Little information exists regarding the performance of Spanish-speaking versus English-speaking patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) on the Mini-Mental State Examination and the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale. In an attempt to identify culturally biased MMSE items or DRS subscales, we matched Spanish-speaking Hispanic and English-speaking non-Hispanic White community-dwelling AD patients by their MMSE scores and examined specific items within each scale. Our findings indicate that Hispanic AD patients perform significantly worse than non-Hispanics in terms of total DRS score, scores on the DRS subscales for Conceptualization and Memory, and on serial subtraction (or backward spelling item) of the MMSE. While mildly to moderately demented Hispanic and non-Hispanic patients obtained comparable scores on the DRS, severely impaired Spanish-speaking participants obtained considerably lower DRS scores than their English-speaking counterparts. The discrepancy in the DRS scores of the severely impaired Hispanic and non-Hispanic examinees might reflect a cultural bias in the test or educational differences between the groups. Alternatively, the DRS may be more sensitive than the MMSE for detecting severe cognitive impairment in Hispanic patients. (JINS, 1999, 5, 301–307.)

Patterns of brain activation associated with covert performance of the Stroop Color–Word task were studied in young, healthy, adult volunteers using blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Comparisons of the incongruous Stroop condition were made with both color naming and word reading baselines. Areas of the left and right anterior cingulate, the right precuneus, and the left pars opercularis displayed larger BOLD signal responses during the incongruous Stroop condition than during baseline conditions. Activation of BOLD signals in these areas was highly repeatable. In a second experiment, pupil diameter was used to assess cognitive load in 7 individuals studied during overt and covert performance of both Stroop and color naming conditions. Cognitive load was similar in overt and covert response conditions. Results from the BOLD study indicate that brain regions participating in selective visual attention and in the selection of motor programs involved in speech were activated more by the Stroop task than by the baseline tasks. The neural substrate involved in the resolution of the perceptual and motor conflicts elicited by the Stroop Color–Word task does not appear to be a single brain region. Rather, a network of brain regions is implicated, with separate regions within this system supporting distinct functions. (JINS, 1999, 5, 308–319.)

In the present study a sequential tapping task was used to compare the planning and execution of finger tapping sequences in children with motor coordination problems (clumsy children) and control children. Fifteen children with significant movement problems were compared to 15 control children matched on age, sex, and Verbal IQ. The clumsy children took significantly longer to initiate the movement sequence (i.e., reaction time). During the execution of the sequence, the clumsy children left their finger on the tap plate for significantly longer for each tap than the control children. No significant differences were found between the groups for the time taken between the taps, or mean average force. Past research has indicated that the source of timing problems in clumsy children may lie in a central timing mechanism possibly the cerebellum, whereas the evidence from the present study indicates an impairment of the peripheral processes may be a more important contributor to timing deficits in clumsy children. (JINS, 1999, 5, 320–329.)

Identification deficits in dementia of the Alzheimer Type (DAT) often target specific classes of objects, sparing others. Using line drawings to uncover the etiology of such category-specific deficits may be untenable because the underlying shape primitives used to differentiate one line drawing from another are unspecified, and object form is yoked to object meaning. We used computer generated stimuli with empirically specifiable properties in a paradigm that decoupled form and meaning. In Experiment 1 visually similar or distinct blobs were paired with semantically close or disparate labels, and participants attempted to learn these pairings. By having the same blobs stand for semantically close and disparate objects and looking at shape–label confusion rates for each type of set, form and meaning were independently assessed. Overall, visual similarity of shapes and semantic similarity of labels each exacerbated object confusions. For controls, the effects were small but significant. For DAT patients more substantial visual and semantic proximity effects were obtained. Experiment 2 demonstrated that even small changes in semantic proximity could effect significant changes in DAT task performance. Labeling 3 blobs with “lion,” “tiger,” and “leopard” significantly elevated DAT confusion rates compared to exactly the same blobs labeled with “lion,” “tiger,” and “zebra.” In conclusion both visual similarity and semantic proximity contributed to the identification errors of DAT patients. (JINS, 1999, 5, 330–345.)

Test–retest reliabilities and practice effects of a broad range of neuropsychological measures were examined in 384 normal or neurologically stable adults. Median test–retest interval was 11 months (range 3–16 months). The reliability estimates for most of the measures are reasonably good, ranging from .70 to low .90s. An exception is the relatively poor reliabilities of most memory measures. For all test measures, the value on initial testing is a strong determinant of the value on the second examination. Practice effects are seen on most measures. The magnitude of the practice effects, however, varies as a function of type of measure, test–retest interval, age, and overall competency level of the participant. This study provides several types of retest information that may be useful for future research and clinical work: comparative reliabilities of the various measures, estimate of error variability associated with each administration, standard deviation of the change, and comparative magnitude of practice effects on various tests. (JINS, 1999, 5, 346–356.)

A major use of neuropsychological assessment is to measure changes in functioning over time; that is, to determine whether a difference in test performance indicates a real change in the individual or just chance variation. Using 7 illustrative test measures and retest data from 384 neurologically stable adults, this paper compares different methods of predicting retest scores, and of determining whether observed changes in performance are unusual. The methods include the Reliable Change Index, with and without correction for practice effect, and models based upon simple and multiple regression. For all test variables, the most powerful predictor of follow-up performance was initial performance. Adding demographic variables and overall neuropsychological competence at baseline significantly but slightly improved prediction of all follow-up scores. The simple Reliable Change Index without correction for practice performed least well, with high error rates and large prediction intervals (confidence intervals). Overall prediction accuracy was similar for the other three methods; however, different models produce large differences in predicted scores for some individuals, especially those with extremes of initial test performance, overall competency, or demographics. All 5 measures from the Halstead–Reitan Battery had residual (observed − predicted score) variability that increased with poorer initial performance. Two variables showed significant nonnormality in the distribution of residuals. For accurate prediction with smallest prediction–confidence intervals, we recommend multiple regression models with attention to differential variability and nonnormality of residuals. (JINS, 1999, 5, 357–369.)

Within the first pages, the authors focus their scholarly energies on verbal, spatial, and mathematical abilities because, we are told, researchers typically have searched for individual differences within such test domains. All four authors provide highly readable 30-page chapters, each taking a variation on the same perspective, i.e., that whatever cognitive differences you thought had been demonstrated between males and females should not be considered biological because (1) cognitive abilities cannot be defined; (2) narrative and meta-analytical reviews have serious limitations as did the research designs of the original studies, and (3) experience, training, expectations, attitudes, preferences, power, status, and domination can influence scores on tests. Knowing the premise in advance sets the reader looking for tight logic and empirical support in favor of the sociopolitical model. Over the past 20 years we all have been subjected to media hype surrounding any claim of biological explanations for sex differences in cognition.

The following is a correction for a printing error that occurred in the Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, Vol. 5, No. 2. The error occurred at Poster Session 1, in the section titled “Subcortical Pathologies.” The abstract in question, by E.H.F. De Haan et al., appeared on page 95 at the top of the right column.

Aaron Smith died on June 13, 1998. He was a past president and founding member of the International Neuropsychological Society, Charter Member and Diplomate of the American Board of Clinical Neuropsychology, Editor of the International Journal of Neuroscience and Professor Emeritus of the University of Michigan. He also developed the Symbol Digit Modalities Test and the Michigan Neuropsychological Battery. In both cases he employed a rationale which permitted differentiation of impairments in higher cognitive functions that the tests were designed to measure from deficits in lower sensory input and motor output modalities which were required to carry out the tests.