After 32 years of conservative rule, it was more than the Queensland government that changed on 7 December 1989 — it was the whole state of Queensland. Driving the reform process across a wide cross-section of government policy (and seeing Queenslanders respond) left a legacy of which we who formed part of that government are proud.

In our first week in office, we purchased additional tertiary places for Queensland. This underlined our commitment to education and sent the signal that our government believed the future was ‘up the food chain’, and that we would therefore invest in education. We abolished the Special Branch of Queensland Police — a symbol of the misuse of the police service by the previous government. We also abolished imperial honours because we believed that Australia should have its own system of recognising our citizens.

In 1989, corruption inquiry commissioner Tony Fitzgerald, QC gave a qualified tick to the use of government media units and press secretaries in his landmark report, which ushered Queensland into an age of accountability.

After an inquiry that included 238 public sitting days and 339 witnesses, his view was that it was both ‘legitimate and necessary’ for ministers, departments and public instrumentalities to employ staff to help keep the public informed. He warned, however, against control and manipulation of information and counselled there was no legitimate justification for politically motivated propaganda funded by taxpayers:

Australia's entrenched liberal democratic traditions of a free media, fair and frequent elections and robust public debate might encourage outside observers to assume Australia is subject to frequent changes in government. The reality is very different: Australian politics have instead been ‘largely unchanged’ since the beginning of our bipolar party system in 1910 (Aitkin 1977, p. 1), with Australians re-electing incumbents on numerous occasions for decades on end. The obvious federal example is the 23-year dominance of the Liberal-Country Party Coalition, first elected in 1949 and re-endorsed at the following eight House of Representatives elections. Even more protracted electoral hegemonies have been found at state level, including Labor's control of Tasmania (1934–82, except for 1969–72) and New South Wales (1941–65), and the Liberals' hold on Victoria (1952–82) and South Australia (1938–65, most unusually under one Premier, Thomas Playford). It is therefore not a question of whether parties can enjoy excessively long hegemonies in Australia; it is instead one of how they achieve it.

The articulation of a ‘Smart State’ strategy by the Beattie and Bligh governments since 1998 represents, in large part, the continuation of a long Queensland tradition, in which governments have secured legitimacy by fostering economic growth and employment. For Queensland Labor, however, ‘Smart State’ programs also represented a key survival strategy as Labor's historic base among workers employed in agriculture, mining and manufacturing shrank into political insignificance. By 2009–10, these three sectors together employed only one worker in seven (Queensland Treasury 2010, p. 16). For this reason, in coming to office in September 2007, Anna Bligh sought both to continue and transcend the ‘Smart State’ strategy of her predecessor. In a series of policy documents launched with considerable fanfare in 2008–09 — ‘Towards Q2’, the ‘Smart Industry Policy and Decision Making Framework’ and the ‘Queensland Renewable Energy Plan’ — Bligh outlined her own vision for Queensland. Central to this vision was the embracing of a ‘green’ agenda — one that tapped into concerns shared by many of Queensland's growing cohort of middle-class professionals. In her first two years in office, Bligh pledged to continue the $9 billion Water Grid in the state's south-east corner, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by one-third, spend $300 million on ‘clean coal’ power generation and provide rebates for households installing solar hot water systems. All of this added considerably to the budget commitments made under Beattie. In highlighting its program for Queensland in 2008, the Bligh government proudly declared that it was ‘set to invest $17 billion’ in the ensuing year (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2008, p. 10).

A generation ago, Queensland's economy relied heavily — as did the standing of the state government — upon a booming resources sector, a bountiful agricultural sector and a still-growing tourist market. ‘Rocks and crops’ (to use a favourite phrase of Peter Beattie's) were mainstays of the state's economic activity, and had long underpinned the government's investment, development and budgetary planning. While to a large extent the same might be said today, critical changes have taken place in the local economy in the intervening period, cultivated by successive state administrations with the express aim of diversifying an economy that was overwhelmingly geared towards primary production. Now it can be argued that Queensland's economy has metamorphosed into a modern, knowledge-based economy that demands greater emphasis on technology, expertise and innovation — what Premier Peter Beattie liked to promote with his catch-all phrase ‘Smart State’. But how effective was this push for diversification in renewing the state's economic foundations? Since the advent of the Goss Labor government in late 1989, has Queensland really moved from a ‘farm and quarry’ to a ‘smart’ economy?

