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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2017
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3 Such as Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew Guzman, Ryan Goodman, Rachel Brewster, Joel Trachtman—add to list and cites of their work
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9 Id.
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11 Strategies alter with repeated games, as Axelrod pointed out in 1984. If parties do engage in a cost-benefit analysis, their winning strategy must change in light of the expectation of multiple games with the same parties. and international life is filled with such repetition. As for expected “punishment”—we now begin to realize that “punishment” not only consists of treaty-based sanctions but a wide range of subtler enforcement measures, such as dispute resolution mechanisms. Andrew Guzman’s work on reputation has helped this process develop. The sharp differential between our “managerial” school of compliance and the “enforcement” school has begun to erode.