No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Designing Democratic Institutions and the Problem of Evil: A Liberal Chinese Perspective*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 June 2009
Extract
Chinese liberals have been searching for a just society, one regulated by democratic institutions and rules—a society where the human potential for evil is properly controlled. It is in this context that Chinese liberal intellectuals such as Yan Jiaqi, Hu Ping, and Liao Xun, drawing on their respective experiences of the tragedies in China, have taken the idea that there is always a potential for evil in human nature as a starting-point for a just society and for designing democratic institutions.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1995
References
1 Yan Jiaqi, born in 1942 in Jiangsu Province, has lived as an exile in Paris since 1989. Yan was elected Director of the Institute of Political Science in Beijing's Academy of Social Sciences in 1985. In October 1986, he was assigned to former Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's Central Research Group for Reform of Political Structure, a government organization headed by Zhao's trusted aide Bao Tong. In 1989, Yan played a major role as one of the leaders of the Association of the Intellectual Circle in Beijing. He was a member of a group of intellectuals who, in May 1989, issued a sharply worded statement attacking Deng Xiaoping as “China's uncrowned Emperor and a senile, muddle-headed dictator,” and demanding his resignation. After the June 1989 Beijing Massacre, Yan and his wife Gao Gao fled to Paris, and, on July 20, 1989, co-founded the Federation Democracy of China, of which he was later elected chairperson.
His writings include: Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige shi dui chuantong wenhua de zhongda tupo” (Political reform makes a great breakthrough in traditional culture), Shenzhen quingnianbao (Shenzhen youth news), 12 5, 1986Google Scholar; Jiaqi, Yan, Wode sixiang zichuan (My intellectual autobiography) (Hong Kong: Sanlian shuju, 1988)Google Scholar; for the English translation of Wode, see Hong, David S. K. and Mair, Denis C., Toward a Democratic China: The Intellectual Autobiography of Yan Jiaqi (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992)Google Scholar; and Jiaqi, Yan, Zouxiang minzhu zhengzhi (Toward democratic politics) (Teaneck, NJ: Global Publishing, 1989)Google Scholar. See also Yan Jiaqi and China's Struggle for Democracy, ed. and trans. Bachman, David and Yang, Dali (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991).Google Scholar
2 Hu Ping was born in Sichuan Province in 1947. He was admitted to Beijing University in 1978 as a graduate student in European philosophy, specializing in Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. He became a contributor to the unofficial periodical Wotu (Fertile), in which he published his long essay “Lun yanlun ziyou” (On freedom of speech), defending the thesis that freedom of speech benefits society. He was voted into office as a representative in December 1980 in the county-level elections, during which he had campaigned for freedom of speech, obtaining 57 percent of the vote. His political stance made him so controversial that, after he obtained his M.A., the university was unable to find him a job. He remained unemployed for five years-the price he paid for having actively championed freedom of speech. In 1987, he enrolled in Harvard University in the U.S. to obtain a Ph.D. in Western political thought. He gave up his academic work when he was elected chairman of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD) in New York a year later-a position he held from January 1988 to June 1991. He is currently an editor for Beijing Spring in New York.
His writings include: Ping, Hu, Gei wo yige zhidian (Give me a fulcrum) (Taiwan: Lianjing chuban Gongshi, 1988)Google Scholar; this is a collection of his essays which includes his writings before he went to the U.S. My citations of this collection refer in the main to his early works, such as “On Freedom of Speech” (1979). See also Ping, Hu, “Bolinqiang suixiang” (Short notes on the Berlin Wall), Democratic China, no. 1 (Paris, 04 1990), pp. 38–43Google Scholar; and Ping, Hu, “Rujia renxinglun yu minzhu xianzheng” (The Confucian view of human nature and democratic constitutionalism), China Tribune, no. 374 (Taibei, 1991), pp. 111–18.Google Scholar
3 Liao Xun, born in Beijing in 1950, is now a research fellow in economics, and the Vice Director of the Research Center of Social and Economic Development under the government of Hannan Province. He was a member of the Institute of Industry Economics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and took part in economic reform in the early 1980s. He gained his reputation from his earlier advocation of the idea of “small government and large society,” which was adopted by provincial leaders in Hannan in the mid-1980s. Since 1985, he has played a major role in designing the institutions of Hannan Province according to his liberal idea of limited government.
