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Unification, Deduction, and History: A Reply to Steel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Todd Jones
Todd Jones*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
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Abstract

Daniel Steel argues that a causal theory of explanation can account for Ferguson's anthropological theory of Yanomami warfare but that a unification theory of explanation cannot. I argue that a unification theory can explain such an account, in a manner similar to Hempel's view of explanation in history. I go on to argue that the unification theory allows for different explanations of specific and general social circumstances.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 65 , Issue 4 , December 1998 , pp. 672 - 681
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1998

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Philosophy Department, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89154.

‡

I would like to thank Dan Steel, Jackie Maloy, and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

References

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Steel, Daniel (1998). “Warfare and Western Manufactures: A Case Study of Explanation in Anthropology”, Philosophy of Science, this issue.CrossRefGoogle Scholar