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Does Biology Have Laws? The Experimental Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robert N. Brandon
Robert N. Brandon*
Affiliation:
Duke University
*
†Departments of Philosophy and Zoology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it as investigating contingent, rather than lawlike, regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However, this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical Positivist conception of law and its essential role in scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of scientific laws.

Type
Symposium: Are There Laws of Biology?
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue S4: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Dec., 1997 , 1997 , pp. S444 - S457
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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