His writings include: Xun, Liao, “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu” (Political democracy and the principle of preventing evil), Zixue (Self-learning), no. 1 (1987), pp 6–9Google Scholar; and Xun, Liao, Xiaozhengfu dashehui (Small government and large society) (Beijing: Shanhuan Press, 1991).Google Scholar
4 Evil is only one of the central themes of Chinese liberals' thinking on democracy. Other important themes include human rights, procedures, and ways of infusing rights-based moral principles into democratic institutions. See He, Baogang, “Democracy as Viewed by Three Chinese Liberals: Wei Jingsheng, Hu Ping, and Yan Jiaqi,” China Information, vol. 6, no. 2 (Leiden, Autumn 1991), pp. 23–43.Google Scholar
5 In this regard, Yan Jiaqi has been influenced by Machiavelli and Madison (see Yan, , “Tizhi gaige”Google Scholar) Hu Ping has been influenced by Hobbes and Hume (see Hu, “Bolinqiang suixiang”); and Liao Xun has been influenced by Madison (see Liao, , “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu”).Google Scholar
6 Fajia was the Chinese legalist or realist school, which emphasized strict control of the People by harsh laws, encouraged agriculture and aggressive warfare, and emphasized the need to preserve and strengthen the state. Like Machiavelli's famous treatise, to which it has often been compared, Han Fei-tzu's work is a handbook for the prince; see Han Fei-tzu:Basic Writings, trans. Watson, Burton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).Google Scholar
7 See He, Baogang, “Han Fei quanli lilun tanwei” (An investigation of Han Fei-tzu's power theory), Zhexue yu wenhua (Monthly review of philosophy and culture), vol. 17, no. 3 (Taibei, 03 1990), pp. 242–48.Google Scholar
8 See, e.g., the introduction of Hao, Zhang, Youan yishi yu minzhu chuanlong (The sense of dimness and democratic tradition) (Taiwan: Lianjing chuban Gongshi, 1989).Google Scholar
9 Ibid., ch. 1 and conclusion.
10 Ping, Hu, “Rujia renxinglun,” p. 111Google Scholar. A more detailed discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this essay.
11 Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige”Google Scholar; Yan, , Wode sixiang zichuanGoogle Scholar; and Bachman, and Yang, , eds., Yan Jiaqi and China's Struggle for Democracy, pp. 54–58.Google Scholar
12 Xun, Liao, “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu,” p. 7.Google Scholar
13 Ibid.
14 This was borrowed from the idea of the “new Soviet man,” which dominated political thought in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s.
15 Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige,” p. 2.Google Scholar
16 Ping, Hu, “Bolinqiang suixiang,” pp. 39–40, and “Rujia renxinglun,” pp. 117–18.Google Scholar
17 Walder, Andrew, “Cultural Revolution Radicalism: Variations on a Stalinist Theme,” in New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, ed. Joseph, William A. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 43–46.Google Scholar
18 Xun, Liao, “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu,” p. 8.Google Scholar
19 Niebuhr, Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics [1932] (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), pp. 61, 222Google Scholar; see also Kegley, Charles W. and Bretall, Robert W., Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 15, 139, 302.Google Scholar
20 Ping, Hu, writing in the periodical China Spring, 07 1988, p. 50Google Scholar. See also Guantao, Jin, “Zhongguo wenhua de wutoubang jinsheng” (Utopianism in Chinese culture), Twenty-First Century, vol. 2 (12 1990)Google Scholar; Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige”Google Scholar; and Bachman, and Yang, , eds., Yan Jiaqi and China's Struggle for Democracy.Google Scholar
21 Davis, James, Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: J. M. Dent and sons, Ltd., 1949) vol. 2, p. 237.Google Scholar
23 Guantao, Jin, “Zhongguo wenhua.”Google Scholar
24 See “Tansuo weilai de daolu: Dongbailin shirentan” (Exploring the road to the future: Ten people's conversation in East Berlin), Democratic China, no. 2 (06 1990), pp. 42, 44, 48Google Scholar; and Jin, , “Zhongguo wenhua.”Google Scholar
25 Chinese moral perfectionism can be compared with German racial perfectionism: the former provided a justification for the Party to deny the rights of those who were regarded as immoral; the latter provided a justification for the Nazis to fight to “liberate” mankind from “rule of subhumans,” and to eliminate forever certain “races” such as the Jews.
26 Guantao, Jin, “Zhongguo wenhua,” p. 31.Google Scholar
27 Ping, Hu, writing in China Spring, 07 1988, p. 50.Google Scholar
28 Ping, Hu, Gei wo yige zhidian, p. 178Google Scholar; see also Wei, Su's speech in “Tansuo weilai de daolu” (supra note 24), p. 44.Google Scholar
29 In traditional China, there were various ideas of hell, which often hold, e.g., that Yarnluor, ruler and judge of the Chinese hell, can see one's sins from his terrace, or that one's sins are reflected in the mirror, etc. Thus, one can still rely on religious persuasion to control evil. However, since belief in hell has been declining in China, the institutional remedy proposed by Chinese liberals is likely to be more effective.
