In all ethical discussion there is an implicit assumption that in our everyday experience we are often able to recognize, as if by direct perception, that the situation confronting us is indubitably bad or unquestionably good in an ethical sense. If, e.g., on a bright afternoon we meet a capable Scout leader with a troop of healthy-minded boys on a hiking expedition through a beautiful district, sharing with one another as they go botanical information, and all obviously happy together, we know without question that the situation, as we see it, is good. We are as certain about that fact as we are that the sun is shining and the grass green. If, however, on another occasion we witness an act of wanton cruelty perpetrated on a small boy by a bully, we immediately and indubitably see that the situation presented to us is bad. Here again we are as certain of the ethical character of what we see as we are of the fact that two people are involved in the mischief. It would be superfluous to quote illustrations to show that moral philosophers, in seeking to establish their conclusions, invariably rely on their judgment regarding the ethical character of situations such as these, the ethical character of which is so perspicuous that, to deny it would be, in Bishop Butler's phrase, “too glaring a falsity to need being confuted.”