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Hard Choices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2017

RUTH CHANG
RUTH CHANG*
Affiliation:
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, NEW [email protected]
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Abstract:

What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what it is to be a rational agent.

Keywords

parityhard choicesincommensurabilityincomparabilitypractical reasonchoicecommitmentHybrid Voluntarismagencyrationalityself
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , Spring 2017 , pp. 1 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2017 

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