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Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ken Gemes
Ken Gemes*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Yale University
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author. Department of Philosophy, Yale University, P.O. Box 208306, New Haven CT 06320–8306; e-mail:[email protected]
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Extract

1. Introduction. Attempts to utilize the probability calculus to prove or disprove various inductive or inductive skeptical theses are, I believe, highly problematic. Inductivism and inductive skepticism are substantive (logically consistent) philosophical positions that do not allow of merely formal proofs or disproofs. Often the problems with particular alleged formal proofs of inductive or inductive sceptical theses turn on subtle technical considerations. In the following I highlight such considerations in pointing out the flaws of two proofs, one an alleged proof of an inductive sceptical conclusion due to Karl Popper, the other an alleged proof of an inductivist thesis originally due to Harold Jeffreys and later advocated by John Earman. Surprisingly, in examining Popper's argument it is shown that certain apparently weak premises, often embraced by both inductivists and deductivists, lend themselves to inductive conclusions. However it is argued that those premises are still philosophically substantive and not amenable to a purely formal demonstration. The lesson to be learnt here is twofold. First, we need to be very careful in determining which formal theses entail, and which are entailed by, inductive skepticism and inductivism. Second, we need to take great care in laying out and examining the assumptions presumed in formal arguments directed for and against such formal theses. In a follow up article I will consider various attempts by David Stove and Karl Popper and David Miller to identify the exact content of inductive skepticism and propose a new identification based on the theory of content developed in Gemes 1994. Finally I will compare this new version with that proposed recently in Alberto Mura 1990.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 113 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Special thanks are due to a referee from this journal who pointed out serious deficiencies and errors in previous versions of this paper and to Patrick Maher who provided a similar service. I am still looking for volunteers to take the blame for any remaining errors. Research for this paper was supported by a sabbatical fellowship from Yale University.

References

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