30 Lei Feng, an ordinary soldier, was praised by Mao Zedong in the 1960s as a moral hero who sacrificed himself for the public good.
31 Guantao, Jin, “Zhongguo wenhua,” pp. 26–27.Google Scholar
32 See Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige,” pp. 54–58Google Scholar; Bachman, and Yang, , eds., Yan Jiaqi and China's Struggle for DemocracyGoogle Scholar; and He, Baogang and Kelly, David, “Emergent Civil Society and the Intellectuals in China,” in The Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems, ed. Miller, R. F. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), pp. 24–39Google Scholar. “Civil society” refers here to autonomous organizations that are independent of direct political control by the state or the Party.
33 This series told the story of a reformer who served people whole-heartedly, sacrificing his own interests.
34 Neo-authoritarian thought emerged among a group of intellectuals in both government and the academy in Beijing between 1986 and 1989, and had the attention and support of senior Party reformers, including the former General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang. See Jun, Liu and Lin, Li, eds., Xinquanwei zhuyi (Neo-authoritarianism) (Beijing: Beijing jingjixueyuan chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar, part 2. I will discuss the neo-authoritarian belief in the necessity of a strong government in Section IV.
35 For example, Immanuel Kant distinguishes natural evil from moral evil in his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Greene, Theodore and Hudson, Hoyt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 24–25Google Scholar. Milo, Ronald distinguishes perverse wickedness from preferential wickedness in his Immorality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Carl Schmitt regards evil not only as dangerous, corrupt, weak, cowardly, and stupid, but as rude, instinctive, vital, and irrational; see his The Concept of the Political [1928], trans. Schwab, George (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), p. 96Google Scholar. John Rawls believes that what moves evil human beings is their love of injustice; they delight in the impotence and humiliation of those subject to them; see his A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 439.Google Scholar
36 Jiaqi, Yan, Wode sixiang zichuan, pp. 98–99.Google Scholar
37 Ping, Hu, writing in China Spring, 04 1988, p. 59Google Scholar; June 1988, p. 52; and July 1988, p. 4.
38 Guantao, Jin, “Zhongguo wenhua,” p. 31.Google Scholar
39 Jiaqi, Yan, Wode sixiang zichuan, pp. 92–98.Google Scholar
40 Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince (New York: Penguin Books, 1961).Google Scholar
41 Jiaqi, Yan, Wode sixiang zichuan, ch. 10.Google Scholar
42 Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige”Google Scholar; see also Madison, James, Hamilton, Alexander, and Jay, John, The Federalist Papers, introduction by Rossiter, Clinton (New York: New American Library, 1961). p. 322.Google Scholar
43 Xun, Liao, “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu.”Google Scholar
44 Author's conversations with Ping, Hu, 01 10, 1993, and November 18, 1993Google Scholar. See also Ping, Hu, “On Freedom of Speech,” in Gei wo yige zhidian.Google Scholar
45 Ping, Hu, in China Spring, 05 1988, p. 33.Google Scholar
46 Friedman, Edward, “Theorizing the Democratization of China's Leninist State,” in Marxism and the Chinese Experience, ed. Dirlik, Arif and Meisner, Maurice (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe), p. 173.Google Scholar
47 Guantao, Jin, “Zhongguo wenhua,” pp. 29–30.Google Scholar
48 This is the title of one of the wall-posters in Beijing University in 1989.
49 Bauman, Zygmunt, “The Social Manipulation of Morality: Moralizing Actors, Adiaphorizing Action,” Theory, Culture, and Society, vol. 8 (1991), pp. 137–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
50 Ping, Hu, Gei wo yige zhidian, pp. 3–8.Google Scholar
51 The Yanan Rectification Movement (Zhengfeng Yundong) was launched in 1942 in the town of Yanan to remold the Party's thinking and guide its growth. It included study, discussion,criticism, and self-criticism, and involved intensive indoctrination and education in the principles of Mao Zedong's thought.
