1. ‘The function of a boundary between States is the attribution of territory, and, accordingly, a frontier regime is closely connected with questions of territorial extent and sovereignty: the precise limits to the exercise of territorial sovereignty can only be determined by knowledge of the location of the alignments enclosing a State on all relevant sides’: Kaikobad, K.H., ‘Some Observations on the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of Boundaries’, 54 BYIL (1983) p. 119Google Scholar. Of course this definition may not cover all circumstances. One restriction upon the definition is that the effective jurisdiction of a State may be reduced by the actual control over part of its territory by another power, such as an internal opposition group or a foreign army. While the effective jurisdiction does not reach to the State frontier, the frontier continues to exist. An example of this is the situation of Angola, where large areas of territory, controlled by UNITA, are outside the effective control of the Government. That country's borders are not regarded as thereby altered. In addition, the definition may not fit all situations – the frontier may not be clearly established in the sense of exercise of sovereignty, and it may be necessary to establish who has sovereignty where a dispute exists; Max Huber's views, as expressed in the Island of Palmas case (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2 RIAA 829) are of great importance:

‘If, however, no conventional line of sufficient topographical precision exists or if there are gaps in the frontiers otherwise established, or if a conventional line leaves room for doubt, or if … the question arises whether a title is valid erga omnes, the actual continuous and peaceful display of State functions is in case of dispute the sound and natural criterion of territorial sovereignty’. Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 3rd edn. (1979) at pp. 127–128Google Scholar expresses a further modification of the idea of frontiers limiting sovereignty, in the sense that the frontier may carry out this function, even though it is not accepted by all relevant States as the frontier.

2. Declaration of 5 June 1945 Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany: CMND 1552, Doc. No. 7, p. 38.

3. CMND 1552, Doc. No. 1, p. 27.

4. The Morgenthau Plan of 6 September 1944 provided, inter alia, for the conversion of defeated Germany into an agrarian State, and proposed the division of Germany.

5. House of Commons Debates, Vol. 467, col. 1597–1598 (21 07 1949)Google Scholar. Sir Winston Churchill: ‘… the Morgenthau Agreement… was initiated by President Roosevelt and by me, and it undoubtedly proposed treatment of Germany which was a harsh treatment, in respect of largely limiting her to being an agricultural country. But that was not a decision taken over the heads of the Cabinet. It was not one that ever reached Cabinet. It never reached the Cabinet because it was only ad referendum; it was disapproved by the State Department on the one hand and by my right Hon. Friend and the Foreign Office Committee on the other, and it just dropped on one side. I must say that it never required a Cabinet negative; it never had any validity of any sort or kind. Nevertheless I must say that I do not agree with this paper, for which I nonetheless bear a responsibility. I do not agree with it, but I can only say that when fighting for life in a fierce struggle with an enemy I feel quite differently towards him than when that enemy is beaten to the ground and is suing for mercy’

Further, it has been suggested in Hubatsch, W., ed., The German Question (1967) at p. 19Google Scholar. that the Morgenthau Plan could be seen in many of its aspects in the directive of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Forces of occupation regarding the Military Government of Germany (JCS1067, Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945–1954, p. 13).

6. Documents on British Policy Overseas (1984), Series 1, Vol. 1, 1945, Doc. No. 603.

7. Part II, A.9(iv).

8. Potsdam Protocol, Part II, A.l.

9. CMND 1552, Doc. No. 2, p. 29; CMND 1552, Doc. No. 4, p. 34 – The Yalta Agreement, where it was agreed that a zone of occupation be allotted to France.

10. CMND 1552, Doc. No. 12, p. 45.

11. [1946] 1 All ER 635.

12. This was the policy known as the Hallstein Doctrine.

13. Extract from Policy Statement by Brandt, to the Bundestag, 28 10 1969Google Scholar; CMND 6201, Doc No. 104, p. 204.

14. The Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community, was signed in 1957. The FRG is one of the original six Member States.

15. Treaties establishing the European Communities, pp. 429–431. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1973).

16. EEC Treaty, Art. 239.

17. Protocol on German Internal Trade, Para. 1.

18. It is necessary to distinguish here between common borders of EEC Member States, which were for purposes of EEC trade, especially in the form of free movement of goods and persons, modified by the Treaty of Rome, and borders between Member States and non-member States. It is in the context of treatment of borders with regard to non-member States that the GDR-FRG border is considered.

