* See Report of the Secretary General of Feb. 11, 1957, par. 20 (TJ.N. Doc. A/3527).

1 In his classical book, The Problem of the Twentieth Century (1930), Lord David Davies traces the history of international police forces all the way back to the Confederation of Delos (477 B.C.). For further bibliography on the subject, see Sohn, Cases on World Law 852–853 (1950).

2 See, e.g., the French proposals of 1932 for an international air force, League of Nations Pub.1932.IX.63, pp. 113–115.

3 1 Walters, A History of the League of Nations 105–109, 140–143 (1952).

4 idem 536–540, 592 n.

5 Ibid. 592–593.

6 Report by the Military Staff Committee, April 30, 1947; Security Council, 2d Year, Official Eecords, Spec. Supp. No. 1, pp. 1–8, 11–12.

7 See Working Paper by the U.N. Secretariat, of Feb. 9, 1948, on the U.N. Palestine Commission, pp. 7–11 (Doe. A/AC.21/13).

8 Report of the Mediator, Sept. 16, 1948, pp. 4–5 (Doc. S/1025). For a Soviet criticism of this action and the reply of the Secretary General, see Security Council, 3rd Year, Official Becords, No. 93, pp. 32–34.

9 Annual Report of the Secretary General, 1947–1948, General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1, pp. xvii-xviii (Doc. A/565). See also Lie, In the Cause of Peace 192-193 (New York, 1954).

10 United Nations Guard: Report of the Secretary General, Sept. 28, 1948 (Doe. A/656).

11 General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Ad Hoc Political Committee, pp. 23–47; Res. 270 (III) of April 29, 1949, in General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Pt. II, Official Records, Resolutions, p. 16 (Doc. A/900).

12 Report of the Special Committee on a United Nations Guard, Oct. 10, 1949, General Assembly, 4th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 13, pp. 2–4, 6–7 (Doc. A/959); Res. 297 (IV), ibid., Resolutions, pp. 21-22 (Doc. A/1251).

13 Doc. S/1588; Eeport of the Security Council to the General Assembly, 1949–1950, General Assembly, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 2, pp. 25–26 (Doc. A/1361).

14 Res. 376 (V) of Oct. 7, 1950; General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 20, pp. 9–10 (Doc. A/1775).

15 Res. 377A (V); General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 20, pp. 10–12 (Doc. A/1775).

16 General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 13, pp. 37–43 (Doc. A/1891).

17 General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 13, p. 5 (Doc. A/1891); ibid., 7th Sess., Supp. No. 17, pp. 12–13 (Doc. A/2215).

18 Resolutions 997 and 998; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1, p. 2 (Doe. A/3354).

19 Docs. A/3289 and A/3302; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Records, Annexes, Agenda Item 5, pp. 14, 19–23.

20 Resolutions 1000 and 1001; Ibid., Supp. No. 1, pp. 2–3 (Doc. A/3354).

21 Doc. A/3375, Annex; General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Annexes, Agenda Item 66, pp. 9–10.

22 General Assembly Res. 1121 (XI); ibid., Supp. No. 17, p. 61 (Doe. A/3572).

23 Doc. A/3526; ibid., Annexes, Agenda Item 66, pp. 52–57.

24 General Assembly Res. 1126 (XI); ibid., Supp. No. 17, p. 62.

25 Doc. ST/SGB/UNEF/1, annexed to Doe. A/3552.

26 For instance, Res. 1122 (XI) of Nov. 26, 1956; Res. 1089 (XI) of Dec. 21, 1956; and Res. 1090 (XI) of Feb. 27, 1957; ibid., Supp. No. 17, pp. 46–47, 61–62. See also Docs. A/3383, A/C.5/683, A/3402, A/3456, A/3560 and A/3560/Add.l; ibid., Annexes, Agenda Item 66, pp. 13–15, 23–25, 31–33, 62–70.

27 Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Tears 68–88 (Utrecht, 1954).

28 49 A.J.I.L. Supp. 194–199 (1955).

29 See pp. 207–208, 209, above.

30 Doc. S/3736; Security Council, 11th Year, Official Eecords, 755th Meeting, pp. 4–14.

31 Report of the Collective Measures Committee, 1951; General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Eecords, Supp. No. 13, pp. 23–24 (Doc. A/1891).

32 Cf. Uniting for Peace Eesolution, par. 8; General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Eecords, Supp. No. 20, p. 8 (Doc. A/1775).