52 Ping, Hu, in China Spring, 04 1988, p. 58.Google Scholar
53 A similar case is that of Adolf Eichmann, who played a major role in Hitler's Final Solution but did not feel he was an evil-doer in the depths of his heart. He did not feel guilty before the law; rather, he declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant's moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty. He thought he was a law-abiding citizen. Hannah Arendt comments that Eichmann gives us a lesson in the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil. See Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), pp. 18, 120, 231.Google Scholar
54 Madsen, Richard, Morality and Power in a Chinese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).Google Scholar
55 Ping, Hu, in China Spring, 05 1988, p. 33.Google Scholar
56 See Schell, Orville, “Kafka, Kundera, Havel, and Mao,” Human Rights Tribune, vol. 2, no. 3 (06 1991), p. 30Google Scholar. This movement is reminiscent of the practices of confession and penitence organized by the Christian Church in the Middle Ages. See Delumeau, Jean, Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture, Thirteenth through Eighteenth Centuries, trans. Nicholson, Eric (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).Google Scholar
57 On the issue of limitations on rights, see He, Baogang, “Chinese Dissidents' Ideas of Human Rights: A Constructive Critique,” Thesis Eleven, no. 30 (MIT Press, 1991), pp. 56–74.Google Scholar
58 Locke states that “as usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to.” See Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
59 He, Baogang, “Infusing Morality into Political Institutions,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 2, no. 1 (1993), pp. 35–52.Google Scholar
60 Dittmer, Lowell and Ruoxi, Chen, Ethics and Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Studies in Chinese Terminology, No. 19 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1981), pp. 112–13, 115.Google Scholar
61 Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige.”Google Scholar
62 Xun, Liao, “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu,” pp. 8–9.Google Scholar
63 Ping, Hu, in China Spring, 06 1988, p. 53.Google Scholar
64 Ping, , “Bolinqiang suixiang,” pp. 42–43.Google Scholar
65 Hegel, G. W. F., Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, T. M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 175, 231.Google Scholar
66 Hume, David, The Philosophical Works, ed. Green, Thomas Hill and Hodge, Thomas prose (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1964), vol. 3, pp. 117–19Google Scholar. See also He, Baogang, “An Analytical Investigation of Hume's Supposition of Knavery in Institutional Design,” Current World Leaders, 12 1994.Google Scholar
67 Kant, , Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 24.Google Scholar
68 Chu, Ding, in China Spring, no. 79 (12 1989), p. 37.Google Scholar
69 Rawls, , A Theory of Justice, 124, 136Google Scholar (on egoism); 267–70, 354 (on the free-rider problem); 367 (on militant civil disobedience); 388 (on intolerance); 570 (on deception and hypocrisy); 439 (on the evil man); and 530–41 (on envy).
70 Ibid., p. 530.
71 Ibid., p. 531.
72 Rawls, John, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: Rational and Full Autonomy,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 9 (1980), p. 534.Google Scholar
73 I should note that my argument is not against Rawls's theory itself but against its application in China. It is unfair to charge Rawls with failing to take the problem of evil into account, because the issue of civil war and the danger of totalitarianism, which are major concerns for Chinese liberals, are not problems for him. Moreover, Rawls's general defense of equal liberties is relevant to Chinese debates over political values, and I have often cited it in my work.
74 Madison, . The Federalist Papers (supra note 42), p. 322.Google Scholar
75 Jiaqi, Yan, Wode sixiang zichuan, pp. 97–99.Google Scholar
76 See Ping, Hu, Gei wo yige zhidian, p. 268Google Scholar; Ping, Hu, “Bolinqiang suixiang,” p. 43Google Scholar; and Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige,” p. 2Google Scholar. See also Jiaqi, Yan, “Liangzhi shi shangdi de shengyin” (Conscience is the voice of God), Democratic China, no. 1 (1990), pp. 6–7Google Scholar; and “Yan Jiaqi, Zhu Gaozheng yibaifenzhong daibianlu” (A long debate between Yan Jiaqi and Zhu Gaozheng), Zhongyang ribao (Central daily news), Taiwan, 05 15, 1990, p. 7.Google Scholar
77 The idea of the middle case fits well with the Chinese people's view that the majority of human beings are good and that only a minority are evil. For example, in a survey conducted in rural Taiwan in 1983, 49.5 percent of the respondents characterized human nature as mostly good, 20.7 percent as a mixture of good and evil, 14.9 percent as all good, 11.0 Percent as neutral, 4.0 percent as mostly evil, and none as all evil. See Jiang, Joseph, ed., Confucianism and Modernization: A Symposium (Taiwan: Freedom Council, 1987), p. 241Google Scholar. I should acknowledge that this study of Taiwan may not represent mainland Chinese attitudes and that, to my knowledge, no such survey has been done on mainland China.
78 Ping, Hu, “Bolinqiang suixiang,” pp. 42–43Google Scholar, and “Rujia renxinglun,” p. 118Google Scholar. Hu also informs me of this in correspondence.