19. The FRG legislation includes many cases of provision for GDR citizens as if they were not foreigners, such as the FRG law on citizenship.

20. Norddeutsches Vieh-Und Vleischkontor GMBH v. Hauptzollamt-Ausfuhrer-stattung, Hamburg-Jonas, , (Swine Bellies case), No. 14/74, 1974 ECJ Rep. 899Google Scholar.

21. During the ratification procedure of the GDR-FRG Basic Treaty, the Federal Government insisted that the two States were not foreign to each other. This view is not shared by the GDR.

22. Supra n. 20, at p. 913.

23. This policy was developed to the extent of weather forecasts for ‘East Prussia’ being broadcast.

24. The citizenship law in force in the Federal Republic is the citizenship law of 1913. Thus, reference is not made as such to the FRG and GDR. The law has been much amended, especially during and after the Hitler dictatorship, but has the effect of creating one German citizenship, which applies to Germans born in the GDR as well as the FRG.

25. ‘…a new border fence [is] being erected behind the old one which experts say is virtually impossible to scale. The 10ft. high electrically charged barricade is set back some 500 yards from the main fence and consists of metal railings with razor-sharp edges designed to cut the hands of anyone attempting to climb it …’: The Times (28 March 1984), ‘E. Germany Builds Electric Fence’.

26. Doeker, G. and Bruckner, J.A., The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in International Relations, Vol. I (1979) at p. 371Google Scholar.

27. 9 ILM (1970) pp. 1026–1027.

28. Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation between the USSR and the GDR, 12 June 1964, Art. 4, CMND 6201, Doc. No. 46, p. 107.

29. Declaration on European Peace and Security issued at the Karlovy Vary Communist Conference, 26 April 1967.

30. Letter concerning German Reunification from the West German Foreign Minister to the Soviet Foreign Minister, 12 August 1970, CMND 6201, No. 125: ‘…dieser Vertrag nicht im Widerspruch zu dem politischen Ziel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland steht, aufeinen Zustand des Friedens in Europa hinzuwirken, in dem das deutsche Volk infreier Selbstbestimmung seine Einheit wiedererlängt’. In Verdross, A. et al. , Territoriale Souveränität und Gebietshoheit. Zur völkerrechtlichen Lage der Oder-Neisse-Gebiete (Territorial Sovereignty and Gebietshoheit. On the International Legal Status of the Oder-Neisse Territories) (1980) at p. 127Google Scholar.

31. Frowein, J.A., ‘Legal Problems of the German Ostpolitik’, 23 ICLQ (1974) p. 105 at p. 114CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32. See section 2 and n. 13, supra.

33. Frowein, , loc cit. n. 31, p. 115Google Scholar. suggests as a precedent the relationship between the UK and Ireland. However, there are legal differences in the manner in which Ireland came into existence as a separate State, in comparison with the GDR and FRG.

34. 12 ILM (1973) p. 16 (English text)Google Scholar; 1 BGB (1973) II, p. 423 (German text)Google Scholar.

35. ‘Sie bekräftigen die Unverletzlichkeit der zvrischen ihnen bestehenden Grenze jetzt und in der Zukunft und verpflichten sich zur uneingeschränkten Achtung ihrer territorialen Integrität’.

There also exists a Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty, Part I of which also refers to the parties' common border. However, this deals with practical details, including the marking of the border, the drawing up of necessary documentation on the course of the frontier and the regulation of other problems connected with the course of the frontier.

36. See section 3, supra.

37. The Moscow Treaty was ratified on 17 May 1972. The Grundvertrag was initialled on 8 November 1972, signed on 21 December 1972, and ratified on 20 June 1973.

38. The treaties are:

(a) Agreement between the Government of the FRG and the Government of the GDR on Transit Traffic of Civilian Persons and Goods between the FRG and Berlin (West), 17 December 1972

(b) Treaty between the FRG and the GDR on Traffic Questions, 26 May 1972.

39. ‘The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any State, municipal or local government or authority …’ See n. 2 supra.

