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Powers, possibility, and the essential cosmological argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2021

Ben Cook Open the ORCID record for Ben Cook [Opens in a new window]
Ben Cook*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA
*
Corresponding author: Ben Cook, email: [email protected]
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Abstract

One classical version of cosmological argument, defended famously by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, deduces the existence of a First Cause from the existence of a particular sort of causal series: one that is ‘essentially ordered’. This argument has received renewed defence in recent work by Feser (2013), Cohoe (2013), and Kerr (2015). I agree with these philosophers that the argument is sound. I believe, however, that the standard defence given of the ECA in these philosophers can be complemented by a formulation that appeals to the powers theory of possibility. This approach to possibility has been defended in recent years by, for example, Pruss (2002), Jacobs (2010), and Vetter (2015). In this article, I show how this modal theory allows us to defend the ECA in a way that is dialectically advantageous as well as clarifying.

Keywords

Powerspossibilitycosmological argumentessential ordercausation
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 2022 , pp. 745 - 758
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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