^{page 67 note 1} Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932), p. 206.Google Scholar

^{page 67 note 2} Gudmunsen, Chris, Wittgenstein and Buddhism (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), p. viii.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 67 note 3} These texts exist only in Chinese. Chung-lun and Shih–erh–men–lun were written by Nāgārjuna, and Pai–lun by his disciple, Āryadeva (c. 163–263).

^{page 67 note 4} After the fifth century, Indian Mādhyamika Buddhism was divided into two schools: the Prāsangika and the Svātantrika.

^{page 68 note 1} See Narain, Harsh, ‘Śūnyavāda: A Reinterpretation’, Philosophy East and West, XIII1, 4 (January 1964), 311–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also De Jong, Jan W., ‘Emptiness’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, II, (December 1972), 7–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and W. L. King, 'Śūnyatā as a ‘Master–symbol’, Numen, International Review for the History of Religions, xvii (August 1970), 95–104.Google Scholar

^{page 68 note 2} Murti, T. R. V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 297.Google Scholar

^{page 68 note 3} Streng, Frederick J., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 139.Google Scholar

^{page 69 note 1} Waldo, Ives, ‘Nāgārjuna and Analytic Philosophy, II’, Philosophy East and West, XXVIII, 3 (July 1978), 288.Google Scholar Chris Gudmunsen also states, ‘Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein, by contrast, stand out as defending the “mundane and customary” uses of words,’ op. cit. p. 87.

^{page 69 note 2} Chris, GudmunsenGoogle Scholar, Ibid. p. 115.

^{page 70 note 1} The Twelve Gate Treatise, IV, I.

^{page 70 note 2} Ibid. VIII, 164b.

^{page 70 note 3} Chi-tsang, , The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises (San-lun–hsüan–i: Taishö, 1852), p. Ia.Google Scholar

^{page 70 note 4} Chi–tsang, , The Meaning of the Twofold Truth (Erh–ti–i: Taishō, 1854), pp. 79c, 80aGoogle Scholar, 99b and 107a.

^{page 70 note 5} Ibid. pp. 82, 86a, 87, 108c and 103b. The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, p. 12.

^{page 70 note 6} Chi–tsang, , The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, p. 91c.Google Scholar

^{page 70 note 7} Chi–tsang, , The Meaning of the Twofold Truth, p. 91a.Google Scholar See also Ibid. pp. 94 and 114.

^{page 70 note 8} Ibid. p. 78b, 79 b, 88–90 and 114b. The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, pp. 4C and 7.

^{page 70 note 9} Ibid.pp. 89c and 93b.

^{page 71 note 1} Ibid. pp. 79C and 80c.

^{page 71 note 2} Chi-Bang, , The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, pp. 1a, 5aGoogle Scholar, 6a, 7–8, 11b, 12 and 13.

^{page 71 note 3} Chi–Bang, , The Meaning of the Twofold Truth, p. 22.Google Scholar

^{page 71 note 4} Chi–tsang, , The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, p. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 71 note 5} Chi–Bang, , The Meaning of the Twofold Truth, pp. 79c, 98cGoogle Scholar, 101 C and 102.

^{page 71 note 6} Ibid. p. 79b.

^{page 71 note 7} See Miyamoto, Shōson, ‘The Buddha's First Sermon and the Original Patterns of the Middle Way’, Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū, XIII, I (1965), 855–845Google Scholar, and Chūdō shisō oyobi sono hattatsu (Middle Way Thought and Its Development), (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1944).Google Scholar

^{page 72 note 1} Theodore de Bary, Wm., The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan, p. 71Google Scholar; it was translated from the Buddhacarita, Sanskrit text as ed., by Johnson, E. H. (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1935), pp. 140–2.Google Scholar

^{page 72 note 2} This is the opening statement of the Middle Treatise.

^{page 72 note 3} Chi-tsang, , The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, p. 6.Google Scholar

^{page 73 note 1} See the Twelve Gate Treatise, II, 162a and xi, 167a. See also the Hui–cheng–lun (Taishō, 1631), 30 and 60.

^{page 73 note 2} See Theodore de Bary, Wm., ed., Sources of Indian Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), I, 31–4.Google Scholar

^{page 74 note 1} ‘Characteristics’ or ‘attributes’ here refer to physical appearances or physical bodies.

^{page 74 note 2} The Middle Treatise, xxvin: 5–6 and xviii: Ia.

^{page 74 note 3} Ibid. xxvn: 4, 7, XVIII: Ib and IX: 3, 5.

^{page 74 note 4} Āryadeva had a good discussion of this in the Hundred Treatise, II, and see also the Middle Treatise, IX.

^{page 75 note 1} Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Smith, Norman Kemp (New York: St Martin's Press, 1965), B312, p. 273.Google Scholar

^{page 75 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 75 note 3} Ibid. B311, p. 272.

^{page 75 note 4} Ibid. B307, p. 268.

^{page 75 note 5} Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, translated by Mahaffy, J. P. and Bernard, J. H. (London, 1889), 13, remark 2.Google Scholar

^{page 75 note 6} See Kant, , Critique of Pure Reason, B391–2, pp. 323–4.Google Scholar

^{page 75 note 7} For Nāgārjuna's critical analysis of the concept of God, see Cheng, Hsueh-li, ‘Nāgārjuna's Approach to the Problem of the Existence of God’, Religious Studies, XII (June 1976), 207–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 75 note 8} Kant, , op. cit. B 147, p. 162.Google Scholar

^{page 76 note 1} Ibid. B294, p. 256.

^{page 76 note 2} Ibid. B33, p. 65.

^{page 76 note 3} See the Twelve Gate Treatise, I. See also the Middle Treatise, 1: 2, 13 and 15.

