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FIAT IUSTITIA, PEREAT MUNDUS: IMMANUEL KANT, FRIEDRICH GENTZ, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PRUDENTIAL ENLIGHTENMENT*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 April 2015
Abstract
Since the early twentieth century, historians of political thought have read Immanuel Kant's interventions into debates over the French Revolution—his essay on “Theory and Practice” (1795), and his tract on Perpetual Peace (1793)—against Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Kant is said to have upheld the sovereignty of pure reason for political practice, over and against Burke's stubborn traditionalism. What this dichotomy ignores, however, is that Kant's first public comments on the Revolution were directed not against Burke's Reflections, but against a heavily edited German version of the text published in 1793 by Kant's former student, Friedrich Gentz (1764–1832). The central thrust of Gentz's translation was that while Kant's normative theory of politics was admirable, it needed to be complemented with a prudential grasp of statecraft in order to be made practicable. Without prudence, the rights of man would remain an empty ideal. In responding to Gentz, Kant entered into a debate over whether philosophical reason and political prudence are mutually compatible. His dogmatic refusal to endorse such an alliance, even in the face of the Terror, places his political thought in an unfavourable light.
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Footnotes
I am grateful to Richard Bourke, Christopher Meckstroth, Isaac Nakhimovsky, Joachim Whaley and the two anonymous referees of Modern Intellectual History for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
References
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12 Ibid., 255. The poles of Wittichen's “antagonism” between Kantian reason and tradition were captured in the title of Friedrich Meinecke's widely read Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat (Munich, 1908).
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17 Gentz, Betrachtungen, 1: 89.
18 Ibid., 1: 89–90, 95.
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28 Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 6: 29.
29 Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?”, Berlinische Monatsschrift, 12 (Dec. 1784), 481–94; repr. in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 8: 35–42.
30 Ibid., 8: 36.
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33 In 1790 Gentz told Garve that he was reading the Wealth of Nations “for a third time”; see Gentz to Garve, 5 Dec. 1790, in Wittichen, Briefe von und an Gentz, 1: 181.
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36 Ibid., 6: 9–10.
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38 Ibid.
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41 According to Gentz, Burke's critique of rationalism belied a “lack of secure first principles”; see Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 6: 114–15.
42 Burke, Reflections, 221.
43 Gentz, Betrachtungen, 1: 89, 93.
44 Ibid., 1: 92–3, 95. Gentz may have borrowed this image from Kant; see Immanuel Kant, Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren? (1786), in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 8: 133–47, at 135.
45 Ibid., 1: 93.
46 Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 6: 182.
47 Ibid., 6: 66.
48 Ibid., 6: 181. Though Gentz did not cite Kant, there was precedent in Kant's corpus. In his Grundlegung für Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant defined “anthropology” as a series of practical investigations into one's phenomenal circumstances, and argued that it was a prerequisite for making morality “effective in concreto in the conduct of one's life”; see Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 4: 387–463, at 388–9. Kant would later echo this sentiment in his Metaphysik der Sitten of 1797, claiming that “morality requires anthropology for its application to human beings”; see Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 6: 205–493, at 412.
49 For Gentz on America see Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 6: 90–98.
50 Ibid., 6: 144.
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57 See, for instance, Gentz to Garve, 8 Oct. 1784, in Wittichen, Briefe von und an Gentz, 1: 140–41.
58 See Gentz to Garve, 5 Dec. 1790, in ibid., 1: 182.
59 See Johann Biester to Kant, 4 March 1794, and Kiesewetter to Kant, 25 Nov. 1798, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 11: 490 and 12: 266.
60 In 1792, the censor had reprimanded Kant for the heterodoxy of his Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, and forbade him from printing sections of it in the Monatsschrift; see Biester to Kant, 18 June 1792, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 8: 329–33.
61 Kant, “Theorie und Praxis,” 273, translation mine.
62 Ibid., 275–6, translation mine.
63 Ibid., 275, italics in original.
64 Ibid., 276.
65 Ibid., 289. Kant's notes to this section of his essay suggest that he wrote it in mid-1793; that is, after the publication of Gentz's Reflections. See Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 23: 125–44.
