Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Fulbright-Hays Program for Dissertation Research Abroad. I would also like to thank the officers and staff of the Central State Military Historical Archive of the U.S.S.R. (hereafter TsGVIA), where the research for this article was conducted.

1. The dangers of punishment for submitting complaints are discussed below, pp. 69–71.

2. John Keep has noted that there are only three memoirs from this period actually written by soldiers and that in general officers were not concerned with the lower ranks in their personal reminiscences. See his “From the Pistol to the Pen: The military memoir as a source on the social history of pre-reform Russia.” Cahiers du Monde russe el soviétique, 21 (July-December 1980),no. 3–4: 295–320. Sources on the social history of the lower ranks in the first half of the nineteenth century generally present a frustrating problem. The main difficulty is the absence of a closed comprehensive body of sources. Regimental records are scattered and fragmentary, and the sources for some militarily significant geographical areas like the Caucasus are inaccessible. The records from the military colonies, garrisons, and guards regiments are better, but these troops are exceptional by nature and cannot provide the basis for a study of the regular standing army. There are no complete service lists for the lower ranks of any regiment. Given the inadequacy of statistical sources for prereform Russian history, this situation is not surprising. Other circumstances are more frustrating.The central bureaucracy showed little concern for the conditions of daily life in the army.The only detailed accounts of local conditions resulted from extraordinary circumstances—flagrant abuses by officers or disobedience by soldiers—that prompted special investigations. There was,then, no systematic reporting on local conditions. Russian bureaucrats were interested primarily in tallying the number of men, horses, and guns and the quantity of money, supplies, and equipment.

3. Even the limitations of judicial materials can reflect the conditions of daily life that underlay the mentality of the lower ranks. Most problematically, judicial records concern serious deviant behavior, which—although recognized as an important source for the study of social norms—is by nature atypical. Moreover, minor violations of the service order resulted in summary punishment at the local level and so escaped the purview of the central authorities. According to a law of 1806,brigade commanders decided cases of first desertion and theft not exceeding twenty paper rubles without convening a court and were empowered to impose sentences of 500 to 1500 strokes by running the gauntlet. Cases involving a second desertion, a second petty theft, or theft exceeding twenty rubles required a court decision and confirmation by the divisional commander, who could assign a punishment of no more than 3000 strokes. The corps commander decided cases up to the fifth desertion and other serious crimes carrying a sentence of no more than 5000 strokes. Finally, the Military Judicial Department (General Auditorial), which was the highest military court and directly subordinate to the tsar, confirmed sentences for multiple crimes and for crimes carrying the death penalty or punishments replacing the death penalty, such as hard labor, exile to Siberia, and exclusion from a military career. Stoletie voennogo ministerstva (hereafter SVM), vol. 12, pt. 1, bk. 1 (St.Petersburg. 1902), pp. 186–88. Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii (hereafter PSZ), (I) 29:22322. Prikazy voennogo ministra (hereafter Prikazy), May 14, 1809, no. 63. Svod voennykh postanovlenii(hereafter SVP), (1838) chast’ 5, kn. l.st. 248–54. 500–502. On the General Auditorial,see PSZ (I) 26: 19265 and SVM, vol. 12, pt. 1, bk. 1, pp. 161–63, 186. See also John P. LeDonne, “The Administration of Military Justice under Nicholas I,” Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, 13(April-June 1972), no. 2: 180–91. Another weakness of the judicial records involved irregularities in the administration of military justice: the possibility of falsifying records or using force to extract confessions. As late as 1854, an order of the war minister warned officials that during the investigation of crimes they were forbidden by law to subject accused persons to “biased interrogations, tortures,and cruelties.” See Prikazy, January 22, 1854, no. 9.