40. See n. 6, supra.

41. ‘Applications of Bavarian State Government and Federal German Government’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrtft (1973) p. 1539. 70 AJIL (1976) p. 147 (English summary with quotations)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; 78 ILR (1988) p. 149Google Scholar.

42. ‘In effect, Bavaria was challenging the Treaty itself. Attacks against international treaties were nothing new to the Federal Constitutional Court. When still an opposition party, the Social Democrats had also used law suits as a legal vehicle against treaties they opposed politically’. Geek, W.K., ‘Germany and Contemporary International Law’, 9 Texas Int. LJ (1974) p. 263 at p. 273Google Scholar.

43. Statute of the Constitutional Court – Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, s. 31. There may be some general limits on the binding effect of the decisions of the Constitutional Court – the wording certainly has binding effect (i.e., the tenor of the decisions), but the reasoning probably does not. This may be affected by any particular importance attached by the Court to its reasoning, such as in the present case. See Geek, , loc cit. n. 42, at p. 275Google Scholar.

44. See n. 41 supra, 70 AJIL (1976) p. 147, at p. 152CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. See n. 41 supra, at p. 153.

46. For example, the Warsaw Treaty, Art. 1(2), in which the FRG and Poland undertake an beobligation and express opinions identical to Art. 3 of the Grundvertrag. There was much opposition to the ratification of the Warsaw Treaty, but the Oder-Neisse Line has not as yet been compared realistically to a Land frontier, such as exists within the Federal Republic.

47. Gelberg, L., ‘The Case of the Treaty Concerning the Bases of Relations between the GDR and the FRG. (Remarks on the Judgment Pronounced by the Federal Constitutional Court on July 31, 1973)’, 15 Polish Western Affairs (1974) p. 259 at p. 267Google Scholar.

48. See n. 41 supra, at p. 153.

49. One leading West German commentator rightly points out:

‘The Treaty on the Basis of Relations is a relatively complicated document of international law; it does not only cause considerable difficulties in interpretation by its verbal compromises, its “agreements not to agree”, its deletions and various interpretation instruments, but also reflects the exceptional character of the legal situation of Germany in nearly every provision’. Ress, G., Die Reehtslage Deutschlands nach dem Grundlagenvertrag vom 21 Dezember 1972 (The Legal Status of Germany after the Basic Treaty of 21 December 1972) (1978) at p. 390Google Scholar.

50. See n. 41 supra, at p. 153.

51. See section 5, supra.

52. See n. 26 supra.

53. Excerpt from a speech delivered by Honecker at the VIII SED Party Congress on 15 June 1971, CMND 6201, Doc. No. 135, p. 235.

54. See n. 35 supra.

55. ‘One of the fundamental principles of international law is the principle of territorial integrity, i.e., territorial inviolability. Territorial integrity is a state conception denoting inviolability of the status of territorial possession’. Wiewióra, B., The Polish German Frontier in the Light of International Law (1964) at p. 46Google Scholar.

56. ‘The Socialist doctrine has raised territorial integrity to the rank of a fundamental principle of contemporary international law’. Ibid., at p. 48.

57. Brownlie, , op. cit. n. 1, at p. 513Google Scholar.

58. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 1970. GA Res. 2625 (XXV). Adopted without a vote.

59. See n. 42 supra, at p. 272.

60. Ibid.

61. ‘Wenn die Grenze zur DDR weiterhin als innerdeutsche Grenze bezeichnet wird, so darf man sich doch nicht darüber im unklaren sein, dass diese Grenze auch eindeutig eine völker-rechtliche Qualität hat’ Frowein, J.A., ‘Die deutschen Grenzen in völkerrechtlicher Sicht’ (The German Frontiers in light of International Law), 34 Europa-Archiv (1979) part 1, p. 591, at p. 596Google Scholar.

62. ‘Die Grenze zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik ist eine völkerrechtliche Grenze zwischen zwei unabhängigen Völkerrechtssubjekten…’

63. ‘Der Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR (Grundvertrag) vom 21 Dezember 1972 ist der umstrittenste alter Ostverträge…’ Blumenwitz, D., Was ist Deutschland? Staats-und völkerrechtliche Grundsätze zur deutschen Frage und ihre Konsequenzen für die deutsche Ostpolitik (What is Germany? Municipal and International Law Principles on the German Question and their Consequences for the German Ostpolitik) (1982) at p. 38Google Scholar.

