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Common-Causes are Not Common Common-Causes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Gábor Hofer-Szabó
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Technical University of Budapest
Miklós Rédei
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Eötvös University, Budapest
László E. Szabó*
Affiliation:
Theoretical Physics Research Group of HAS, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Eötvös University, Budapest
*
Contact address: History and Philosophy of Science, Eötvös University, H-1518 Budapest Pf. 32, Hungary; [email protected]

Abstract

A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events, probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Work supported by OTKA (contract numbers: T032771, T024841, T035234, T 025880 and TS 04089).

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