66 Ibid., 290. Because Kant asserted these rights rather than deducing them from his more basic metaphysical commitments, there exists a long-standing interpretive debate about the relation between political freedom and moral autonomy in his thought. In this context, it is perhaps helpful to note that Gentz provided a Kantian derivation of political right from “the pure concept of humanity” in an article printed in the Monatsschrift in 1791, entitled “Über den Ursprung und die obersten Prinzipien des Rechts.” This might explain why Kant was content to assert his preferred catalogue of rights in “Theory and Practice,” rather than making their theoretical grounding explicit. For Gentz's essay see Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 8: 7–33; see also Green, “Gentz's Reflections,” 645–8.
67 Kant, “Theorie und Praxis,” 290–92, 295.
68 Ibid., 297–8.
69 Garve's charge was that Kant's rationalism is not able to inspire moral conduct in practice, since all human action assumes a eudemonistic idea of moral flourishing. In his response (ibid., 279–80), Kant argued that in the moment that the will acknowledges the sovereignty of moral duty, it postulates a conceptual end a priori (which it then pursues, of necessity). This response to Garve might therefore be read as a tacit rejection of Gentz's claim that in the pursuit of just ends, human actors often resort to immoral means. Insofar as one truly submits to the authority of reason, Kant argued, moral action will follow in due course.
70 Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 344.
71 Kant, “Theorie und Praxis,” 277.
72 Kant had been making this argument consistently since the mid-1780s against the natural law resistance theory of Gottfried Achenwall: see Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 27: 1319–94. For an interpretation of Kant's politics that places central emphasis on it see Waldron, Jeremy, “Kant's Legal Positivism,” Harvard Law Review, 109 (1996), 1535–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
73 Kant, “Theorie und Praxis,” 299.
74 See Gentz, “Über die Moralität in den Staatsrevolutionen,” in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 6: 74–100.
75 Kant, “Theorie und Praxis,” 301.
76 Ibid., 303.
77 Ibid., 285, 301–2.
78 Friedrich Gentz, “Nachtrag zu den Räsonnement des Herrn Professor Kant über das Verhältnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis,” Berlinische Monatsschrift, 22 (Dec. 1793), 518–54; repr. in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 7: 35–72.
79 Gentz, “Nachtrag,” in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 35–6.
80 Kant, “Theorie und Praxis,” 273.
81 Gentz, “Nachtrag,” in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 37.
82 Ibid., 36, 43.
83 Ibid., 57.
84 Ibid., 56.
85 Ibid., 57–8, emphasis mine.
86 Ibid., 54–5.
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91 Gentz, Mallet du Pan über die französische Revolution, 272.
92 Mallet du Pan, Considérations, 63.
93 See Johann Biester to Kant, 4 March 1794, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 9: 490–92.
94 See Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 353; for discussion see below.
95 For Kant's other interlocutors see Maliks, Kant's Politics, passim.
96 Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 349–50, translation mine.
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98 Ibid., 372.
99 Ibid., 372, 374.
100 Gentz, “Nachtrag,” in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 53.
101 Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 370, translation mine.
102 Ibid., 374, translation mine.
103 Ibid., 378.
104 Ibid., 353, translation mine.
105 Ibid., 378. Kant's slogan does not have ancient roots; Manlius's Loci Communes (1563) cites it as the motto of the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I (r. 1558–64), which seems the likely antecedent for Kant's usage.
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107 Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 378, translation mine. Kant had other reasons for trusting that his principles would ultimately lead to a more just world; these include his rational theology, his belief in historical progress, and his account of the “unsocial sociability” inherent in human nature.
108 Gentz, “Nachtrag,” in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 66–7.
109 Fichte, J. G., “Über Machiavelli als Schriftsteller” (1807), in Fichte, Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 42 vols. (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt, 1962–2012), 9: 245 Google Scholar. For Fichte's own attempt to harmonize the principles of right with the harsh realities of eighteenth-century power politics see Nakhimovsky, Isaac, The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte (Princeton, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
110 Arendt, Hannah, “Friedrich von Gentz: Zu seinem 100. Todestag am 9. Juni,” Kölnische Zeitung, 8 June 1932 Google Scholar; repr. in Arendt, , Reflections on Literature and Culture, ed. Gottlieb, Susannah (Stanford, CA, 2007), 31–7Google Scholar; Schmitt, Carl, Politische Romantik (1919), trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, MA, 1986)Google Scholar.
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