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Structural Humility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Cruz Austin Davis
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Abstract

In this article I discuss various humility theses about individuals and intrinsic properties as discussed by authors such as David Lewis. I argue that we should accept a similar humility thesis about the world’s space-time structure regardless of which metaphysics of space-time we accept. I argue this undercuts some important motivations opting in for an ontic structural realist metaphysic.

Type
Realism and Epistemic Humility
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 860 - 870
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Benjamin Jantzen and Patrick Grafton-Cardwell for discussions that lead to the writing of this article. Many of the ideas found in this article originated in discussions I had with Ben. I am especially grateful to Phillip Bricker for his invaluable feedback and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.

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