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How Not to Detect Design—Critical Notice: William A. Dembski, The Design Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Branden Fitelson ,
Christopher Stephens  and
Elliott Sober
Branden Fitelson
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Christopher Stephens
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Elliott Sober
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Abstract

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Type
Review Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 3 , September 1999 , pp. 472 - 488
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to Elliott Sober, Philosophy Department, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706.

‡

We thank William Dembski and Philip Kitcher for comments on an earlier draft.

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