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Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2004

Laura Langer
Affiliation:
University of Arizona

Extract

Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts. By Scott A. Comparato. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 192p. $64.95.

There is a plethora of studies examining whether or not judges engage in strategic behavior, yet many important questions remain about the motivations that encourage judges to behave strategically and how institutional rules shape these motivations. In his book, Scott A. Comparato asks whether institutional rules encourage strategic behavior by state supreme courts, litigants, and amici participants. His work is motivated by the idea that information provided by interest groups in amicus briefs is an important reference point for state supreme court justices.

Type
BOOK REVIEWS: AMERICAN POLITICS
Copyright
© 2004 American Political Science Association

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