4. For both the authorities and the witnesses, judicial testimonies had an express purpose that often casts doubt not only on their veracity but also on the accuracy of official conclusions. It is practically impossible to determine which testimonies are truthful and which false, although the actual facts of a case are less important than the view a testimony gives of military society. When a soldier voices a grievance, he is either telling the truth or trying to justify his own malfeasance with claims that he expects to arouse the sympathy of the authorities. In either case the historian can learn something about social relations.

5. The term “lower ranks” is used throughout the article for nizhnie chiny. Many of the sources do not distinguish between soldiers and noncommissioned officers.

6. According to the Code of Military Regulations of 1838, brigade commanders conducted inspections three times a year, divisional commanders twice a year, and corps commanders and commanders in chief once. SVP (1838), chast’ 3, kn. 1, st. 792.

7. TsGVIA, fond 16231, opis’ 1, delo 164, l. 5–8.

8. In Iashvis view the sergeant major was especially guilty, for he “should have been the first to report on these intentions and repeated meetings concerning the presenting of a petition. But, on the contrary, he himself read the written petition before the entire company. “

9. TsGVIA, fond 16231, opis’ 1, delo 164. l. 15 and 19.

10. The claims considered unproven, unfounded, or untrue included: 568 rubles for gun-stock money not requested by Komorov, 94 rubles withheld from the pay of dead soldiers and recruits,and 783 rubles for boot leather not received. The claims that Komorov had to satisfy included: 30 rubles for munitions money, four pairs of boots, 3453 rubles for artel funds used to buy provisions and forage without permission from the commanding authorities, and 1067 rubles allocated forprovisions but used by Komorov for forage without authorization. TsGVIA, fond 16231, opis’ 1,delo 164, l. 49–52, 59. In addition to the monetary satisfaction of these claims, Komorov's punishment included arrest for one month and denial of the right to command until he received recognition from his superiors. TsGVIA, fond 16231, opis’ 1, delo 164, l. 62–63.

11. The law allowed officers to hire soldiers for private work, but the soldiers were to be paid,they were not to be forced into work, and the work was not to interfere with the fulfillment of regular service duties. See PSZ (I) 24: 17576, 17856; 27: 20581.

12. TsGVIA, fond 410, delo 67, l. 44–47.

13. TsGVIA, fond 801, opts’ 20, delo 2, l. 63ob–64ob.

14. TsGVIA, fond 801, opis’ 61/2, delo 250, c. 889.

15. TsGVIA, fond 395, opis’ 213, delo 21, /. 1089.

16. TsGVIA, fond 395, opis’ 213, delo 21, l. 1084–87. While on the march, a recruit's rations included three cups of vodka a week. See PSZ (11) 6: 4677.

17. For a contemporary journalistic account of the regimental economy, see “O polkovykh komandirakh i ikh khoziaistvennykh rasporiazheniiakh.” in A. I. Gertsen and I. P. Ogarev. eds.,Golosa iz Rossii, vyp. 1, pp. 46–109 (reprint ed., Moscow. 1974). The best contemporary scholarly account is Anichkov, V M., Voennoe khoziaistvo. Sravnitel'noe issledovanie polozhitel'nykh zakonodatel'stvRossii, Frantsii, Prusii, Avstrii, Sardinii, Bel'gii i Bavarii (St. Petersburg, 1860)Google Scholar. The most recent and broadly conceived discussion can be found in Beyrau, Dietrich, Militär und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1984)Google Scholar. Zatler, Compare Fedor, Zapiski oprodovol'stvii voisk v voennoe vremia (St. Petersburg, 1860 and 1862)Google Scholar and Curtiss, John S., The Russian Army under Nicholas I (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965)Google Scholar. For a fuller discussion of the materials presented here, see Elise Kimerling, “A Social History of the Lower Ranks in the Russian Army, 1796–1855” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1983), chapters 3 and 5. and Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, “The Lower Ranks in the Peacetime Regimental Economy, 1796–1855,” The Slavonic and East European Review (forthcoming).

