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Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2004

Michael C. Munger
Affiliation:
Duke University

Extract

Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice. By Phillip J. Nelson and Kenneth V. Greene. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 261p. $55.00.

Are people good? Can they be? Is goodness intentional, or consequential? One way to think of goodness derives from Adam Smith's baker, whose selfishness drives him to bake good, cheap bread. If “good” institutions are enough, we can design mechanisms (with markets being one, but only one archetype) where the collective consequences of self-interest are not harmful. In politics, this invisible hand is the focus of Federalist #51: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”

Type
BOOK REVIEWS: AMERICAN POLITICS
Copyright
© 2004 American Political Science Association

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