33 When the Israeli delegate pointed out that the functions of the officers of the Truce Supervision Organization were not compatible with their new functions as members of the command of the Force, the Secretary General replied that the Chief of Staff would resign from the Truce Organization upon his appointment as Chief of Command of the Force. General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meetings, p. 83.

34 Idem 127. Despite these objections the members of the Soviet bloe did not vote against the resolutions establishing the Force; instead they abstained on all the important votes.

35 Doc. A/3302, par. 9. See also the statement by Mr. Urrutia (Colombia), General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Eecords, Plenary Meetings, p. 87. The Secretary General also expressed the view that his report on the appointment of the Command of the United Nations Emergency Force was based on the “legal fact created by the vote taken … by the Assembly.” Idem 83.

36 General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Becords, Supp. No. 13, p. 34 (Doe. A/1891).

37 Doc. A/3302, par. 4.

38 Resolutions 1000 and 1001; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Becords, Supp. No. 1, pp. 2–3.

39 Ibid.

40 Res. 1001; idem 3.

41 Doc. ST/SGB/UNEF/l, Regulation 6.

42 Doc. A/3552. Similarly, the agreement between the United Nations and Egypt describes the U.N. Emergency Eoree as “an organ of the General Assembly of the United Nations established in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter.” Doc. A/3526, p. 2.

43 Doc. ST/SGB/UNEF/1, Begulation 15.

44 Ibid., Regulation 11.

45 See Ees. 1001; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Eecords, Supp. No. 1, p. 3.

46 Doc. A/3302, pars. 4 and 9. It has already been pointed out that the Soviet Union considered that only the Security Council could have set up an international armed force. General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meetings, p. 127.

47 Ibid. 99.

48 Ibid. 99–100. As this sentence was not deleted, the Philippines abstained from voting on the relevant paragraph of Res. 1001. Ibid. 128.

49 Ibid. 115, 119.

50 Res. 998; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 1, p. 2.

51 Report of the Secretary General of Nov. 6, 1956, par. 8 (Doc. A/3302).

52 Doc. A/3302, Annex 7. General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Records, Annexes, Agenda Item 5, p. 23. See also the statement of the delegate of Syria, General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meetings, p. 102. On the contrary, the delegate of the United Kingdom contended that the Force should remain in the area until the Palestine and Suez Canal problems have been solved. Idem 113.

53 Doc. A/3302, par. 8. As this point was restated later by the Secretary General, the use of military force by the United Nations must “be impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial.” Doc. A/3512, par. 5(b); General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Eecords, Annexes, Agenda Item 66, p. 47.

54 As emphasized by the Foreign Minister of Egypt, the “United Nations Emergency Force is in Egypt, not as an occupation force, not as a replacement for the invaders, not to clear the Canal of obstructions, not to resolve any question or settle any problem, be it in relation to the Suez Canal, to Palestine or to any other matter; it is not there to infringe upon Egyptian sovereignty in any fashion or to any extent, but, on the contrary, to give expression to the determination of the United Nations to put an end to the aggression committed against Egypt and to the presence of the invading forces in Egyptian territory.” General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Eecords, Plenary Meetings, p. 348.

55 Doc. A/3302, par. 10.

56 Ibid., par. 11. Similarly, Mr. Trujillo (Ecuador) described the United Nations Emergency Force as a “new form of army, whieh is going not to fight, but simply to supervise and guarantee the effectiveness of the resolutions of the General Assembly.” General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Eecords, Plenary Meetings, p. 94.

On the other hand, the Soviet delegate seemed to have a different conception of the proposed function of the Force. He thought that Ees. 1001 “was inconsistent with the purposes for which the United Nations Charter permits the creation and use of an international force. The Charter envisaged the use of such a force to help a State victim of aggression to repel the aggressor and to defend such a State against the aggressor.”

“But the resolution 1000 (ES–I) of 5 November 1956 and the plan for its implementation, which is contained in the resolution just adopted provide for the use of an international force for quite another purpose than that of repelling aggression against Egypt. The plan provides for the introduction of the international force into Egyptian territory and the transfer of a large part of that territory, including the Suez Canal zone, to its control.

“No one can fail to see that the occupation of the Suez Canal zone by an international force really means removing the Canal from Egyptian administration—and that, as we all know, was one of the purposes of the United Kingdom and France in launching aggressive operations against Egypt.

“For these reasons, the Soviet delegation regards the proposal for the establishment by the General Assembly of an international force to be stationed on Egyptian territory, a proposal which by-passes the Security Council, as contrary to the United Nations Charter.” Idem 127.

