A long-standing debate in the field of international relations concerns the relationship between power and conflict. While balance of power (BOP) theorists view parity as a condition preserving peace, power transition (PT) theorists argue that parity (and transitions) between the dominant (global or regional) power and a dissatisfied challenger make war more likely. Kelly Kadera asserts that empirical evidence on whether parity is peaceful or dangerous is quite mixed. She attempts to reconcile these seemingly disparate theories by developing a dynamic model of power and conflict. She argues that the empirical puzzle stemming from the BOP-PT debate can be resolved by “defining three types of power distribution: approximate parity, a decisive advantage, and overwhelming preponderance” (p. 81). She develops a series of dynamic models that apply under each of these conditions. The key variables in each model are a state's power and the conflict it sends and receives from its rival. She assumes that 1) a state's power is generated by a dynamic process (capturing internal growth); 2) a state's power is negatively affected by the conflict a rival directs against it; and 3) more powerful states are able to direct increasing amounts of conflict toward their rivals.