64. ‘Wichstigtes Ziel der DDR in Rahmen des Entspannungs – und Normalisierungsprozesses war ihr UNO-Beitritt…’ Ibid at p. 39.

65. ‘…so blieben nunmehr gegenüber der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nur noch zwei wichtigere Ziele ihrer Westpolitik offen: Erstens die vorbehaltlose volkerrechtliche Anerkennung ihrer souveranen Staatlichkeit, und das mit allen Konsequenzen z B für die Grenzen, das Staats-angehörigkeitsrecht, die Wiedervereinigungspolitik; zweitens die Aufhebung der Blockade ihrer Aussenbeziehungen, multilateral in den internationalen Organisationen und bilateral bei den westlish orientieren oder neutralen Ländern…’ Zündorf, B., Die Ostverträge (The Eastern Treaties) (1979) at p. 211Google Scholar.

66. ‘Die Ostverträge und die KSZE-Schlussakte enthalten keine Garantie der Grenzen in Mitteleuropa. Insbesondere gibt es fur die beiden deutschen Staaten kein Anschlussverbot…’ Blumenwitz, , op. cit. n. 63, at p. 43Google Scholar.

67. Guiding principle I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty ‘…They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement…’

68. Extract from statement to the Bundestag on 13 December 1966, CMND 6201, Doc No. 68, p. 149.

69. ‘Gerade weil der Satz pacta sunt servanda so wichtig ist und weil wir uns im Sinne der Prdambel des Warschauer Vertrages bewusst sind – ich habe das vor wenigen Tagen noch einmal in dent Brief an den Kollegen Hupka auch deutlich gemacht – dass die Unverletzlichkeit der Grenzen und die Achtung der terhtorialen Integrität und der Souveränität aller Staaten in Europa in ihren gegenwartigen Grenzen eine grundlegende Bedingung für den Frieden sind, gerade deshalb stehen wirzu den in diesem Vertrag getroffenen Vereinbarungen, undzwarin vollem Umfang’. Das Parlament, 16/23 02 1985, Nos. 7–8, p. 11Google Scholar.

70. ‘…ob die DDR und die Bundesrepublik zueinander Grenzen haben, die denen aller Staaten in Europa in ihrer rechtlichen Qualität gleichgestellt werden konnen, erscheint, nicht nur im Lichte des Urteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, welches von einer staatsrechtlichen Grenze zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR ausgeht, zumindest fragwürdig’. (n. 49 supra, at p. 78).

71. ‘Diese Gleichstellung der Grenze zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR, die mit dieser Einleitungsklausel in Grundlagenvertrag, mit den Grenzen alter Staaten in Europa ausgesprochen ist, legt die Auslegung nahe, dass auch die Grenze zwichen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR (und nicht nur die Grenze beider Staaten zu Drittstaaten) als eine volkerrechtliche Grenze anzusehen ist’. Ibid.

72. ‘Dieser Satz der Präambel bekräftigt damit den Willen der Parteien, die zwischen ihnen bestehende, auf besatzungsrechtliche Akte zurückgehende Demarkationslinie als Staatsgrenze zu betrachten’. Ibid.

73. ‘…ausgehend von den historischen Gegebenheiten und unbeschadet der unterschiedlichen Auffassungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zu grundsätzlichen Fragen, darunter zur nationalen Frage…’.

74. Ress, , op. cit. n. 49, at p. 74Google Scholar.

75. Art. 4 of the Moscow Treaty.

76. For example, the Soviet Union maintains military missions in each of the Western sectors of Germany and regularly carries out military patrols there. This function is based upon its status as one of the four powers. Moreover, the Soviet Union permits the existence of military missions of the Western Powers, and military patrols, in the GDR. This is also a manifestation of the four power status of Germany.

The role of these missions was highlighted in 1985 with the shooting by Soviet forces of a US officer in the GDR. See The Times (26 March 1985), ‘Reagan Protests to Russians over US Major's Death’; ‘First Death after 39 Years of Incidents with Soviet Soldiers’; ‘Counting the Missions'Cos’.