57 As stated by the delegate of the United Kingdom, the Force “should be interpolated as a shield between Israel and Egypt.” Idem 112.

58 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 17, p . 62 (Doc. A/3572).

59 Res. 998; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Eecords, Supp. No. 1, p. 2.

60 Ibid., Plenary Meetings, pp. 70–71.

61 See the statement by the representative of EI Salvador, idem 69.

62 Idem 83.

63 Idem 87.

64 Doc. A/3302, par. 9.

65 Doe. A/3302/Add.4/Bev. 1; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Becords, pp. 23-24. See also ibid., Plenary Meetings, p. 117. Such consent need not be entirely voluntary. The Soviet Union, for instance, felt that Egypt, “the victim of aggression has been compelled to agree to the introduction of the international force, in the hope that this may prevent any further extension of hostilities.” Idem 128.

66 Doc. A/3295; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Sess., Official Becords, Annexes, Agenda Item 5, p. 17.

67 Doc. A/3375, Annex; General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Eecords, Annexes, Agenda Item 66, p. 10.

68 Doc. A/3512, par. 5(b); idem 47.

69 Idem, par. 14.

70 Idem, par. 29.

71 Idem, par. 20.

72 Res. 1125 ( X I ) ; General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 17, p . 62 (Doc. A/3572). privies

73 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Becords, Plenary Meetings, pp. 1192–1193.

74 Ibid. 1276.

75 Note, for instance, the statement by the Foreign Minister of Egypt on Nov. 27, 1956, that “this Force has gone to Egypt to help Egypt, with Egypt’s consent; and no one here or elsewhere can reasonably or fairly say that a fire brigade, after putting out a fire, would be entitled or expected to claim the right of deciding not to leave the house.” Ibid.

76 Doc. A/3563, Annex; idem, Annexes, Agenda Item 66, p. 71.

77 General Assembly, 1st Sess., 1st Pt., Official Records, Resolutions, pp. 25–30 (Doe. A/64).

78 See p. 215 above.

79 See, for instance, the Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947, between the United States and the United Nations; 11 U.N. Treaty Series 12-36; U. S. Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1676; 43 A.J.I.L. Supp. 8 (1949).

80 Doc. A/3526; General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Annexes, Agenda Item 66, pp. 52–57.

81 Res. 1126 (XI); idem, Supp. No. 17, p. 62.

82 Doc. ST/SGB/TJNEF/l.

83 Ibid., Regulation 30.

84 Ibid., Regulation 44.

85 Res. 1000; General Assembly, 1st Emergency Spec. Seas., Official Records, Supp. No. 1, p. 2.

86 Ibid. In both these respects the resolution followed a recommendation made by the Secretary General in his first report, Doe. A/3289, par. 4.

87 Doc. A/3302, par. 6.

88 Idem, par. 14. See also Doc. A/3694, pp. 4–5.

89 Doc. A/3302 and Add. 1 to 16.

90 “The United Nations Emergency Force on Duty in Egypt,” 3 U.N. Review 25–26 (February, 1957). The selection of the offers to be accepted was left by the General Assembly to the Secretary General, and no reasons were given by him for declining some of the offers. Complaints have been voiced in the press that the Egyptian Government had “vetoed” some of the offers, but no official explanations are available on the subject.

91 Doc. A/3383; General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Annexes, Agenda Item 66, pp. 13–15.

92 Doc. ST/SGB/TJNEF/1.

93 New York Times, April 11, 1957, p . 13.

94 Pearson, “Force for U.N.,” 35 Foreign Affairs 395, at 401–402 (1957).

95 Ibid. 402.

96 General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Plenary Meetings, p. 86.

97 Statement by Mr. Jamali (Iraq), Nov. 16, 1956. Idem 90.

98 Statement by Mr. Lange (Norway), Nov. 27, 1956. Idem 366. Mr. Lange pointed out, however, that “such forces would not, in the proper sense, constitute an international police”; they “might, however, be considered an international fire brigade, available for use in situations where there is reason to fear that existing international tension might result in brush fires.” Ibid.

99 Statement by Mr. Sasorith (Laos) on Nov. 29, 1956. Idem 431. See also the statement by Mr. Entezam (Iran) of the same date. Idem 437.

100 Statement of Nov. 28, 1956. Idem 401.

101 Statement of Nov. 29, 1956. Idem 417.

102 A proposal that an international force be sent to Kashmir was made in the Security Council by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States on Feb. 14, 1957. Doc. S/3787.