79 Hamilton, , The Federalist Papers (supra note 42), p. 458.Google Scholar
80 Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige.”Google Scholar
81 There are many Chinese articles which have argued for and against neoauthoritarianism; see Liu Jun and Li Lin, eds., Xinquanwei zhuyi (supra note 34). Here I limit my discussion to the ways in which neo-authoritarian institutional design addresses the problem of evil.
82 Ping, Hu, “Rujia renxinglun,” p. 118.Google Scholar
83 Xun, Liao, “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu.”Google Scholar
84 Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. Schwab, George (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 66.Google Scholar
85 Ibid.
86 He, Baogang, “An Investigation of Han Fei-tzu's Power Theory” (supra note 7).Google Scholar
87 Binjiu, Zhang, “Jingji tizhi gaige he zhengzhi tizhi gaige de jincheng yu xietiao”Google Scholar (Process and coordination of economic and political reforms), and “Jijin de minzhu haishi wenjian de minzhu?” (Radical or moderate democratization?), in Liu Jun and Li Lin, eds., Xinquanwei zhuyi (supra note 34).
88 This assumption is certainly wrong. I have examined the emergent democratic culture in China; see He, Baogang, “Democratization: Anti-Democratic and Democratic Elements in the Political Culture of China,” Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 1 (1992), pp. 120–36.Google Scholar
89 Ping, Hu, Gei wo yige zhidian, p. 176Google Scholar; Ping, Hu, Zai lixiang yu xianshi zhijian (Between and reality) (Hong Kong: Tianyuan shuwu, 1990), pp. 151–63.Google Scholar
90 Hume, , Treatise, p. 251.Google Scholar
91 I acknowledge that although democracy as defined by Yan Jiaqi focuses on fair procedures, and incorporates general rules that permit a peaceful succession, the problem of succession during the process of democratization is far from being resolved.
92 Feng Shengbao points out the negative effects of the students' demonstration in 1989 and argues against the strategy of creating “political earthquakes”; see Shengbao, Feng, “Minzhu yundong yu zhongguo de zhengzhi chulu” (Democracy movement and a political breakthrough in China), Zhishi fenzi (Chinese intellectuals), vol. 6, no. 4 (1991), p. 56.Google Scholar
93 Pye, Lucian W., The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press, 1988), p. 128.Google Scholar
94 Jiaqi, Yan, Disan gonghe—Weilaizhongguo de xuanze (The third republic — A choice for future China) (New York: Global Publishing Co., Inc., 1992), pp. 313–17.Google Scholar
95 See Ping, Hu, Gei wo yige zhidian, pp. 37–39Google Scholar; Ping, Hu, “Bolinqiang suixiang,” p. 40Google Scholar; and Ping, Hu, “Ziyouzhuyi sichao zai zhongguo de mingyun” (The prospect for the trend of liberalism in China), China Spring, 04 1991, pp. 51–52Google Scholar. See also Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 131.Google Scholar
96 See Hu Ping's essay on the right to ssent in Gei wo yige zhidian. Wang Juntao has also defended the right to make counter-revolutionary statements, including statements against J e Party. See Gittings, John, China Changes Face: The Road from Revolution, 1949–1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 154.Google Scholar
97 See also Madsen, , Morality and Power in a Chinese Village (supra note 54).Google Scholar
98 See Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige,” p. 2Google Scholar; and Wode sixiang zichuan, ch. 10.
99 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. and trans. Cohler, Anne, Miller, Basia, and Stone, Harold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 155, 187.Google Scholar
100 Huning, Wang, “‘Wenge’ fansi yu zhengzhi tizhi gaige” (A reflection on the Cultural Revolution and political reform), Shijie jingji taobao (The world economical herald), 09 29, 1986, p. 6.Google Scholar
101 Jiaqi, Yan, Wode sixiang zichuan, ch. 14.Google Scholar
102 Jiaqi, Yan, Zouxiang minzhu zhengzhi; see esp. his essay on freedom of the press.Google Scholar
103 Ping, Hu, “On Freedom of Speech,” in Cei uo yige zfidian.Google Scholar
104 Jiaqi, Yan, Wode sixiang zichuan, ch. 14; see esp. p. 111.Google Scholar
105 Xun, Liao, “‘Fange yuanze’ yu zhengzhi minzhu.”Google Scholar
106 See Wei, Su's speech in “Tansuo weilai de daolu” (supra note 24), p. 44.Google Scholar
107 Jiaqi, Yan, “Tizhi gaige,” p. 2.Google Scholar
108 For the idea of an alteration, see Hume, , Treatise (supra note 22), p. 197.Google Scholar
109 Jiaqi, Yan. “Tizhi gaige,” p. 2.Google Scholar