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Why Selection and Drift Might Be Distinct

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

In this paper, it is argued that selection and drift might be distinct. This contradicts recent arguments by Brandon (2005) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that such a distinction “violates sound probabilistic thinking” (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 62). While their arguments might be valid under certain assumptions, they overlook a possible way to make sense of the distinction. Whether selection and drift can be thought of as causally distinct, I argue, depends on the source of probabilities in natural selection. In particular, if the probabilities used in defining fitness values are at least partly a result of abstracting from or ignoring certain features of the environment, then selection and drift might in fact be causally distinct.

Type
Natural Selection and Evolution
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Thanks to Jim Thomas, Roberta Millstein, and the members of the D.C. History and Philosophy of Biology Group, especially Lindley Darden, Eric Saidel, Ilya Farber, and Jason Baker.

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