18. On Peter the Great's military economic reforms, see SVM, vol. 5, pt. 1 (St. Petersburg,1902), pp. 9–35. On contracts between the military and private suppliers, see Arkhiv gosudarstvennogo soveta, vol. 4, no. 2, pt. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1888), col. 1915–26, 1945–47, 1959–65, 1976–78.On the obligations of the state and local society in supplying the troops, see SVM, vol. 5, pt. 1,pp. 85–90, 103–11. On difficulties due to local variations in the quality and availability of supplies,see PSZ (11), 17: 15867, 16113, 16368; 22: 21248; 25: 24409; 26: 25063. See also Curtiss, The Russian Army, pp. 246–47.

19. See the chapter on the regimental economy in Beyrau. Militär und Gesellschaft. When the local population was very poor, the soldiers ate from the common pot. Anichkov, Voennoe khoziaistvo,pp. 577–78.

20. On soldiers’ economic grievances and officers’ abuses, see Kimerling, “Social History of the Lower Ranks,” chapter 5. On the legislated norms for pay and provisions, see SVM, vol. 5, pt. 1.pp. 87, 91, 94; Arkhiv gosudarstvennogo soveta, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg. 1878). col. 876; Istoricheskoe obozrenie voenno-sukhoputnogo upravleniia, 1825–1850 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1850). pp. 56, 61–63;and Prokhodtsov, I. I., Riazanskaia guberniia v 1812 godu, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 146 Google Scholar—47.For the actual legislation, see PSZ (I) 8: 5864. 17: 12748. 30: 23297, 37: 28644 and 28767; (II)2: 1004, 5: 3658, 6: 4677, 11: 9141 and 9762. 12: 9952, 13: 11478. 17: 15808. 18: 17271. 19: 18096 and 18269, 24: 23702. 26: 25441 and 25595. 27: 25991. Compare SVP (1838). chast’ 4. kn. 3,appendix 15 to articles 483, 502; and Prikazy, December 6, 1836. no. 131, July 1, 1842. no. 69. and December 6, 1849, no. 122.

21. See the case study below, pp. 79–81.

22. For cases of officers misusing resources or reallocating monies for the good of the army, seeTsGWA, fond 801, opis’ 61. deb 11,11. 82–85; fond 16232, opis’ 1, delo 142. l. 229–60ob.

23. TsGVIA, fond 801. opis’ 6i. delo 71. l. 20–38.

24. The government, however, considered both Tishchenko and the lower ranks guilty of violating the service order, although allowance was made for the extenuating circumstances. Given the soldiers’ wishes. Tishchenko's formerly unblemished and zealous service, and the fact that when the regimental commander was informed about the money Tishchenko immediately began an investigation,his sentence was light. In addition to the year he had already spent under arrest. Tishchenko faced another month in the fortress. The lower ranks, who were guilty of not informing the authorities at the appropriate times that they had not received the munitions money, were freed from punishment on the basis of an amnesty declared in 1826. PSZ (II) 1: 29. 548–49. 704. 789; 2: 1033; 3: 1847; 6:4254. For two cases where the authorities forgave economic irregularities because of an officer's impoverished circumstances, see TsGVIA. fond 801. opis’ 61. delo 11. II. 162ob–63ob and delo 202.ll. 402–29.

25. See Kimerling. “Social History of the Lower Ranks.” chapters 3 and 5.

26. For example, in 1826 the Preobrazhenskii regiment operated three shops and three vegetable gardens. See TsGVIA. fond 36. opis’ 6. delo 95. l. 1–3 and fond 395, opis’ 325. delo 20. l. 34–39ob. Compare Anichkov, Voennoe khoziaistvo, p. 558.

27. See SVP (1838). chast’ 4, kn. 4. si. 86–121.

28. See TsGVIA. fond 801. opis’ 62. delo 66. l. 8–1 lob.

29. Anichkov, Voennoe khoziaistvo. p. 417. For a squadron the figure was 120 silver rubles.Each soldier was supposed to have a minimum of 7 rubles 15 kopecks (15 rubles in the guards) in the artel. For such a case, see TsGVIA. fond 16232. opis’ 1. delo 142. l. 229–236ob.

30. Compare TsGVIA, fond 801, opis’ 61. delo 11, l. 32.

31. Cases in TsGVIA, fond 36, opis’ 6. delo 95. l. 1–3 and fond 395. opis’ 325. delo 20. l. 34–39ob.

32. This type of collusion between officers and soldiers led to an extensive private economy at the Kinburn artillery garrison. See TsGVIA, fond 801, opis’ 87/32, delo 9, chast’ 1–2 and fond 395,opis’ 286, delo 389, l. 18–23.

33. Recognizing the problem, in March 1846 the commander of the Southern Artillery Region informed all garrison commanders that if governmental funds were insufficient for the soldiers'munitions they should release three privates from each company to engage in outside work. See TsGVIA, fond 801. opis’ 87/32, delo 9, chast’ 2, l. 299–299ob. The Austrian army followed similar practices, also because of economic necessity. See Rothenberg, Gunther E., The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette. Indiana: Purdue University Press. 1976), p. 76.Google Scholar

34. In 1830 the commander of the Suzdal infantry regiment was sentenced to four months’ arrest followed by assignment to service without the right to command a battalion for employing such means. PSZ (II) 5: 3835. Also see below, p. 76.

35. See the case concerning the death of Private Voichulionis. in which the responsible officer was found innocent of cruel punishment. TsGVIA. fond SOI, opis’ 61/2, delo 250. From 1801 a regimental doctor was supposed to oversee sentences of corporal punishment to ensure that the victim was strong enough to survive. PSZ (1) 26: 20070 and 30: 23691. Imperatorskie ukazy i prikazy voennogo ministerstva za 1809 g., June 6, 1809, no. 743.

36. SVM, vol. 12, pt. 1, bk. 1, p. 67. PSZ (I) 5: 3006.

37. See n. 3.

38. SVM, vol. 12. bk. 1. appendix 4, pp. 29–30.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. TsGVIA, fond 16231, opis’ 1, delo 430, l. 1–lob.

42. Here Kiselev is referring to the failure of regimental commanders to supervise the disciplinary actions taken by subordinate officers and noncommissioned officers.

43. TsGVIA, fond 16231, opis’ 1, delo 430, l. 2–3.

44. At least by 1830 officers faced trial and conviction for using broadswords and cleaning rods.See PSZ (II) 5: 3835.

45. TsGVIA, fond 801, opis’ 61, delo 34, l. 509–18, 533–537ob.

46. The law exempted decorated soldiers from corporal punishment. See PSZ (I) 30: 22903,23160; (II) 18: 17255, 20: 18848.

47. Artel monies belonged to the lower ranks and were supposedly used for their personal needs. The law forbade the use of artel funds to purchase clothing or repair equipment. SVP (1838),chast’ 4, Kn. 4, st. 86–121. The state provided cloth for uniforms, and the troops used each piece of equipment or item of clothing for a legally specified period, after which the government replaced it.SVM, vol. 5, pt. 1, pp. 90–91.

48. TsGVIA. fond 801, opis’ 61. delo 34. l. 509.

49. Kniazhnin and Vel'iaminov, both aged 37. were from the nobility. Kniazhnin had entered the service in 1784 and reached his present rank of colonel in 1810. Vel'iaminov had entered service from the elite Corps of Pages in 17% as a lieutenant and reached the rank of major general in 1807.Both had served in battles and had been decorated.

50. TsGVIA, fond 801, opis’ 73, delo 32. l. 138–72. 180–94. and 205–15.

51. TsGVIA, fond 801, opis’ 73, delo 32, l. 138–42ob. 184–86.

52. Ibid., l. 138–42ob.

53. Ibid., l. 190–94.