies (consequently increasing the cost of healthcare), the challenge produced by the epidemiological shift in disease prevalence and the marked social inequalities in health. In addition, the notions of ‘medicalisation of everyday life’/overmedicalisation, healthism, biomedicalisation and the dominance of the technological paradigm in medicine have also drawn wide criticism. In not considering these as entirely good or bad, the problem is the undue attention to individualised solutions and personalised/customised technologies,Reference Crawford6 transforming health to individual moral responsibility.Reference Clarke, Mamo, Fishman, Shim and Fosket7

On the other hand, under the foregoing transformations in healthcare, medical training instils qualities such as objectivity and emotional distancing to maintain clinical neutrality, concepts partly counterposed to values, narratives and meanings. Similarly, clinicians have come to associate professional status and power with increasing technological involvement in clinical practice, rather than with being sensitive to the patient's distress and life story. Although clinical knowledge is based on biological understanding and scientific methods, it is also interpretive and narrative.Reference Montgomery8

Thus to paraphrase Bracken et al, it is not just mental health problems but all health problems in general that undoubtedly have a biological dimension, and that by their very nature can reach beyond the body to involve social, cultural and psychological dimensions.

References

1 Bracken, P Thomas, P Timimi, S Asen, E Behr, G Beuster, C et al Psychiatry beyond the current paradigm. Br J Psychiatry 2012; 201: 430–4.Google Scholar
2 Szreter, S. Rethinking McKeown: the relationship between public health and social change. Am J Public Health 2002; 92: 722–5.Google Scholar
3 Krieger, N. Proximal, distal, and the politics of causation: what's level got to do with it? Am J Public Health 2008; 98: 221–30.Google Scholar
4 Krieger, N Smith, GD. ‘Bodies count’ and body counts: social epidemiology and embodying inequality. Epidemiol Rev 2004; 26: 92103.Google Scholar
5 Leucht, S Hierl, S Kissling, W Dold, M Davis, JM Putting the efficacy of psychiatric and general medicine medication into perspective: review of meta-analyses. Br J Psychiatry 2012; 200: 97106.Google Scholar
6 Crawford, R. Healthism and the medicalization of everyday life. Int J Health Serv 1980; 10: 365–88.Google Scholar
7 Clarke, AE Mamo, L Fishman, JR Shim, JK Fosket, JR Technoscientific transformations of health, illness, and biomedicine U.S. Am Sociol Rev 2003; 68: 161–94.Google Scholar
8 Montgomery, K. How Doctors Think: Clinical Judgment and the Practice of Medicine. Oxford University Press, 2006.Google Scholar
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