^{page 291 note 1} See Scotus, John DunsOpera Omnia ed. Wadding-Vives, . Vol.13, Paris 1893, pp. 446–471Google Scholar. A passage on pp. 460b–461b is to be found (with translation) in Wolter, Allan B., Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Selected and translated with an Introduction by Wolter, Allan B., O.F.M., Washington D.C. 1986, pp. 172–175Google Scholar. In this paper the translations from the Latin are my own. In Wadding-Vives vol. 13 pp. 444b–445a Peter Lombard is quoted: ‘Alibi vero dicitur, peccatum fieri tribus modis, scilicet cogitatu, verbo, et opere; unde Hieronymus super Ezechielem: “Tria generalia delicta sunt, quibus humanum subjacet genus; aut enim cogitatione, aut sermone, aut opere peccamus.”’ Ibid. p. 446a Scotus asks ‘Utrum peccatum possit esse in cogitatione?’

^{page 292 note 2} Wadding XIII, 451a: Non videtur quod subsit [cogitatio] imperio voluntatis, quia omnis volitio requirit necessario intellectionem naturaliter priorem, licet simul duratione.

^{page 293 note 3} See Wolter, pp. 180–3. For discussion of Scotus on will see: Bonansea, , B.M., , O.F.M., , ‘Duns Scotus's voluntarism’ in John Duns Scotus 1265–1965, eds. Ryan, J.K. and Bonansea, B.M., Washington, D.C. 1965Google Scholar. The article is reprinted in Bonansea, , B.M., , O.F.M., , Man and his Approach to God in John Duns Scotus, New York 1983Google Scholar. See also Broadie, A., The Shadow of Scotus, Edinburgh 1995, chs. 2–3 for extended discussion.Google Scholar

^{page 293 note 4} … voluntas naturalis, secundum quod formale importat, non est potentia vel voluntas, sed inclinatio voluntatis et tendentia qua tendit in perfectionem passive recipiendum. See Wolter, p. 182.

^{page 294 note 5} For Scotus on rational and irrational powers see Wolter, pp. 144–173. Wolter's text is a revised version of Scotus Opera Omnia, ed. Wadding, vol. VII, 606–17.

^{page 294 note 6} Meta. IX, 1046 b 1–4: ‘It is clear that some potencies will be nonrational but others will be with reason. Hence all the arts or productive sciences are potencies.’

^{page 294 note 7} Mrta. IX, 1048 a 5–7.

^{page 297 note 8} Wadding XIII, 454b: Dicitur igitur quod aliqua intellectio vel cogitatio est a voluntate imperata; et cum possit distingui cogitatio generaliter in primam et secundam, de prima probo quod non potest esse in potestate voluntatis, quia aliqua cogitatio praecedit necessario omne velle (saltern natura); sed quod praecedit omne velle, et est prius, natura saltern, non est in potestate nostra.

^{page 298 note 9} Wadding XIII, 455b–6a: Sed de secunda cogitatione videtur difficile quod sit in potestate nostra cum ad nihil videatur move re voluntas nisi ad cognitum, et dicitur… quod sufficil cognitio illius obiecti remissa, vel quod voluntas remittat intellectum ad cogitationem inexistentem sibi.et tune illa cogitatione remissa occurrit aliud cogilabile.

^{page 298 note 10} Wadding XIII, 456b: Bene enim concedo quod voluntas potest remittere cogitationem inexistentem; sed tune a casu accidit, quod occurrit aliud intelligibile, vel cogitatio alterius intelligibilis, vel eiusdem aliter quam prius, quod quidem intelligibile moveat intellectum et voluntatem, et sic solum casualiter et non per se esset cogitatio in potestate voluntatis. Praeterea, non salvat propositum, quia quantumcumque voluntas moveat ad aliud, remittendo priorem cogitationem, hoc tamen non est per se ad aliquod determinatum, quia hoc solum est ad phantasma fortius, quod fortius movet, et hoc per accidens, inquantum scilicet remitdt illam cogitationem.

^{page 300 note 11} For discussion of latitudo formarum see Clagett, Marshall, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (London 1961)Google Scholar; Sylla, Edith, ‘Medieval concepts of the latitude of forms: The Oxford calculators’, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du mcyen âge, 40 (1973).Google Scholar

^{page 300 note 12} Wadding XIII, 460b: una intellectione perfecta et distincta existente in intellectu, multae intellectiones indistinctae et imperfectae possunt inesse.

^{page 301 note 13} Wadding XHIb, 460b: si hoc est possibile in sensu, multo magis in intellectu.

^{page 302 note 14} Wadding XIII, 460b: intellectione inexistente, licet non cognita ut obiectum, potest voluntas velle et complacere sibi in obiecto illius intellectionis, et in ilia intellectione, et non complacere sibi.

^{page 302 note 15} Wadding XIII, 461a: voluntate complacente intellectioni, intellectio firmatur et intenditur, ipsa autem non complacente vel nolente, infirmatur et remittitur.

^{page 304 note 16} See fn. 2 above.

^{page 306 note 17} Wadding XIII, 469a: si cogitatio placet et continuatur, non propter cogitatum, sed ut per earn quis ad finem debitum deducatur, non est peccatum.

^{page 306 note 18} Wadding XIII, 468b: et hoc non solum de carnalibus, ut cogitare luxuriant, sedetiam in actibus intellectus respectu aliorum obiectorum, ut imaginari et moraricum delectione in cogitatione mortis inimicorum.

^{page 309 note 19} The phrase occurs in the course of Scotus's investigation of the claim that the will is necessitated: Impressio facta ab objecto in voluntate est pondus, et inclinatio; sed omne pondus inclinans necessitat inclinatum suum, nisi inclinatum renitatur, sed non renitatur, nisi per actum, etc. Collationes XVI, n. 3, in Wadding, vol. V, p. 209b. Scotus replies: sed impressum in voluntate est tantum inclinans, ideo voluntas nunquam necessitatur ab obiecto. ibid. 210b.

^{page 310 note 20} I am grateful to Dr Voula Tsouna for valuable discussion of a draft of this paper. Miss P. S. Martin made a number of suggestions, gladly received, on matters of style. The paper first saw the light of day as a contribution to a conference ‘The Scottish Tradition of Philosophy’, held at the University of Aberdeen in June 1995 as part of the University's quincentenary celebrations. Discussions with the participants greatly helped me to sharpen up my views on sinful thought.