^{page 76 note 4} The Middle Treatise, III: 3 and 4.

^{page 77 note 1} Murti, T. R. V., op. cit. p. 294.Google Scholar

^{page 77 note 2} Kant, , op. cit. B350, p. 297.Google Scholar

^{page 77 note 3} H. Kern, La Vallée Poussin, Max Walleser, A. B. Keith and Harsh Narain interpreted the Mādhyamika philosophy of emptiness in this way. For example, Harsh Narain recently claimed that ‘(Mädhyamika philosophy) is absolute nihilism rather than a form of absolutism or Absolutistic monism’. ‘Śūnyavāda: A Reinterpretation’, Philosophy East and West, XIII, 4 (January 1964), p: 311.Google Scholar

^{page 77 note 4} The Middle Treatise, xxiv: 7.

^{page 77 note 5} Ibid. XIII: 8. Nāgārjuna also said, ‘Nothing could be asserted to be śūnya (empty), aśūnya (non-empty), both śūnya and aśūnya, and neither śūnya nor aśūnya. They are stated as provisionary names.’ Ibid. XXII: II.

^{page 78 note 1} Chi-tsang, , A Commentary on the Middle Treatise (Taishō, 1824), pp. 111–13Google Scholar; The Profound Meaning of Three Treatises, pp. 5–6 and 10–11; The Meaning of Twofold Truth, pp. 82, 87a, 91a, 94, 108c and 114b.

^{page 78 note 2} Kant said, ‘The transcendental illusion (metaphysical speculation)… does not cease even after it has been detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism’, op. cit. B353, p. 299.

^{page 78 note 3} In India philosophical study of the nature of words and its relation to meaning occurred in the Jaimini-sūtra, the Nyāya–sūtra and the Vaiśesika–sūtra from 500 B.C. to A.D. 200.

^{page 78 note 4} See Sharma, Dhirendra, The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic (Hague: Mouton, 1969), p. 23Google Scholar, and Radhakrishnan, S. and Moore, C. A., ed., A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 356, 386Google Scholar, 425 and 487. See also Pandeya, R. C., The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), pp. 188 and 206.Google Scholar

^{page 78 note 5} Generally speaking, the Mimāmsā School is a representative of the latter view and maintains that a word refers to a genius and only indirectly to a particular. The Nyāya School is a representative of the former view and holds that a word refers to an individual, the class residing in the individual and its configuration or form.

^{page 79 note 1} The Middle Treatise, xxv: 24.

^{page 79 note 2} Ibid. xxii: I b.

^{page 79 note 3} The Hui-cheng–lun, 22, 23, 55 and 57.

^{page 79 note 4} Ibid. 25.

^{page 79 note 5} Seng-chao, , Chao-lun, p. 152c.Google Scholar

^{page 80 note 1} Seng-jui, , ‘Preface’ in the Twelve Gate Treatise, p. 159b.Google Scholar

^{page 80 note 2} The Middle Treatise, xxvii: 30.

^{page 80 note 3} Gudmunsen, Chris, op. cit. pp. 68–9.Google Scholar

^{page 80 note 4} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, translated by Anscombe, G. E. M. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 20.Google Scholar He said, ‘Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? - In use it is alive.’ Ibid. p. 128.

^{page 80 note 5} Fann, K. T., Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 68.Google Scholar

^{page 81 note 1} Wittgenstein, , op. cit. p. 45.Google Scholar

^{page 81 note 2} Ibid. pp. 51–2.

^{page 81 note 3} Ibid. p. 48.

^{page 81 note 4} Ibid. p. 47.

^{page 81note 5} Ibid. p. 49. Wittgenstein also said, ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.’ Ibid. p. 47.

^{page 81 note 6} According to Henry Le Roy Finch, Wittgenstein's dualistic way of thinking is essentially Kantian: ‘Kant's innovation, the presuppositional method, dividing the world into the a priori and the a posteriori, is capable, we now see, of replacing the Cartesian division of inner and outerentirely. This is what Wittgenstein's philosophy showed, for it carried the Kantian method to the point of wiping out the inner world of private objects altogether… Wittgenstein, who put all meaning into the presuppositional (even when, as inthe later philosophy, this was regarded as only an aspect of the phenomenal), is the ultimate Kantian…’ Wittgenstein - The Later Philosophy: A Exposition of the Philosophical Investigations (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977), p. 248.Google Scholar

^{page 82 note 1} See Wittgenstein, , On Certainty, ed. Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H., trans. Paul, D. and Amscombe, G. E. M. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), pp. 115, 219Google Scholar, 341, 354, 450, 519 and 625.

^{page 82 note 2} Wittgenstein described ordinary certainty as ‘the foundation of all judging’ (Ibid. pp. 308 and 614); ‘the foundation of all operating with thoughts’ (Ibid. p. 401); ‘the substratum of all my inquiring and asserting’ (Ibid. pp. 88, 151 and 162).

^{page 82 note 3} The Twelve Gate Treatise, VI: I.

^{page 83 note 1} Ibid. V: I. See also the Middle Treatise, V: 1–5.

^{page 83 note 2} Wittgenstein stated that ‘It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case.’ Philosophical Investigations, p. 56.

^{page 84 note 1} The Middle Treatise, XVIII: 5b.

^{page 84 note 2} Chi-tsang, , The Meaning of the Twofold Truth, p. 94c.Google Scholar

^{page 85 note 1} Seng-chao, , op. cit. p. 153c.Google Scholar

^{page 85 note 2} For the detailed discussion of the influence of Mādhyamika thought upon Zen, see Cheng, Hsueh-li, ‘Zen and San-lun Mādhyamika Thought: Exploring the Theoretical Foundation of Zen Teachings and Practices’, Religious Studies, XV (September 1979), 343–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar