Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
As a consequence of its dismal experience in the War of Cambrai (1509-1517), the Venetian Republic adopted a military policy of avoiding battlefield encounters. As a commander in the war and as doge of Venice after 1523, Andrea Gritti was the foremost proponent of this strategy, earning for himself the appellation of "Fabius Maximus," the Roman general who opposed Hannibal by delay and defense in the Second Punic War. In the 1520s, the Republic aspired to play the role of a great power — or at least that of an independent, balancing force between France and the Spanish-Habsburg Empire; but its refusal to commit its troops to battle fatally weakened the political coalitions opposing Charles V and thereby significantly contributed to the rise of Habsburg hegemony in Italy. A major step toward Charles V's triumph was the infamous Sack of Rome in 1527, a calamity for which the Fabian policy of Venice bears some responsibility.
The ideas in this paper grew out of a cordial debate with Elisabeth G. Gleason on the role of Venice in the Italian Wars; I am gready indebted for her encouragement and criticism. The following abbreviations are used in the notes: CSP-Spain — Calendar of State Papers, England and Spain, Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere. CSP-Venice — Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts existingin the Archives and Collections of Venice and in other Libraries of Northern Italy, 1520-1526.