Tourism has been a major driver of economic and social development in Queensland since the end of World War II. In 2011, tourism's direct contribution to the economy was estimated to be $7.8 billion, and it generated direct employment of an estimated 118,000 full-time equivalent jobs (Queensland Tourism 2011). The multiplier effects of tourism account for another $9.2 billion, making it the most important component of the state's service sector. These figures suggest that the approach adopted by the Labor government over the last two decades to manage and develop Queensland tourism has generally been positive. However, a closer examination of recent trends and criticisms reveals that visitor demand has flat-lined: the industry is struggling under the weight of global and local pressures, investment has slowed, and there are issues of stagnating demand, competitiveness, service quality, industry capacity and innovation. Moreover, Queensland is losing international market share compared with New South Wales and Victoria (Tourism Research Australia 2011). Given that governments have a key role to play in creating and maintaining policy conditions that contribute to both a healthy economy and social well-being, what have been the Queensland Labor government's contributions to tourism, and what are the key challenges into the future?

Soon after Johannes Bjelke-Petersen became Premier of Queensland in 1968, companies in which he held shares were given six-year leases to explore for oil on the Great Barrier Reef. The following year, ministers in his government accepted parcels of Comalco shares. So did senior bureaucrats and the Premier's wife. Criticism at the time was muted because Labor politicians and some journalists had also taken shares (Whitton 1989, p. 19). Bjelke-Petersen was adamant that he had done nothing wrong — a feeling that presumably was shared by other beneficiaries of Comalco's largesse (Wear 2002, p. 93). Because it is inconceivable that a saga of such blatant conflict of interest would be played out in today's Queensland, there is a temptation to tell a simple ‘before and after Fitzgerald’ story of public accountability and administrative reform. Considered analysis suggests, however, that the reality is much more complex. There was progress, but there was also backsliding. Some reforms — such as those to the electoral system — were significant and enduring. Others — such as whistleblower and FOI legislation — were fairly quickly watered down. There was a lack of long-term interest in public administration, parliament retained its usual place on the margins of Queensland's political institutions and executive power remained relatively unconstrained. Cases of corruption continued to emerge.

An account of cultural policy-making in Queensland since the election of the Goss Labor government in 1989 requires revisiting the rise and fall of what Stevenson (2000) has called the ‘cultural policy moment’ in Australia.

This period, from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, was characterised by political and scholarly interest in the civic and symbolic utility of culture, and in the outcomes achieved through its management. The cultural policy moment was produced simultaneously within government, the cultural sector and the academy. Within government, it was characterised by a new and highly visible interest in managing culture and (through it) the citizenry (O'Regan 2002). Within the academy, the cultural policy project was raised by Tim Rowse in Arguing the Arts (1985) and developed by the Institute for Cultural Policy Studies at Griffith University through the work of Ian Hunter, Tony Bennett, Toby Miller, Colin Mercer, Jenny Craik, Tom O'Regan and Gay Hawkins in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Stuart Cunningham's Framing Culture (1992) focused existing debate within Australian cultural studies over the place of policy-based approaches within the discipline.

Since the Australian Labor Party came to power in Queensland in 1989, social attitudes towards the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) community have undergone significant change. In 1989, the decriminalisation of male-to-male homosexuality was the subject of intense debate, even within the ALP, which ultimately put forward the legislation. Today, policies have evolved considerably, with the Queensland ALP endorsing gay marriage and Anna Bligh, the current Queensland Labor Premier, releasing a YouTube video for the ‘It Gets Better’ campaign to give hope to LGBT youth experiencing harassment and perhaps contemplating suicide. During Labor's time in power, apart from the decriminalisation of male-to-male sexual activity, same-sex relationship laws have been reformed, altruistic surrogacy has been introduced and the presumption of lesbian parenthood has been extended. Some areas of LGBTIQ policy are still being contested, however, with debates surrounding civil unions, an equal age of consent and the existence of the ‘gay panic’ defence continuing. This article considers the progression and limits of these policies and areas of LGBTIQ reform that are still being disputed.

Debates over water and related issues have become prominent in twenty-first century Australia, where global warming is combining with climatic extremes to produce a volatile public and politics. The specific context of the Gold Coast Desalination Project, to be analysed here, was a prolonged drought earlier in the decade that reduced dams in densely populated South-East Queensland to unprecedented levels. This situation in turn triggered water rationing and uncertainty about the capacity of existing infrastructure to supply one of the fastest-growing areas of Australia. During the crisis, the Queensland state government was criticised in the press for mismanagement of water resources before the drought, and for the inadequate water situation, which ultimately led to the construction of a desalination plant. The period of this study covers the plant's construction and implementation. Capable of providing up to 125 million litres of clean, fresh drinking water to the South-East Queensland region every day, the desalination plant — which remains politically contentious — began in 2006 and was operational in early 2009.