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Response time and click position: cheap indicators of preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Fadong Chen  and
Urs Fischbacher
Fadong Chen*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Universitätsstr. 10, 78457 Konstanz, Germany Thurgau Institute of Economics, Hauptstr. 90, 8280 Kreuzlingen, Switzerland Graduate School of Decision Science, University of Konstanz, Universitätsstr. 10, 78457 Konstanz, Germany
Urs Fischbacher*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Universitätsstr. 10, 78457 Konstanz, Germany Thurgau Institute of Economics, Hauptstr. 90, 8280 Kreuzlingen, Switzerland
*
[email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper investigates how process data like response time and click position relates to economic decisions. We use a social value orientation experiment, which can be considered as a prototypical multi-attribute decision problem. We find that in the social value orientation task more individualistic subjects have shorter response times than prosocial subjects. Individualistic subjects click more often on their own payoffs than on the others’ payoffs, and they click more often on their own payoffs than prosocial subjects. Moreover, the response time information and the click position information are complementary in explaining subjects’ preferences. These results show that response times and click positions can be used as indicators of people’s preferences.

Keywords

Click positionResponse timeSocial preferencesExperiment

JEL classification

D87: Neuroeconomics C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , November 2016 , pp. 109 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2016

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-016-0026-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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