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The Minority Voters' Promised Land?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2022

Joseph L. Bernd
Joseph L. Bernd*
Affiliation:
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
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Extract

The novel scheme for proportional representation developed by Professor Steven J. Brams (PS, Summer, 1970, pp. 321–335) has at least two major advantages in comparison with most electoral plans:

1 The plan permits the voter to give effect to the intensity of his support for individual candidates. Each voter has at his disposal a number of votes equal to the number of offices to be filled, but, assuming that fractions are not allowed, the voter has as many alternative means for distributing his votes as there are mathematical combinations for the set of numbers represented by the number of votes to be cast. For example, let us assume that six seats on the APSA board are to be filled. The voter may cast his six votes, one for each of six candidates, or he may cast six votes for a single candidate, or he may distribute his votes equally or unequally among several candidates.

2 Professor Brams presents a mathematical analysis to demonstrate that the plan under specified conditions facilitates representation of differing interests, including minority interests, in rough proportion to their numerical strengths, provided the interests are effectively organized, have accurate information as to the voting strengths of the competing interests, and are able to make and implement maximizing choices regarding the voting decisions. As in gaming, the aim of such organized effort is to maximize the chances of the opposition electing only a minimum number of its chosen candidates. For example, if three candidates are to be elected, a minority group able to poll a united vote of 26 per cent is able to muster 3 x 26 = 78 votes. If the other 74 per cent of the votes are united in organized opposition, they may divide their 3 x 74 = 222 votes in the following alternative arrangements:

a) 222 votes for one candidate.

b) 111 votes for each of two candidates.

c) 74 votes for each of three candidates.

It is evident that the minority, if able to concentrate its effort behind a single candidate (3 x 26 = 78 votes), will elect its candidate in spite of any strategy which the majority interest may choose.

Type
Research Article
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 3 , Issue 4 , Fall 1970 , pp. 645 - 649
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1970

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References

1 Grateful acknowledgement is made to my colleague, Professor James F. Herndon, who read an early draft of this paper and offered valuable critical commentary. I am of course solely responsible for all statements of fact and conclusion.

2 See the author's previous models combining weighted voting and proportional representation – “Equal Protection of Voting Rights: The Logic of One Person, One Vote,” in Beck, Carl, ed., Law and Justice: Essays in Honor of Robert S. Rankin (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 133–148 Google Scholar; see also “Some Problems in the Theory of Political Coalitions,” Virginia Tech Pamphlet (November 7, 1967), co-authored with Michael Weinstein; and see “Additional Votes for Solons Seen Re-districting Solution,” Dallas Times Herald (July 22, 1964), p. 32A.

3 It is possible that for many the introduction of decimal points into a deliberative body is an unforgivable sin which includes the notion of the myth of excessive complexity. The plan is uncomplicated – it is political science which is complex.